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ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN POLITICS AND KINDRED SUBJECTS

By the Same Author

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ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN POLITICS AND KINDRED SUBJECTS

BY

WILLIAM TEMPLE

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PREFACE

Most of the Essays contained in this volume originally appeared in *The Pilgrim*, a Quarterly Review of Christian Politics and Religion. It was in the early summer of 1920 that Mr R. G. Longman approached me with the suggestion that I should edit such a periodical to be published by his firm. I gladly consented, and the first issue appeared in the October of that year. I was then a Canon of Westminster. Before the second issue was published I had been appointed Bishop of Manchester. But though this inevitably reduced the time available for editorial activities, Mr Longman asked me to hold on. The magazine continued to appear for six and a half years; but it failed to secure any real volume of support, and with the issue of January 1927 its career ended. Its aim had been to present a Christian view of the various questions of the day, not with any suggestion that no Christian could properly hold any view, but as illustrating the conclusions reached by various minds which agreed in testing their judgments by the touchstone of Christian principle.

It was part of the scheme that the Editor should contribute an article to every number. Several of these dealt with passing events, and such interest as they may ever have had has long ago evaporated. But some dealt with matters of more permanent interest, and it is a selection of these which is here reprinted, with a few trifling alterations.

I have added an Essay on "Democracy," which formed

UNITED THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
MAR 31 1958

one of the series of *Present Day Papers* published under the auspices of "Copec," and I am grateful to the Editor of that series for his permission to include it.

This is followed by four of the six Presidential Addresses which I have had the honour to deliver to the Diocesan Conference of the undivided diocese of Manchester. These may be regarded as completing a series, for the first address was mainly concerned with my impressions of the problem of the Church in this part of the country and had therefore only a personal, local, and ephemeral interest, while another has already been published in substance in the book *Personal Religion and the Life of Fellowship*. With regard to the last of these addresses, I wish to say that the whole course of it was determined before I read an address on the same subject by the Bishop of Durham, published in *The Bishoprick*, and I was delighted to find how close was our agreement. But I read his address before delivering my own, and have little doubt that his eloquence affected some of the expressions that I used, though I am not conscious of having actually borrowed any phrases from him.

One other address I have included—a sermon preached before the University of Cambridge in February 1927.

So far as the Essays and Addresses here published have any unifying principle, it is to be found in an effort conscious and constant, however ineffective, to consider the subject under review in the light of fundamental Christian principles; and they are republished in the hope that, so far as they have any influence, it may be as a stimulus to the same effort in those who read them.

W. M.

March, 1927.

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I
CHRISTIAN POLITICS

FELLOWSHIP

THERE has been an abundance of talk in recent years about Fellowship. It seems to be the word which, more than any other, gathers up and focusses the strivings of our time. The Bishops at the last Lambeth Conference plainly found it to be the pivot round which their thoughts revolved. But it was not the business of the Lambeth Conference to provide an intellectual analysis of the terms in current use, and it is not to be expected that social and political propagandists will spend time or energy on such a task. Yet it needs to be done, and it is Christianity which gives the clue. Others, indeed, besides Christians are seeking for fellowship; it has in fact been the one thing sought after through all the history of civilisation. But in the experience of Christians is given an assistance to the understanding of it which others lack, and for lack of which they are liable to miss in practice the way which leads to fellowship as something more than a dream.

I

Fellowship presupposes freedom. A body of persons held together by some form of compulsion is not a fellowship. The compulsion may be physical—a literal herding of men; then there is no appearance of fellowship. Or

it may be intellectual—the consideration that the gain in co-operation, or the loss in antagonism, is so great that it is worth while to hold together; and then there is an appearance of fellowship, because the unity does rest upon choice. But it is not true fellowship, for the motive that holds it together is altogether external to the unity which it cements, and when the goal is reached the unity will dissolve. Fellowship must be free in an ultimate and absolute sense. It must be a unity of souls which have found their unity excellent in and for itself.

For these reasons the search for fellowship, though it is the aim of all progress, never becomes conscious in the early stages of progress. There is a preliminary work to be done—the recognition of personality, which is the essence of liberty. In every great advance there must always be first an individualist stage, and only when that is well established can the collectivist stage safely set in. Of course, it is not the case that in the development of any country freedom is first established in every sphere and fellowship follows on its heels. Progress comes, if it comes at all, by departments; and the individualist stage may mark one department while the collectivist is being established in another. Moreover, every form of collectivism tends to stereotype itself and to become rigid, so that health requires that it shall be shaken and perhaps broken up by the reassertion of liberty in a reversion to individualism. For whenever a society begins to tyrannise over its members, it ceases in that degree to be a true fellowship. It has abandoned the necessary foundation of fellowship, and its members hold together no longer by an essential unity of will but by fear of consequences if they break away. It does not follow that a society is always wrong to exercise coercion on its members. It does follow that whenever this happens the ideal is proved to be not yet reached.

II

Fellowship is not a mere prevalence of undefined good-will. It cannot be created by bringing people together and bidding them be in fellowship with one another. Fellowship is always found in something else. The memory of a common experience or devotion to a common cause will spontaneously create fellowship. The fellowship is then found to exist rather than de liberately constructed. It is truly free for, being found to exist, it is valued for its own sake; and when the goal sought is a limited one, so that its attainment may actually be effected, the fellowship often survives its occasion, finding its root in a memory instead of a hope.

That the word does carry with it this implication no thoughtful Christian can doubt. The Greek word, of which in the New Testament it is a translation, is *κοινωνία*, which certainly means, not a general state of good-will, but a partnership in some common treasure. The fellowship of the Holy Ghost, which St Paul regards as something so fundamental in Christian experience and so supreme in its own dignity that he ranks it side by side with the grace of the Lord Jesus and the love of God, is not so much the companionship of the Holy Spirit with Christian men and women as their unity with one another because they are all governed in heart and will by Him. It is a partnership in the Divine power and enthusiasm. And this is the chief Christian contribution to the understanding of fellowship. The world outside was drawn to the Church because they said, "See how these Christians love one another!" But the Christians loved one another because they had all received the knowledge of the love of God. "We love, because He first loved us."

But even on this basis of partnership in a common goal there is the possibility of a spurious fellowship. For

many of the purposes that from time to time unite men are purposes of antagonism. We had the experience of such a spurious fellowship in the Great War. Our nation had shown many tendencies towards division in the period previous to August 1914. In face of the common peril we closed our ranks. We had for the time an experience of fellowship. With substantial unanimity we were agreed that our nation was morally bound to enter the war and equally bound to carry it to a decisive issue. We were united—in a common enmity. The fact that we were right to be at enmity with Germany does not at all affect the other fact that the bond of our union was a common enmity. And that vitiated the fellowship resulting from it. No doubt the war brought to many another and a truer fellowship than this—a fellowship in endurance, in pain, in sorrow, in hope for a new world. This truer fellowship still lives, even though in the rush of competing claims for the attention it lives chiefly in silence and reminiscences. The fellowship which was based on a common enmity is gone, and the passions on which it rested survive; indeed, they are partly responsible for the break-up of the fellowship.

Community in resistance to attack or in hostilities against some foe is not especially admirable; it is a marked characteristic, for example, in wolves. It is good as far as it goes; and it is useful. But it was only an unimaginative insularity which could experience the years 1914–1918 as years of fellowship. The dominant fact of those years was antagonism. The emotions of hostility were far more stimulated than those of fellowship, and men who dreaded the character and influence of those emotions had to keep themselves by a deliberate and conscious effort aloof from the main stream of national feeling. Those emotions, so stimulated, survive the occasion which caused and in great measure justified them. War may

sometimes be right; it was right for Great Britain in 1914 to declare war. But there is one thing which it is psychologically impossible for war to foster, however righteous the war may be; that thing is fellowship.

That lesson from our recent experience is very apposite just now. It is the supreme moral achievement of the Labour Movement that it has made fellowship the ideal of a political party. To a great extent the principle of fellowship is a living influence in its own ranks. The demand for nationalisation is a symptom of this; whether that demand be wise or foolish, it derives its influence and dynamic force from the conviction that nationalisation (in some form or other) is the economic expression of fellowship. The demand of the miners for a "national pool" sprang from the same source. A "sympathetic strike" (and almost all strikes are ultimately "sympathetic") is a practical manifestation of fellowship.

But the last illustration brings a warning. For while the ideal of the Labour Movement is fellowship pure and simple, the fellowship which it has brought into being is largely spurious. It rests in part upon a common antagonism to a system and to a social class. To say this is not to condemn it, but merely to indicate that this movement, like others, is unable by itself to realise its own ideal. No careful observer of the Labour Movement can doubt for a moment that if it could suddenly succeed in abolishing Capitalism it would fall to pieces, and some of the sections would display a considerable degree of pugnacity in their dealings with the others.

For the true fellowship we need to find a common goal which is altogether free from the element of hostility, an enterprise in which all succeed together and no one is defeated. But that enterprise must be spiritual, for it is only in the spiritual region that success is absolute

and not comparative. If two scholars are devoted to the search for truth, each can rejoice in the discoveries of the other; if two artists are devoted to the creation of beauty, each can rejoice in the achievements of the other; if two saints are devoted to the increase of peace and good-will on earth, each can rejoice in the efficacy of the other. But the devotion must be complete; if artist or scholar or saint allows his natural egoism to affect him, so that it is not the attainment of truth or beauty or goodness but *his* attainment that he cares about—or (still worse) his reputation,—then the success of another will be his defeat as truly as if they had competed for a prize. We shall find fellowship only when we find some object great enough to claim and retain the absolute devotion of every soul; neither the communist state nor any other political construction can do that.

III

Fellowship is valuable in proportion as it brings together to share one another's experience people who are different in antecedents, temperament, and outlook. To take an illustration from the movement towards Christian reunion, it is quite easy to gather into fellowship all those Christians who describe themselves as Evangelicals; and as far as it goes it is quite a good thing to do, but it is not worth very much. And it is quite easy (psychologically speaking) to gather into fellowship all those Christians who describe themselves as Catholics; and such fellowships are good as far as they go, but they are not worth very much. The fellowship that is really valuable is one that draws together Catholic and Evangelical on the basis of common loyalty and mutual appreciation. Undenominationalism was a false way of fellowship; it united men by neglecting their differences. What we need is a unity which is frankly based on differ-

ences, where men desire to learn from one another while holding fast to all that they have found true or precious, and to contribute to others their peculiar treasures while receiving from those others in like manner. Such a fellowship is beginning to arise in the Church of Christ, and it is significant that it has its source in the recovered sense of the immense task that the Church is called upon to undertake.

This feature of fellowship also has its social application. It is right to work for a social and industrial system which shall itself be an expression of fellowship. But all the various kinds of experience, which history has hitherto facilitated, are wanted if the fellowship when it comes is not to be impoverished. This is of especial importance in the realm of ideas and of education. We should work towards a real fellowship of all classes in the control of the education of all classes. Hitherto the "upper" and "middle" classes have controlled the education both of their own class and of the "working" class. It is natural that a demand should arise for "working-class control of working-class education." And to achieve that would be a step forward—but a false step none the less. To adopt that motto is to abandon the ideal, which is fellowship of all in the education (or idea-making) of all.

IV

Fellowship is to rest on freedom; it is to be a partnership in devotion to a cause so great that the devotion which it claims and inspires is absolute; it is to unite men and women of every temperament, of every kind of experience, of every variety of outlook. Is such a thing possible? It is possible, for it is actual. Fellowship so described is the Kingdom of God which Jesus Christ proclaimed and which He died and rose again to found. That Kingdom is already a fact of experience to those

who let His spirit have free course with them. All true fellowship is Fellowship of the Holy Ghost. In science, in art, in every effort towards good life, He is at work, drawing men into fellowship. But His own proper home is the Church of Christ, which exists to be the perfect fellowship.

But is it?

CHRISTIAN SOCIAL PRINCIPLES

I

The fundamental Christian social principle is that of liberty, or (to express it more pedantically) the principle of respect for personality in all men. This follows at once from the theological dogma of divine Fatherhood. A man's value is not merely his value to himself, nor is it merely his value to society; a man's value is his value to God. Every degraded wretch of whom society despairs is a soul that God created as an object of His love, and died (or eternally dies) to win to loving fellowship with Himself. A social doctrine or system which aims at being in accord with facts will deal with every human being as of unique and irreplaceable value, because he is a child of God. And this involves two consequences. First, there must be the best possible chance for the development of all gifts and faculties; or, in other words, every child is entitled to the best procurable education. Secondly, there must be the widest possible area of effective choice, for it is in actual choice that personality manifests its most distinctive features.

Judged by this principle, English civilisation is severely condemned. It tolerates gross inequalities in the educational facilities open to the various classes in society, and puts off the great majority with a mere introduction to education which stops short before true education begins. At this moment it is turning thousands of children out from its schools, not even into industrial employment,

but into unemployment with all its concomitant degradations. And its industrial system pays scarcely any respect to the worker's personality at all. The deepest ground for the challenge presented by Labour to the existing system is the sense that it outrages the personality of the working man.

The plain fact is that political liberty is of little value without economic liberty. Men have fought and suffered and died in the cause of political freedom. And what they have meant by this freedom has always been the same thing; it is not an absence of laws which they must obey; it is the right to a voice in making the laws which they are to obey. But the laws of a nation do not invade a man's house and tell him when he must get up or when he may go to bed. The laws of industry do this; yet in making them he often has no voice at all. He is consulted only if he threatens to hold up the whole industrial process by means of a strike. If liberty is to be realised in industry, the worker must have a voice in determining the conditions under which he works, not as an occasional concession, but as a permanent right.

This is not an academic point. A few years ago I heard the following story:—During the war a new munitions factory was opened one January in the neighbourhood of a great city. The workers were girls who came out from that city for their working hours. They were quite properly turned out of the sheds during the dinner-hour so that the sheds could be cleaned and ventilated; but there was no place for them to go to. The only available accommodation was a small village public-house, which would hold about forty out of some thousands. That year snow-storms and blizzards were frequent and continued far into the spring. The girls knew, and their friends knew, that if they had been cattle there would have been a shed for them; because if a horse or an ox dies, it costs money to replace it. Yet the par-

ticular contractor was not a bad man; on the contrary, he was a good man. When someone connected with the Young Women's Christian Association told him of the state of affairs, he was genuinely shocked, and offered to pay for the erection of a large hut under Y.W.C.A. auspices, though it would absorb his very narrow margin of profit for some time to come. He was not a selfish man, making all he could for himself; he had drawn up terms which would only just leave him a margin of profit. But he had forgotten the need for shelter. Now if there had been associated with him some representative of the workers, charged with the definite responsibility of caring for their interest, this would not have been forgotten. A system which puts all control in the hands of one of the parties to the partnership of industry invokes a lack of justice to the personal claims of the other party; Capital will remember what conduces to the efficiency of Labour, but it will very often forget, even when it does not ignore, what conduces to the personal welfare of the labourer. If there is to be justice, it must be by partnership in control.

The principle of liberty or of personality involves another modification of the economic system which exists to-day. Broadly speaking, Labour is to-day treated as a commodity which those who possess it sell as dear as they can, and those who need it buy as cheap as they can; therefore when Labour is scarce (as in the war) wages rise, and when Labour is plentiful (as at present) wages drop. Labour stands out for the highest wages it can get; Capital pays the lowest wages by which it can obtain Labour. But Labour differs from the commodities which it helps to create in this important respect, that Labour is not separable from the labourer. When a pair of shoes has been made, it can be subjected to the action of "Supply and Demand" without any direct degradation of the person or persons who made it. But Labour is in

fact men labouring. To buy men labouring for so many hours of the day or the week is an improvement on the old form of slavery, whereby one man bought another man for all the hours of all the days that he might live; but it does not differ from it in principle, if the price paid is settled by the condition of the "labour market." There is still the same neglect of all rights of personality. To describe the prevailing system as one of "wage-slavery" is no doubt provocative; but it is a quite precise and just philosophical designation of it. There are many alleviations, due to sympathy among capitalists and combinations for mutual defence among workers; but a system which treats "Labour" as a commodity to be bought and sold is not a Christian system.

II

As the first Christian social principle is liberty or the sacredness of personality, so the second is brotherhood or fellowship. This is impossible without the first, for fellowship is essentially free co-operation, so that without liberty there can be no fellowship. On the other hand, liberty without fellowship results in chaos, disruption, social collapse. Only if men will use their liberty to pursue freely the common good in preference to their own is liberty even tolerable; and in fact men have in history many times rejected it and welcomed despotism in its place as a means to social order, when experience showed that the temptations incident to liberty were too strong for the moral character of the citizens. The two kinds of tyranny, illustrated by contemporary Russia and Italy, both have this same root. Russia had been too long subjected to a despotic and corrupt government to be able to enjoy liberty in fellowship; Italy had failed to display the requisite moral character; in both cases tyranny is preferred to chaos or hopeless inefficiency. Liberty

requires a high standard of public service and public honour; but these are the marks of a true fellowship—a free seeking of the common good.

Our application of this principle to contemporary affairs shall follow a different method. Christians sometimes give away part of their case by their manner of stating it. They say (as is true enough) that industry ought to be co-operation for public service rather than competition for private gain. But this suggests that industry is not in fact co-operation for public service; yet that is just what it is. The Christian conception of anything is always the real essence of that thing, not some remote Utopian and perhaps impracticable ideal. This is primarily a theological point. If Christ were only a great moral teacher, then it might be true that what He taught was too good to be true. But if He is also the Creator of the world, then His thought of anything is what that thing truly is. Christ's conception of human nature is what human nature really is; if we want to be severely "practical" and free from all illusions we must treat men and women after the example and teaching of Christ. So, too, industry is in fact what it is in the mind of Christ; it is those who conduct it as if it were something else who are the illusionists.

Plainly industry exists for public service. If men had no desires or needs there would be no production. And production is a system of co-operation between Capital, Management, and Labour; on the day that these elements cease to co-operate, the industrial process stops. I live in Lancashire, where most people are employed, one way or another, in the cotton industry. The cotton is grown in Egypt or America; it is shipped to England; it goes through many processes. At last, as a finished product, it reaches a shop where it is sold and used. Hosts of people co-operate, and the result is service of the community in the shape of goods supplied to

meet its needs. Industry *is* co-operation for public service.

If, then, those who are engaged in industry treat it as if it were competition for private gain, they are treating it as if it were what in fact it is not; it is they, and not the Christian idealists, who are indulging in illusions. If capitalists are primarily concerned about profits and workers about wages, then both are doing their work with their attention directed to what is not of primary importance. The attitude of mind that would correspond to the real facts would be a co-operation of Labour and Capital in promoting the most efficient service of the community. But industry has been organised on the false basis. Its essence or spirit is co-operative; its organisation or body is competitive. As a result, it is constantly ill at ease. It will find its own peace when those who are engaged in it discover and adopt a method of conducting it which corresponds with its real nature.

I am not in the smallest degree qualified to say what that method will turn out to be, or how closely it will resemble that with which we are familiar. But one thing is perfectly obvious: it must involve an abdication of absolute ownership on the part of those partners to the industrial co-operation whose contribution takes the form of capital. That absolute ownership is objectionable in principle and disastrous in result.

It is objectionable in principle because it is unjust. If a new railway is to be built a group of persons combine to supply the capital; they are "the company." They employ certain other persons to plan the railway and supervise its construction—"brain-workers"—and certain others to carry out the actual construction under the direction of the former—"manual workers." While the work is in process they pay these two groups the money necessary to secure their services; when the work is finished, it belongs solely to the suppliers of the capital,

and not at all to the other two groups. Of course it is true that capital won no return for its expenditure during the period of construction, while the brain-workers and manual workers were receiving salaries and wages; and that fact must be taken into account; so must the risk to which capital is exposed when it submits to heavy expenditure which will only be repaid if the venture is successful. But it cannot reasonably be maintained that this difference entitles those partners to the process who supplied the capital to the sole ownership of the completed work for ever, while the partners who supplied brain-power and physical effort are entitled only to what they were able to exact while they were actually engaged on the work; least of all is this justifiable if the "company" is formed on a basis of "limited liability." Capital has a perfectly just claim to its own price or reward in the shape of interest; and the rate of interest must be such as to repay the loss in the time of unremunerative expenditure and the risk of failure; but this does not, at any rate in all cases, amount to a right to the whole margin of profit. Nor is it just that of three indispensable partners, Capital, Skill, Labour, one alone should claim complete ownership of the product.

And sole ownership is disastrous in result; for its result is that the owner of an industrial concern thinks he may dispose of that concern at pleasure, and that what he does with it is nobody else's business. Thus there may be a "boom" in some industry; those who are inside may know that the boom is near its end; they "sell out" at a high figure, and if the buyer afterwards complains, they will say that it was his business to see that he got his money's worth, and if he did not, he has only himself to blame; no one compelled him to buy. Thus the transaction is treated as one that affects buyer and seller alone. But in fact it affects very many others. It may be that the buyer, having paid a high figure, cannot afford to

sell the goods at the price which the public is prepared to pay. Then the works close down, and it may be that thousands are thrown out of work. The sale of stock or plant which had this effect was plainly an anti-social and therefore a wicked act. We must not condemn any individual who acted thus when the general standard of commercial life permitted it; but we must condemn that general standard and ourselves for tolerating it.

III

The third Christian social principle follows from the first two; it is the duty of service. Each man should be free to exercise the utmost degree of choice in determining his conduct; but in this exercise he must remember that he is one member of God's family, and seek not his own but the general welfare. That means that he must conduct his life as an act of service. This is the principle of vocation, and it has two main spheres of application. The first is the choice of a trade or profession. It must be clearly recognised that to choose one's life-work on purely selfish grounds is as great a sin as a man can commit, for it is the withdrawal of the greater part of his time and his energy from obedience to God. Of course it is quite respectable; but it is also quite wicked. A man must choose his life-work by considering what he can do that will most serve the community. It need not be something he dislikes; he will do best what he enjoys doing, and inclination may be a real guide to vocation. But he must choose as his life-work the work that he soberly believes that he can most serviceably do, and not the work that will enable him to make most money, or that will leave him leisure for other interests. But elders do not as a rule adopt this standpoint in discussing with young men what they are to do with their lives.

Very often there is no choice of occupation possible.

Circumstances point the way irresistibly. The Christian will accept their guidance as an intimation from divine Providence. But here comes the second application of our principle. Once a man is committed to any occupation, it becomes his vocation. Every activity which is of any social utility or value can be followed as a divine vocation. Everything turns on the question whether he gives his attention first to his own interest or to the service he can render.

When we look at the world as it is to-day we see the forces of Labour striving for a fuller realisation of brotherhood and fellowship in economic life. The bringing of this principle into the forefront of political thought and aspiration is Labour's great contribution to political progress. But it must be observed that Labour stands to gain by such a development; and when we turn to the principle of service there is no sign that Labour is more ready than Capital to perfect the service it renders irrespective of the gain it can acquire. Its ideal is right, and is a genuine advance on the political ideals which had held the field in modern Europe before the rise of Labour; but its methods are often hopelessly wrong and constitute a flat repudiation of the goal they are supposed to achieve. The only way to advance the cause of fellowship is to live in the spirit of service. The materialist will think this involves surrender to the selfish powers that be. But it is not so; it is in fact the only way to overthrow their selfishness.

IV

This brings us to the fourth Christian social principle, which is at the very heart of the Christian religion, but which we have scarcely dared to apply to social or international questions even in thought; this is the power of sacrifice. And in fact it is by suffering that good causes are helped forward. So far as war does any good, it is by

the heroism of endurance, not by the effectiveness of destruction. So far as a strike makes real progress, it is by men's constancy in hardship, not by inconvenience caused. Force has its place in resisting evil which force threatens to inflict; it was right (as I think) to resist by force the forcible aggression of Germany. It may be right for Labour to resist by force a forcible aggression of Capital. But real progress comes by self-sacrifice. In a society that had never become corrupted, fellowship might rest on justice; but when once corruption has set in, it can only be based on self-sacrifice. The voluntary suffering of the innocent is the healing balm for the wounds of the world. When nations are ready to suffer rather than risk the sin of aggression, when Labour and Capital are ready to suffer rather than risk receiving unrighteous gain, when all of us are ready to suffer rather than risk the wickedness of consuming more than we contribute,—then, and not till then, will men have rest from their troubles. The Cross is the means of salvation.

V

"But this puts off for ever all hope of a solution; you are impracticable; you are a dreamer."

If so, then Christ was a deluded fanatic and His religion is a fraud.

"But what you propose is impossible; you cannot alter human nature."

No; but God can; and Christ was born and died and rose again and sent the Holy Spirit to do that very thing.

CHRISTIANITY AND POLITICS

What is the relation of Christianity to Politics? The question is becoming perpetually more urgent, and was forced upon our attention by the conference on Christian Politics, Economics, and Religion which took place in Birmingham in 1924. Some would say that there is no relation between them at all; they deal with different spheres, which either have no mutual contact or else only affect each other indirectly. The Bishop of Durham is reported to have said lately that "Christianity is completely indifferent as to the types of political and social order." In this essay we shall consider some of the ways in which, as we think, Christianity should be related to Politics.

I

One ground for demanding a complete isolation of Christianity from Politics is the belief that Christianity is concerned solely with the spiritual life of the individual. That is, in fact, a very inadequate conception of Christianity; but we will leave that consideration at present. It is true that Christianity is always first concerned with individuals and that its hope of regenerating society rests on its power to transform individuals, and it is wholesome, in view of many contemporary tendencies, to be reminded that the spring of all moral progress is the conscience and will of the individual.

But just because of its concern with individual character,

the Church is vitally concerned with the conditions that affect character. This is admitted in principle, for it is admitted wherever the connection between conditions and character is obvious. Thus it has long been admitted that the Church has a duty in relation to Housing and to Schools, for no one can doubt the effect which these have on character. The public interest in the Housing of the poorer classes is largely due to Lord Shaftesbury, who certainly urged it on religious grounds, and certainly believed in individual conversion as the chief aim of religion. It is, indeed, painfully evident that slum conditions, overcrowding and the like, create difficulties in the way of the formation of character which might well be called insuperable if social workers did not tell of miracles of grace even under these conditions. Education, too, is allowed to be the concern of the Church. Indeed it could hardly be otherwise, for until the State made itself responsible, by far the greater part of the education given in this country was due to the activity of the Church. It can scarcely be argued that because the State has intervened the concern of the Church ceases. The Church is still responsible for doing all it can to give the rising generation the fullest possible opportunity to grow up as God-fearing and useful citizens; but the channel of its activity must now be different; instead of controlling all education itself, it must inspire those who exercise this control with the right ideals, and it must teach the community to take with full seriousness the responsibility which, through the State, it has undertaken.

When we look closely we soon see that no firm line can be drawn marking off those sides of public life and its ordering which properly concern the Church from those which do not. The *English Review* lately put the Archbishop of York in its "pillory" because his Grace uttered some very wise and Christian sentiments con-

cerning the present outlook in Europe; it complained that he had broken a tacit understanding, whereby the clergy refrain from meddling in politics; yet it may safely be presumed that no such objection would have been raised to a plea from the same quarter that the Government should take steps to hasten the building of houses. In a similar way, Mr Lloyd George, when Prime Minister, called upon the Churches to help the Government to deal with the temperance question; a little later he was very indignant because the Churches helped him to deal with the Irish question. There is no doubt that a very widespread public opinion supposes that there is an ascertainable frontier of the Church's legitimate concern; but there is not. No department of human life lies outside the scope of moral principle, and in none are the order of life and the maxims governing public action without influence on character. There is a frontier of the Church's legitimate concern, but it is not one that excludes any human interest; it only defines the Church's method of dealing with that interest. The limitation of the Church's sphere is not a matter of area but of method.

It is, of course, perfectly true that some institutions have a far less direct influence on character than some others; but this does not prove that the influence is less potent. A political constitution, and still more the accepted social stratifications, have a moral root and a moral result. They have a moral root, because they come to exist through the steady and continuous pressure of the characters of the citizens and their sense of values. Honour is paid, broadly speaking, to what is widely regarded as honourable. This at once brings political constitutions and social organisations within the purview of a society which exists for the moral and spiritual welfare of mankind. But the moral results are still more important; those who grow up in a society organised

on the supposition that certain things are specially honourable have a strong tendency imposed upon them to honour those things. Thus the citizens have their sense of values largely trained by the order of the society in which they live. But the sense of values is far the most important factor in moral character. Christianity on its ethical side almost consists of a scale of values—a scale which is from the worldly standpoint highly paradoxical. If it is to train souls to adopt this scale of values it must be deeply concerned with any influence in this field.

This is no novel argument, nor is it even specifically Christian. It is the argument of Plato's *Republic*. We must choose whether man is to be regarded as an immortal being or not. If he is not, the aim of politics is his temporal welfare, in which the goods of this world take a prominent place. But if he is, then whatever affects his character must be regarded in the light of his eternal welfare, and temporal welfare must take a second place. That the political constitution and social order exert an influence on character both for good and for evil cannot be denied, for they both conserve the moral gains of the race by stamping as failures or disreputable those who sink in its scale, and they hamper moral advance by stamping as eccentric those who try to live by a truer sense of value. Consequently the Church must criticise them, by inquiring how far they represent the Christian scale of values—that scale which sets so little store by riches and so much by humility, so little by respectability and so much by love.

From this it follows that even if Christianity were concerned directly with the individual only, it would still have to concern itself with politics for the sake of its work with individuals.

II

In fact, however, it is not possible to limit the scope of Christianity to the individual alone. Christianity appeared in the world as a society. It was not, indeed, a society with a finished constitution prescribing what officers it should have, or what its specific aims should be. It was something closer knit than that; it was constituted by the Spirit within it, which possessed its members and so made them its members. It was not a society which people joined as one might join the Tariff Reform League, or any other organisation with a specified object; that is an external sort of attachment. Men joined the Church because the Spirit in the Church took hold of them; to become a member and to receive the Spirit were the same thing. So intimately social was the primitive Christianity. This does not mean that it was any the less concerned for the individual; on the contrary, because the society had no distinctive rules or constitution, it depended the more completely on the genuine conversion of individuals. It is only when we think by means of analogy with what is less than human that there seems to be a conflict between the social and the individual points of view. We think of two types of unity, such as a heap or an organism. In a heap, the parts, remaining separate, give character to the whole; in an organism, the life of the whole dominates the parts. But a society is essentially a unity of free spirits; by their free choice they constitute it; but what they constitute, by claiming their loyalty, determines their free choice. Only when something goes wrong is there a conflict between the interest of the community and the interest of the citizen. No doubt, something has gone wrong with almost every human society, and the conflict in fact exists. But it need not exist.

For the highest human welfare is social. This does not

mean that the interest of a corporate person, such as a nation, is always higher than that of an individual citizen, which should on that account be sacrificed to it. What is meant is that the highest human welfare is found in the social unity of various human beings knit together in friendship.

If that is true, then both the origins of Christianity and the nature of human welfare indicate that Christianity has a direct concern, and not only such an indirect concern as has already been demonstrated, for the ordering of social life. It must criticise actual institutions in the light of its own social principles, because it aims, not at the salvation of individuals one by one, but at that perfect individual and social welfare which is called the Kingdom of God or the Holy City.

III

It is sometimes admitted that the Church has a right and a duty to exert an influence directly on all questions of political and social order, but that this must be regulated by the ascertained economic laws, which cannot be modified. There is a large element of truth in this, but those who urge this contention usually include under the head of "economic laws" nearly all the generalisations reached by the writers on Political Economy from Adam Smith to J. S. Mill. I have even heard it said that "the Laws of Political Economy are as fixed as the Laws of Nature, and Christianity has no more to do with Economics than with Geometry."

That utterance happens to be a particularly happy one for my purpose, inasmuch as it is itself an instance of exactly that confusion of thought which I wish to remove. It not only compares Economic Law with Natural Law, but it also compares Natural Law with Mathematical Law—equating all three in point of fixity. We will

leave Economic Law on one side for the moment, and consider only the comparison of Mathematical and Natural Law. In Mathematics conclusions can be reached which are absolutely certain and absolutely universal. Thus, that "the internal angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles" is a proposition always absolutely true. But this is because the word "triangle" means precisely what it has been defined to mean. The proposition does not enable us to assert exact equality to two right angles of the internal angles of any actual figure. When we pass from the region of notions where mathematical science abides, to the consideration of actual bodies extended in space, we can only secure universality by resorting to hypothesis; *e.g.* "if this is a triangle, its internal angles are equal to two right angles," or "in the degree in which this figure approximates to perfect triangularity, the sum of the degrees of its internal angles approximates to 180." In thought about the real world, universality is reached only by transforming affirmations into hypotheses; what is really affirmed is not a fact, but a connection of content. I am at liberty to say "All men are mortal" if what I mean is that either mortality or conditions necessarily resulting in mortality are part of the content of Humanity as I define it. That leaves open the possibility that a being may appear who resembles other men in all other respects than those which involve death, so that he is called by everyone a man, but is in fact immortal. Then it has to be determined whether or not the novel feature is part of the essence of the kind of being under consideration, *e.g.* whether mortality is part of the essence of Man; if it is, then the new-comer must be called something other than Man; if it is not, we must cease to say that Man is (or All men are) mortal. Exactly this happened in the case of swans. Everyone was ready to say "All swans are white" till black swans were discovered; then it was decided that

the whiteness of the swans hitherto known was not bound up with their biological type, so instead of denying that the newly discovered birds were swans, men ceased to say that all swans are white.

Thus no Law of Nature is universal except in so far as it is turned into a definition. Then it is universal, because any exception would be excluded from the category covered by it. The real Law is a hypothetical proposition or connection of content. "If A, then B." In Physics and Chemistry, or any science where laboratory experiments are possible, this leads to no trouble or difficulty, because it is possible to reach something like certainty that the hypothesis is actually fulfilled. But it remains true that the Law of Nature is a generalisation from experience in the form of a hypothetical proposition: if A, then B.

Now the so-called Laws of Political Economy are of exactly this sort. They are not divine decrees. They are not axioms. They are generalisations from experience, which are only truly valid when put into hypothetical form. But whereas Physics and Chemistry deal with inorganic matter, Political Economy deals with human beings. In Physics and Chemistry it is possible to be sure that the hypothesis is really fulfilled; in Political Economy it is not. In fact, the Political Economy of the "classical" type openly makes a hypothesis which is seldom in correspondence with fact; it assumes that in business every person engaged is concerned about nothing except making the best bargain, and acquiring the greatest possible amount of wealth. But this is in the first place only partly true; in the second place it is a hypothesis concerning the directions of men's wills, and so comes within the purview of the Church. The Church has not only the right, but the bounden duty to reply to the Ricardian economists: "It may be true that most men in business are mainly concerned about what they can

make; but they ought not to be; and if I persuade them not to be, all your deductions from the hypothesis that they are will collapse."

But it is not true that at any time men are solely actuated by economic motives. Intelligent public opinion has long ago agreed to treat the economic man as a figure of fun. But he is the hypothesis on whom the classical economists based their process and their conclusions, and the sane man's attitude to the result has been expressed once for all by Ruskin in *Unto this Last.*

> "I neither impugn nor doubt the conclusions of the science if its terms are accepted. I am simply uninterested in them, as I should be in those of a science of gymnastics which assumed that men had no skeletons. It might be shown, on that supposition, that it would be advantageous to roll the students up into pellets, flatten them into cakes, or stretch them into cables; and that when these results were effected, the reinsertion of the skeleton would be attended with various inconveniences to their constitution. The reasoning might be admirable, the conclusions true, and the science deficient only in applicability. Modern political economy stands on a precisely similar basis. Assuming, not that the human being has no skeleton, but that it is all skeleton, it founds an ossifiant theory of progress on this negation of a soul; and having shown the utmost that may be made of bones, and constructed a number of interesting geometrical figures with death's head and humeri, successfully proves the inconvenience of the re-appearance of a soul among these corpuscular structures. I do not deny the truth of this theory: I simply deny its applicability to the present phase of the world."

Ruskin wrote with the vehemence of protest against

a dominant habit of thought. We must not be blind to the services of the classical economists. To a great extent it was, and still is, true that acquisitiveness governs the world of commerce and industry. The older economists worked out their theories on that hypothesis, and so showed how some evils could be remedied while the hypothesis held the field. If A, then B: if Capitalists chiefly seek the highest profits and workmen the highest wages that they can get, certain results will follow, and are, in fact, found to exist. But self-interest is assumed as the one relevant motive; and it is not good for any man's immortal soul that self-interest should be his only motive in any activity. Ruskin quotes Adam Smith's dictum that "the effectual discipline which is exercised over a workman is not that of his corporation, but of his customers; it is the fear of losing their employment which restrains his frauds and corrects his negligence." The comment is a "request to any Christian reader to think within himself what an entirely damned state of soul any human creature must have got into, who could read with acceptance such a sentence as this: much more write it; and to oppose to it the first commercial words of Venice, discovered by me in her first church: 'Around this temple, let the Merchant's law be just, his weights true, and his contracts guileless.'"

There is more sheer selfishness in the world than Ruskin was ready to admit. The economists were not so very far wrong, though they were partly wrong, in their reading of the facts. Their disastrous error was the assumption that those facts were unalterable. They not only set forth the laws which (in the main) the commercial world of their day was following; but they made conformity with these expressions of greed into a system of ethics. It is no accident that the most rigid adherents of the Ricardian economy opposed the Factory Acts introduced by Lord Shaftesbury.

What all this leads us to is the conviction, not that the Church has no concern with economics, but that the Church has a great concern with the spirit in men which shapes the economic system. No doubt there are some economic principles which stand firm; such are the impossibility of permanently carrying on any business at a loss, or of distributing goods which have not been produced. But the principles of this sort are very few. The Laws of Political Economy are mostly generalised statements of what happens if we have certain motives. If A, then B: if men are mainly acquisitive, then the competition for raw materials and for markets, and the class-war (for it must be remembered that Adam Smith stated the class-war as a fact, and when Marx and Engels proclaimed it as a duty they were only doing what Adam Smith and his followers had done with other facts); but if Christian men, then a system of fair exchange and mutual consideration. Our world exhibits neither of these hypotheses in its purity but a mixture of the two. All our welfare depends on rapidly establishing the Christian background of economic life.

IV

Much of the reluctance to admit the right of the Church to handle these matters arises from the unquestionable mistakes of the past. The Church did at one time claim quite clearly the leadership of all human life. But the attempt to govern political life was ruined because the Church adopted the method of the State for doing it and so lost the power to discharge its own proper function. The logic that lies behind the Hildebrandine exaltation of the Papacy is irresistible. The Church, that is men organised for spiritual ends, ought to control the State, which is themselves organised for temporal ends. But the mediæval mind never saw that

this is merely a demand for the self-control of the spiritually minded man. So the Church as one institution set out to control the State as another institution; and for this it adopted the methods of a State; it waged wars and levied taxes; so it lost the spiritual kind of control which belonged to it, without even successfully usurping the political kind of control which did not. This brought discredit on the whole notion of the authority of religion in commercial and political affairs. In the reaction (called the Reformation) the Church recovered its spiritual function, but passed under the control of the State; this was admittedly so in Germany and England, and effectually, though never admittedly, so in Holland and Scotland. This also was an evil, for it unduly limited the sphere of the Church, and to its subjection to an oligarchic state must largely be attributed its disastrous inactivity throughout the Industrial Revolution. It must be admitted that the subjection of the Church to the State, while bad for both, is less evil than an attempt by the Church to exercise political authority over the State, for the latter secularises the Church far more deeply and so destroys the soul of the whole community more completely. The petrifaction from which Wesley roused the Church in England was not so deadly to all the higher interests of men as the putrefaction from which Luther called it in Europe two and a half centuries earlier. But both were hideous, and account for some unbalanced reactions as their consequence.

V

The danger of the present is the danger of return to the mediæval blunder. If the Church turns its attention largely to political and social problems, as it is in duty bound to do, it may become infected with the prevailing diseases. Above all, it may easily come to identify itself

with palliatives of some gross evils, which are really based on the denial of its own principles. The Dean of St Paul's has expressed this forcibly in that great utterance "Confessio Fidei," the first of the second series of *Outspoken Essays* (p. 48): "The Incarnation, rightly understood, implies a very complete 'transvaluation of all values.' It gives a keener edge even to the Beatitudes. The Divine life, under human conditions, was the life that ended on the Cross. And it is worth while to remind ourselves that what is best for us is also best for others. The Church at present suffers as much from the vicarious hedonism of its social ethics as from the self-indulgence and greed of some among its unworthy adherents. Both are equally materialistic; both alike rest on an estimate of good and evil which makes the Incarnation unintelligible. . . . Popular Christianity says in effect, 'Keep your values unchanged, but redistribute them.' The deepest meaning of the Incarnation is very different from this."

So we come back to the sense of values. Everything turns on this, and this is the Church's sphere. We shall not, indeed, say men must be made perfect first and their social order perfected afterwards; for we shall have regard to the educative value of the political and social order. But we shall pray and work to secure in all citizens the Christian spirit, with the full and potent expectation that as it grows it will progressively establish a Christian social order.

GOD AND THE STATE

Of the Resolutions brought before the "Copec" Conference at Birmingham in 1924 by the Preparatory Commissions, very few aroused any signs of serious opposition. One of those few was a Resolution, proposed by the Commission on Politics, which claimed a divine authority for the State. This was criticised and even censured on the ground that it gave to the State an undue exaltation, and the expression of this view evoked loud applause. I am doubtful whether I can do justice to the subject, for I totally fail to understand either the criticism or the applause, unless it is supposed that the only theory of Divine Right which can be framed is that of the Stuarts, which, as we shall see in a moment, really tried to combine the Christian doctrine of Divine Right with the Machiavellian doctrine of the State's absolute sovereignty. That combination of opposites wrought fearful havoc in English history, and still appears capable of producing chaos in the minds of our contemporaries. For those who repudiated all notion of Divine Right were ready to assent to a substituted Resolution which declared that in normal cases it is a "sacred obligation" to obey the State. If the word "sacred" means anything, it means that this is an obligation sanctioned by God; this implies that the commands of the State are similarly sanctioned, and that is the doctrine of Divine Right. As to me it appears luminously clear that the only effective way to limit the authority of the State is to regard that

authority as bestowed by God for certain purposes, I cannot sympathise with a view which denies Divine Right for fear of State absolutism. No doubt to call it a human contrivance is to pay it less honour than to call it a divine institution. But the despised contrivance in practice dominates human life, while the honoured institution can be made to serve it.

I

There can be no doubt that Christianity came before the world with a doctrine of Divine Right. The words of St Paul have been quoted often enough, but it is impossible to exaggerate their significance, for when he wrote them the power of the State was embodied in Nero, who made an art of tyranny.

> "Let every soul be in subjection to the higher powers: for there is no power but of God; and the powers that be are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, withstandeth the ordinance of God: and they that withstand shall receive to themselves judgment." (Romans xiii. 1-3.)

When first a civilisation appeared in whose formation Christianity had exercised a potent influence, it certainly contained a belief in Divine Right. This might be interpreted as given through the Church (as in the Papalist theory) or by direct bestowal (as in the Imperialist theory). That the emperor, and *a fortiori* kings, "held of" God was not disputed. Moreover, the real implications of this were clearly seen, and the great Christian philosophers had no doubt at all that power which is abused is forfeit, and that the tyrant may be deposed, however legitimate his title. Such a declaration as the following words of St Thomas Aquinas represent the mind of the Middle Ages.

"A tyrannical government is not just, because it is directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler, as the Philosopher states (*Polit.*, iii; *Ethic*, viii). Consequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately, that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance than from the tyrant's government. Indeed it is the tyrant rather that is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition among his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely; for this is tyranny, being conducive to the private good of the ruler and to the injury of the multitude." (*Summa Theologica*, pt. ii, 2, Q. 42, A. 2.)

II

In the decadent period of Mediævalism, when the Church was becoming secularised and thereby disqualified for its task of pointing to the one super-national authority, nationalism begins to assert itself as a dominant force. The coincidence in time of the Council of Constance and the career and burning of St Joan is no accident. The Council stands first for the general recognition that the Church was intolerably corrupt and called for drastic methods of reform; its failure was largely due to the rivalry of the "nations" within it. At the same time Joan of Arc was at once evoking and embodying the national spirit of France, until she was condemned and burnt in the name of Catholicism but at the instance of a rival nation.

Plainly there is no earthly authority superior to the State; and when the State is the organ of a nation it will recognise no check to its sovereignty, unless the nation, that is, the people, upholds the higher authority of God, whose servants all States and nations are. The glory

of the early Middle Ages is their uncompromising insistence on this higher authority; but the method of the insistence was to make the Church, as it were, a super-State. Hildebrand was profoundly right in claiming that political activities should be subordinate to spiritual principles; he was disastrously wrong in seeking to realise that claim by methods that were themselves political, that is, by erecting an authority in the Papacy which could coerce instead of by trusting to the conviction of heart and conscience in kings and peoples. It is to be noticed that, in this sense, excommunication is just as "political" an instrument as prison or block; it is a method of coercion—of directing conduct apart from conversion of heart and will. And the Papacy which issued interdicts was also soon to be found raising armies. The method of Hildebrand and Innocent III frustrated their truly noble aims—the noblest aims perhaps, that have inspired world-rulers at any period. By adopting methods which were bound to render unattainable the actual supremacy of religion over politics, they opened the way to stark nationalism, to the Cardinal of Valencia, Duke of Valentinois, and the Florentine genius who took him for a model.

Cæsar Borgia and Machiavelli differ from most politicians of the period after Constance more by the lucidity and consistency of their thought than by any other quality. Either there is an authority superior to the State, to which the State owes allegiance, or there is not. If there is, it plainly sets limits to the functions of the State, which can only pass those limits by usurpation. If there is not, then the importation of moral considerations into politics is a sentimentality which will place its victims at the mercy of those who have no such weakness. No doubt the non-moral statesman will respect moral principles where to outrage them is to let loose ungovernable forces of resentment or

opposition; but then his respect for them is just as non-moral as would be his defiance of them when that seemed expedient.

This question whether or not the national State is its own ultimate end was the most fundamental issue at stake in the war of 1914–1918, but the fact was not universally recognised. The German Government appeared, at least, to accept the complete sovereignty of the national State as the basis of its policy. Moreover, many great German writers had openly advocated the doctrine that the essence of the State is Power (*Macht*), and that self-realisation or the fulfilment of destiny is for a State merely the development of its power. This is sheer Machiavellianism; and when confronted with it in a naked and unmitigated assertion, the conscience of humanity revolted at it. But in repudiating this doctrine men committed themselves to the position that the State is not its own sole end, but exists to serve something beyond itself—which must be either the Society of Nations or the Kingdom of God. The trouble is that all nations had been living largely by the principles which, when baldly stated by Germany, revolted them, and had only avoided coming under the condemnation of their own consciences because they were either (as in our own case) less clear-headed about them and therefore less thorough, or else (as in the case of France) without the means of acting on those principles effectively. France under Louis XIV and Napoleon was no whit less Machiavellian than Prussia under Frederick II and Germany under William II. And France under Poincaré has not seemed very different. Great Britain, because of its geographical position, is specially interested to maintain a Balance of Power in Europe; this leads us to resist overweening might on the part of any one European State. It is strongly to our interest to promote justice. This has two effects. One is that our sense of

our own interest is crossed and modified by our concern to maintain justice, and the fact that our aim is objectively moral tends to moralise our own pursuit of that aim; the other is that we can never be sure that the British concern for justice is anything more than self-interest in decent habiliments. On the whole it is probably true that, broadly speaking, Governments are self-seeking and exploit the moral passion which (as it happens) can always be aroused in support of our Foreign Policy, while the people as a whole are genuinely concerned for the moral principles, while thankful that they commonly coincide with the promptings of self-interest. This is the background and foundation for the complaints often made against British hypocrisy; it is not hypocrisy; it is the natural psychological reaction to geographical facts. But this is little better than hypocrisy itself as a starting-point for moral censure of other people.

III

We have to assume, then, an actual triumph of Machiavelli. What has happened is a virtual deification of the State. No one defends this in principle, though nearly everyone tolerates it in practice. And this will continue until Christian citizens squarely face the question: If the State is not its own end, what is its end? To what does it owe allegiance?

An attempt is being made in our day to move cautiously towards an organisation of States which may have some characteristics, at least, of a super-State. Supporters of the League of Nations have often told us that this organisation in no way interferes with the sovereignty of the national State. After four or five centuries of Machiavellianism, this may be salutary humbug; but plainly it is humbug. By the Covenant of the League the national States transfer to the League certain rights which they

have hitherto possessed—such as the right to make war upon any other State according to their own judgment, without any opportunity given for inquiry or reconciliation—to say nothing of arbitration. Plainly this is a limitation of sovereignty. And indeed the best of all arguments for the League is that it marks the end of this horrible idolatry of the State into which Christendom slipped with the decline of the Middle Ages.

That the policy represented by the League of Nations ought to be supported whole-heartedly by all Christians does not seem to admit of doubt. It is a political expression of belief in a common human interest and, therefore, of a world-wide fellowship. The progress of morality has consisted in a steady widening of the area within which moral obligation is recognised as binding. We have learnt that this extends to all men, in their individual relationships; but the relations between States have been almost non-moral. The inauguration of the League is a great step forwards in the moralisation of the relations between nations.

But the League is still a political contrivance. Is the end of the national State to be found in a super-national State? Or is it to be found in something which belongs to another plane of existence? Here we are at once involved in questions concerning the nature and destiny of man. If man is terrestrial only ; if his existence is bounded by birth and death; if fellowship with his contemporaries is the fullest expansion possible to his nature—then the end of the State may be a super-State. But if man is always a child of God as well as of his earthly parents, if he is a citizen of eternity, if he is capable of membership in a communion of Saints where death is no longer a barrier, then the State which exists to serve the purposes of human life must find its end in something of a different kind from itself, and recognise that all its work is preliminary and preparatory only. And inas-

much as the higher spiritual interests are only realised through the free activity of personality, we may say with confidence that, if Christianity is true, the end of the State is freedom, because freedom is the indispensable condition of all the higher aims of mankind.

IV

At this point logical completeness would require a definition of freedom. That would call (if the definition were to be more than dogmatic) for a discussion as long as the whole of this article. But we may well start from a dictum of Lord Acton: "By liberty I mean the assurance that every man shall be protected in doing what he believes his duty against the influence of authority and majorities, custom and opinion."[1] Probably most people would to-day feel that this limits the conception of freedom too narrowly to the individual, and that one necessary element in political liberty is that every citizen should have a voice in framing the laws which he is to obey. But if this element is emphasised exclusively, as is now often done, the part of freedom which is of chief spiritual value is left out. For the individual is immortal and the State is not; that is the fundamental conviction which must always distinguish Christian politics from secular politics. As Plato saw, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is of cardinal political importance; for if it is true, it is the State which is transient while the individual is permanent, and the State must serve the individual, only claiming from its citizens such service as it is in their own interest that they should render; while if that doctrine is false, the State is permanent and the individual transient, so that the individual's interest may reasonably be sacrificed to that of the State.

[1] Lord Acton, *History of Freedom*, p. 3.

It is through omission of all reference in politics to the immortality of citizens that the perspectives and proportions of democracy tend to be destroyed. If the citizens are immortal, the State (like all earthly institutions) becomes a kind of school, training men well or ill for eternity, and the test of a constitution is provided by the question whether it encourages to the greatest possible extent the development of good character. For this, individual freedom is indispensable; but political freedom, in the sense of self-government, is necessary also, for the responsibility of political action, even in the attenuated form of a vote, has an expanding influence on personality. It is its educative effect for which democracy is chiefly valuable. But if it is once forgotten that the citizen is something more than a citizen—namely, a child of God—all proportion is destroyed. In Lord Acton's words: "The true democratic principle, that the people shall not be made to do what it does not like, is taken to mean that it shall never be required to tolerate what it does not like. The true democratic principle, that every man's free will shall be as unfettered as possible, is taken to mean that the free will of the collective people shall be fettered in nothing." [1]

These perversions are inevitable if the eternal destiny of the citizens is once forgotten, for it is precisely this which forbids them to give to any earthly State an absolute allegiance. In temporal things, no doubt, the State takes precedence of the individual, and may claim from him the sacrifice of his wealth or even of his life; but this will not conflict with his true interest—rather his willing response to those claims will conduce to it. But over his spiritual interest the State has no right to exercise control; and as wide freedom of choice will conduce to his spiritual development, the State should so far as possible secure this for all citizens. The end of the State is freedom.

[1] *Essays on Liberty*, pp. 93, 94.

V

This doctrine condemns some political structures out of hand. It condemns Lenin's Communism and Mussolini's Fascismo. But apart from such extremes it leaves a great area for variation. For the freedom aimed at is not the theoretical freedom which may be held to consist in absence of restraint, but effective personal freedom of choice. Such freedom may be far more completely destroyed by the pressure of blind and unrestricted forces than by legislation. To praise freedom is not to censure organisation. On the contrary, at least some organisation is indispensable to freedom. The question at issue is not whether there shall be control or not, but whether the control is to be exercised with real respect for the individual. If it is so exercised, there will be a great concern for the rights of minorities, even though they be very small. If it is not so exercised, minorities, and all individuals who differ from the prevailing tendencies, are sure to be bullied. And the question whether minorities are respected or despised depends in the long run on the further question whether or not the constitution is framed and administered under the directing influence of faith in God and in Immortality.

INDUSTRY AND THE COMMUNITY

Behind all questions of the proper relation between the various parties engaged in industry there lies the problem of the relation between Industry itself and the life of the Community as a whole. There is a good deal to be said here under three separate heads: there is the general relation of Industry as a whole to the general life of the Community; and inasmuch as Industry itself is, most regrettably, divided into two more or less conflicting camps, there are also questions concerning the relation of Capital to the Community, and questions concerning the relation of Labour to the Community.

I

The immense number of persons engaged in industry, and the vast amount of wealth devoted to it and produced by it, are liable to give to it a disproportionate place in the life of the community. But that place must be estimated not by reference to the persons or the money employed, but by reference to the function discharged by industry in the economy of the general life. Clearly that function is indispensable; as clearly it is subordinate. A nation does not exist to produce material wealth; nor is the production of such wealth at any time an end in itself. Wealth is produced in order that it may be enjoyed. How it should be enjoyed is a further question, and belongs to the realm of ethics and politics.

But if economics is the science of the production and distribution of something, the end of whose being is the subject-matter of ethics and politics, it follows that economics must be regarded as subordinate to ethics and politics. In the nineteenth century this was largely forgotten. During that period of unexampled expansion, the facts seemed to justify the view that industry prospers most, and performs its function best, when it is least controlled. But long before that century had ended, the pressure and drive of competition had created a situation in which the State, as concerned for the general well-being, had been compelled to interfere in a variety of ways with industrial processes. For example, quite early in that century it became necessary to prohibit the employment of men and women engaged in industry for more than a limited number of hours in the day, in order that they might have the opportunity to be in a true sense men and women.

The point so easily forgotten is that no "worker" is only a "worker," but is also both an individual and a citizen. Not only does industry occupy no more than a portion, though a very large portion, of the population, but it does not absorb the whole personality of those who are occupied in it. There is therefore an absolute supremacy of the interest of the community, and of members of the community as such, over the interests of industry. There can be no proper conflict between these, for the only true interests of industry are those which subserve the interest of the community. This fundamental principle is one of the roots of all forms of theoretical Socialism: and in itself it is incontrovertible.

The real objection to Socialism in any fully developed form is not that it wrongly envisages the relations between industry and the community, but that no person or body of persons is likely to be available wise enough to conduct, without grave mistakes, so immensely complicated a

business as would by such a system be entrusted to the State. And, indeed, it seems probable that, if the right spirit is forthcoming, free industry, conducted in the spirit of public service, and adapted in its several parts to varying circumstances as only a free industry can be, will have more prosperity in itself, and serve the public better, than an industry under centralised control. But the right spirit is at present not forthcoming in anything like adequate volume. And there is much in the present organisation of industry which, to say the least, makes the development of that spirit very difficult. Individual capitalists or employers can show it, and call forth a similar response from their employees. It is very hard to see how the joint stock company, left to itself, can show it. If that is so, the case for a movement in the Collectivist direction seems to be proved, whether or not the whole journey is to be travelled to a complete Socialist State. And indeed there seems to be little dispute about this. The Labour Party is avowedly socialistic in aim; the Tory Party is manifestly socialistic in action, for its Electricity scheme and its Broadcasting scheme are plainly socialistic; and the Liberal Party has issued two manifestos—on Land and on Coal—in which socialistic principles receive a fairly wide application.

The important differences do not arise on that point. Quite evidently "we are all Socialists now." The important differences concern the conception of that general well-being to which by common consent industry should be subservient. And it is here that on the whole Capital and Labour tend to uphold divergent principles of policy.

II

In English history power has passed by successive stages of devolution from the Crown to the nobility; from the nobility to the "middle class"; and from this again to

the "working class." But the last stage is not fully worked out. Moreover, the "middle class" consists of two distinct, though largely overlapping, subdivisions—salaried persons or professional men earning their livelihood at fixed rates, and capitalists earning an income through profits on investments. The interests of these two subdivisions are not the same, for high profits, which are welcome to investors, may be obtained by means of high prices, which are unwelcome to those who live on fixed salaries. Now students and professors nearly always belong to the professional and salaried section. Consequently the majority of text-books on Political Economy represent, to some extent, the viewpoint of the salaried section of the middle class. Thus, for example, cheapness of commodities is a great advantage to such folk, and they tend to commend Low Prices, pointing out that these will compensate for Low Wages. But the workman may reply that High Wages will compensate for High Prices, while they have the advantage (from his point of view) of obliterating the economic distinction between the salaried and the wage-earning classes. And indeed this has happened to so great an extent that in an ever-increasing degree the salaried classes are making common cause with the wage-earning classes and are joining the ranks of "Labour," except in so far as they are also capitalists.

The Capitalist is not much interested in the difference between the rival policies of High Wages with High Prices and Low Prices with Low Wages, for his return is proportionate in either case; he usually has a traditional preference for the latter, but it is rather an inherited prejudice than a reasoned conviction. The special temptations of the Capitalist are to take the short view rather than the long view, and to concentrate attention too narrowly on economic issues. It is indeed to the interest of Capital to take long views, if the term Capital

be used to describe the whole class of capital-owners; but, unfortunately, it is often by no means to the interest of the individual who owns capital at any particular time. He is often tempted to press for high immediate returns, after which he sells out, having made his fortune, and leaves others to carry the burden. The trouble with some collieries to-day is that former owners have "skinned the seams," taking all the easy coal, so that now there is only hard coal to be got. Those companies which always took the easy and hard coal together are in the better position now; but those who suffer now from the previous policy of quick returns are seldom those who gathered in those returns; those fortunate folk very often have sold out and left the industry. In this way the interest of the Capitalist (though not of Capital as a whole) may often be at variance with the interest of the whole community. That is by no means peculiar to the Capitalist; others face the same temptation though it reaches them in other ways; but the Capitalist is exposed to it, and when he yields to it the resultant evil is specially great, because of the widespread effect of the policy adopted by the controllers of Capital in a society organised as ours is to-day.

The Capitalist is tempted to take a too narrowly economic view because his human life—as a member of a family, as a sportsman, as an art-collector, or whatever it may be—is less immediately dependent on economic policy from day to day, so that he views this in considerable detachment from the wider interests which it subserves. During the coal strike the day-to-day amenities of life were greatly diminished for the miners; we doubt if there were many owners who had very seriously to alter their habits of life in consequence of it. Thus the working man always sees an economic issue as fundamentally a human issue; sometimes his consciousness of the human values at stake may so stir his sentiments as to make him

blind to economic facts; yet at the root his view is right, even if it is blurred and confused. The Capitalist tends to think of the economic issue in isolation; his apprehension of it may be clearer because of the comparative absence of disturbing sentiments; yet at the root it is false, because it depends on an abstraction which is not acknowledged. At the moment of crisis the Capitalist is likely to see more clearly, and therefore to be at that moment the safer guide. But when the crisis is past the error of the abstractly economic view will prepare for the next disaster, unless the human interests which are truly fundamental are fully met. It is, for example, probable that the policy advocated by Mr Cook on behalf of the Miners' Federation throughout the first two months, at any rate, of the strike was quite impracticable; but if the policy of the owners, as expressed by Mr Evan Williams, gave more hope of immediate practicability, it gave no hope whatever of permanent peace, unless when the economic crisis is passed attention is given again in full measure to those human values which Mr Cook, whatever his faults, never for a moment forgets.

If Capital is to play its true part in reconstructing our national prosperity, it must escape from the false notion that economic considerations should be paramount even in business. Of course it is true that no business can be continued at a loss; there are certain economic conditions which must be conformed to on pain of complete disaster. But Economic Law is normative only in that negative and limiting sense. Provided that loss is avoided, and enough profit made to secure the continued investment of the necessary capital, there is a wide margin of possibility, the use of which is a matter for ethics and politics, not, or at any rate not solely, for economics. Our need is an ever greater number of capitalists, such as do already exist in greater numbers than is often supposed, who in their very business are citizens first and profit-seekers

afterwards. Probably they will transform the organisation of industry; probably they will by degrees welcome Labour to a fuller and fuller share in control of the industry and direction of its policy. Probably the new spirit will show itself in fresh forms of association between these Capital and Labour organisations on the one side and the State as representing the whole community on the other. But whatever the upshot, the need is for more capitalists who are citizens first and profit-seekers afterwards. There are many such already; in the increase of their number lies one main hope for the future. When such men can predominate in Employers' Associations, those Associations will naturally play the part suggested for them by Professor Ramsay Muir through a "functional devolution" on the part of the State.

III

In the present phase the most interesting part of our inquiry is that which concerns the relation of Labour to the Community. This theme was thrown into uncomfortable prominence by the "General Strike." We do not wish here to discuss that event as a particular episode. But it has raised, and still more have some of the comments on it raised, great issues in the field of political philosophy. There can be no doubt that a far-reaching influence has been exerted by the speeches of Sir John Simon. But he confuses, if I read him right, three quite distinct issues—the legal, the constitutional, and the moral. It is quite true that he nowhere claims explicitly to be answering the moral question; and he does claim to be dealing with something more than the legal question. But as I read the speeches, final judgment is given on the basis of legal considerations. He does himself say: "I thoroughly agree, if I may be allowed to say so, that there is, apart from the legal

question, a much bigger question, a constitutional question, a parliamentary question, and that, side by side with that, there is a social question, an industrial question, and a human question."[1] But he proceeds to deal with the "General Strike" itself, accepting that misnomer at its face value, on grounds more legal than constitutional, and ignoring all ethical considerations that are non-legal or non-constitutional, and on those grounds alone pronounces an absolute condemnation.

Sir John Simon scrupulously and admirably avoided all provocative phraseology; but the substance of his thought, as distinct from its emotional colour, is not so very different from that of persons who regarded the Government as representing the whole country *de facto* as well as *de jure*, and described the General Council of the Trade Union Congress as "a gang of criminal conspirators against the State." What is at stake is the whole theory of sovereignty, and the whole conception of loyalty.

Legally, of course, there is no doubt about the omni-competence of the King-in-Parliament, and of the supremacy of this Sovereign over all persons and causes. Parliament has legal authority to pass a law requiring all eldest sons, on attaining their twenty-first birthday, to kill both their parents. But it has no power to make the eldest sons act so. And when we look into the matter carefully we find that the efficacy of parliamentary enactments always depends on the willingness of citizens to obey. The legal omni-competence of King-in-Parliament is nothing more than the non-existence of any other legal authority exercising legal control over the Sovereign. The supremacy is real in legal theory, and for legal purposes; it is not an empirical fact, and only under an inconceivable despotism could it become one.

[1] *Three Speeches on the General Strike*, by the Rt. Hon. Sir John Simon, M.P. (Macmillan), p. 26.

The Constitution is something wider than the Law. It is the whole body of the Law, together with a mass of unformulated custom, and its limits are indefinite. What at this moment, for example, are the constitutional powers of the King with regard to the dismissal of Ministers or the dissolution of Parliament? Could he constitutionally dismiss a Ministry which, he was convinced, had lost the confidence of the nation, even though it retained the confidence of Parliament? Could he dissolve a Parliament which, he was convinced, had lost the confidence of the nation, even though his Ministers, resting on a majority in that Parliament, advised against it? Or again, could he refuse the Royal Assent to a Bill which had passed both Lords and Commons? Broadly speaking, I should answer that the King has all these powers, and is expected by the Constitution to use them if he were convinced that the true liberties of his people required it. But the interest of these questions for our present purpose is merely to illustrate the difficulty of determining with any narrow exactitude what is and what is not unconstitutional.

The private citizen would seem to have only one constitutional right—the right to vote. But if the true end of the Constitution is to preserve the traditional liberties of the people, he, too, may on exceptional occasions take exceptional action with that object, and claim that this is true to the Constitution.

The whole community of Labour has often to consider its duty in regard to such questions, the more so because, as was said earlier, the process of its enfranchisement is still incomplete. In the political sphere, indeed, it is tolerably complete; but within industry itself the acknowledged rights of workmen are often still very small. It often happens that their only available method of securing attention to their demands is by withdrawing their labour.

Let us turn back to Sir John Simon, not from any reckless desire to enter into controversy with so redoubtable an adversary, but because he has published a very clear expression of views which seem to us to be essentially confused, or at least to rest on an insufficient analysis. He draws a sharp distinction between the Coal Strike and the General Strike, on the ground that the former was strictly industrial, being concerned with conditions within the Coal Industry; while the latter was political, being an attempt to obtain results by pressure put upon the public or the Government. But the distinction, though a real one, is not nearly so sharp as Sir John Simon suggests. The Coal Strike was no doubt industrial in aim and in the first stages of its methods; but in its process it affected multitudes of people—specially workers in other industries—and of course the strikers relied on the extending inconvenience, and even distress, resulting from the strike to persuade any parties who might be concerned, including the Government, to agree to a settlement such as the strikers desired. Pressure on the community was a real factor in the policy of the Coal Strike; it was an even more prominent factor in the policy of the Railway Strike of 1919. On the other hand, the avowed aim of the General Strike was to secure the withdrawal of the notices posted at the end of April by the mine-owners, but the attempt was to secure this industrial object by pressure directly exerted upon the community. There is a real difference, but it is not either a sharp or a complete difference. The fact is that all strikes are symptoms of the incompleteness of our civilisation; as things are, the right to strike is (as Sir John Simon strongly urges) a necessary protection of Labour. But our civilisation is so far advanced that no industrial conflict is now industrial only; it always has its political aspect. It is not possible to say that one strike is purely industrial and therefore justifiable, while

another is purely or largely political and therefore unjustifiable.

Of course there is no doubt that the Coal Strike was legal; that is to say, it broke no existing law. It is held that the General Strike was illegal; that is, that it did break existing laws. In so far as no notice was given, it certainly involved breach of contract; so far as it called on workers to strike in a quarrel that was not theirs, some doubt has been expressed about it. To break the law is, in itself, a serious thing, but the right of rebellion is the indefeasible right of man as a moral agent. It is not quite so clear, as Sir John Simon suggests, that the extended sympathetic strike is illegal; other high authorities have expressed another view. But the answer to the legal question settles nothing finally; it is of great, but not of ultimate, importance.

More important, though still not ultimate, is the question whether it was constitutional. This is a vague question, because the term constitutional has no precise meaning. It was not initiated from any desire to overthrow the existing Constitution. It was not initiated with the primary desire of coercing the Government. But it did contain the peril of civil war, and might very easily have led to an overthrow of the Constitution; and it called on a vast number of citizens to act in a way very inconvenient (at least) to the community as a whole. It does not seem fair to call it unconstitutional in fact; but to say that it imperilled the Constitution is to state an obvious truth. Such an expression, however, as "the establishment of a rival government in Eccleston Square over against the Government at Westminster" is rhetorical foolishness and nothing else. It could only seem to be sensible on the supposition that obedience to the *de facto* Government is always a duty. But this carries us over from the legal and constitutional to the ethical aspect of the question.

Legally men work not for the Government but for their employers. Morally they should work for the community. They have a right to say on what conditions they will work, and to refuse their work if those conditions are not provided. But if they so refuse, they must first consider the welfare of the whole community. Now it cannot be too emphatically stated that it was for the sake of the welfare of the community, as they conceived it, that the Trade Union Congress called the General Strike. They inflicted this inconvenience on the public to save the public from something still worse. A cutting down of wages, first for the miners, later (in all probability) for others also, would be (so they argued) a calamity so great that if it could be prevented, even at the cost of the suffering entailed by a General Strike, it ought to be prevented. The effort failed; and it was bound to fail; that is a main ground for its ultimate condemnation.

"No," says the believer in Austinian sovereignty, "an action on so great a scale must never be taken by a private group. The Government represents the whole community; no other body does or can; therefore it must decide, and to it an ultimate loyalty is due."

It is noticeable that when we want to express condemnation, we always assume an extreme theory of Free Will, so that we may attribute what we censure to the spontaneous and deliberate wickedness of our opponent. Everyone does it; but it is not reasonable. Loyalty cannot arise to order. It is a duty to cultivate it, no doubt; in the ideal state there will be such unity of feeling among all citizens, and between the whole body of them and the Government which acts for them, that loyalty will be natural; but loyalty cannot be generated all of a sudden by an act of moral choice. If there is a failure of loyalty on a large scale, the blame

rests quite as much on the Government that has not won loyalty as on the rebels who refuse it. The fact that the Conservatives won the last election lays upon them the responsibility of acting on behalf of the whole nation; and normally men of other parties, though they may try to modify Conservative measures by amendment, or to reject them if they can so that they never become law, yet submit to them if they do become law, not only from fear of penalty but also for the sake of upholding the majesty of Law. A good Government avoids putting an excessive strain on this proper loyalty, and a loyal people submits to Government up to a point where submission is unbearable. If a break does come, the Government, being in a special sense the trustee for constitutional order, must decline to parley with those who defy it; but it should realise that the existence of such defiance is its own condemnation. It ought never to have let things come to such a pass.

Of course this does not mean that the present Government was solely, or even of necessity chiefly, to blame for the occurrence of the General Strike. What stands condemned is the whole history of governmental dealings with Labour troubles from (shall we say?) the younger Pitt onwards, but especially from 1914 onwards. Men will differ in their estimate of the root of the failure; some will find it in reckless concessions during the war; others will find it in lack of sympathy since the war; others again will find it precisely in the combination of these two. The plain fact is that the affairs of the country had not been so conducted as to create that unity of spirit which is the fount of loyalty. We are still "Two Nations," in Disraeli's phrase; and each feels a loyalty to itself before it feels loyalty to the ill-knit structure that contains both.

No doubt Labour too has had faults as conspicuous as those of the governing classes. It has been collectively

selfish, ready to join with Capital in exploiting the needs of other countries (as our whole Coal Trade did just after the war), and resentful of having to bear its share of loss when the opportunity for loot is over. It has shown in the ways open to it at home those qualities which make it, in its turn, oppressive to the coloured races in South Africa. I do not ask for an exculpation of Labour —or of any of us: I only plead that those whose natural interest is served by loyalty to the *de facto* Government should not visit with special moral indignation those who turn out not to feel such loyalty.

For after all it is only a necessary fiction to say of our society that the Government acts for all classes. The fiction is necessary, and the Government must uphold it; if they fail in this, they must resign, so that there shall be a Government that can successfully uphold it. And because this is the duty of Government, and the General Strike was full of peril to the Constitution, the Government was perfectly right to demand its unconditional cancellation. But it is a fiction none the less, and the citizen is bound to give to his own conscience—his own judgment of right and wrong—a place superior to the commands of Government.

Let us consider any group of men taking part in the General Strike; let us take the railwaymen for illustration. They had by vote committed to the General Council of the Trade Union Congress the right to call them out on sufficient occasion. That vote appears to have been contrary to the requirements of their own Unions, which lay down conditions to be fulfilled before a strike is called, and was therefore technically invalid. But that could, and should, have been dealt with at an earlier stage. The General Council believed that it could, or might be able to, check a general reduction of wages, beginning with those of the miners, by calling out the railwaymen and others. So they withhold their labour; they judge that

the conditions under which they are willing to work are not fulfilled. There was no time given for proper notice to the employers; another blunder; but that too could have been avoided; the notice could have been given and the strike begun a week later, or whatever was the time required. As the Home Office had had nine months to prepare against the strike, this would have made little difference. My point is that a General Strike could be called without breach of any contract or law. It would still contain an implicit threat to the Constitution. Could it ever be right?

I do not believe that in a country as democratic as ours circumstances could in fact arise that would justify it. No Government, with the next General Election always within sight, would dare to resort to such oppression as would make it a real service to the community in the long run to inflict on the community the immediate loss and suffering of a General Strike, and only this could justify it. Certainly in my judgment the strike of May 1926 was not justified. But this is not because there can be admitted no directing authority within the State except the Government; it is not because there was some treasonous usurpation in the action of the General Council of the Trade Union Congress; it was simply because that course of action was bound to do more harm than good, and might do harm desperate, incalculable, and irremediable.

Under a despotism things might be different. Despotism provides no constitutional means for bringing the despot to book; and exceptional means may have to be taken; even then, however, it is probably better to shoot the despot than to starve his subjects. In a democracy there may be a negative use for a General Strike; for example, if a Government elected on some other issue were to declare a war which the world of Labour thought wicked, it might be justifiable to paralyse

that Government's action by a General Strike. That seems to me possible, though most unlikely.

Broadly, however, there can be no doubt that the General Strike is to be condemned on the ground that in a democracy there are other methods of determining the national action, and this method, which involves great injury to the community, has an inherent tendency to weaken the authority of constitutional Government and may even destroy it, and then almost certainly fails in the result, ought never to be utilised. But this is not because "holding up" the Government of the day is necessarily wrong. It is quite as important to settle the grounds of our condemnation of the General Strike as to determine whether or not it is to be condemned. And while for ourselves we condemn it unreservedly, we also repudiate the theory of sovereignty, in the name of which that condemnation has often been pronounced. Legal sovereignty, no doubt, is absolute; but actual sovereignty is relative, and depends on the unity of spirit in the community; it is, in short, the correlative of loyalty which is itself the moral fruit of a very tender plant, whose roots are psychological, and whose growth depends on its history and environment.

LOYALTY

In the last essay a consideration of the relation of Labour to the Community in our times led to the assertion that loyalty is the flower of a rather tender plant, of which the roots are psychological. It seems worth while to consider this matter more fully, for many of our difficulties to-day arise from the fact that all parties are demanding from their members loyalty to the party itself or to the object which it serves without very carefully considering how loyalty may be generated. The word itself is taken to represent a virtue, and many people here, as elsewhere, save themselves the trouble of serious thought by adopting in the case of others a doctrine of free will of a kind that they would never accept for themselves. We are apt to say of someone who does not share our allegiances, "He is a disloyal scoundrel," and regard the matter as dealt with by the implied attribution of his disloyalty to a wicked will, which is wicked only because it chooses to be. But if we ourselves are in rebellion against any lawful authority, we are quick to mention a host of considerations impelling us that way, which, we tend to claim, certainly explain our conduct and probably justify it.

I

Loyalty is plainly a sentiment. It has its roots in the most elementary principles of our moral nature; but I will not here invite the mutually self-annihilating criticism

of rival schools of psychology by venturing to analyse it into its component parts or even by naming these. There is in all of us a strong natural tendency to trust those in whose care we are. Psychologists talk a great deal about the parental instinct. To the dabbler in such high matters it would appear equally certain that there is a filial instinct—a tendency to trust those who care for us in our helplessness. This tendency, like others, can be developed or stunted; when, as is usual, it finds itself justified and so is developed, it becomes an important ingredient in true loyalty.

But trust in those who are older or stronger is not yet the whole of loyalty. There must be added to this something of which the root is to be found in the gregarious instinct. This impels us to close association with our fellows and to agreement with them in opinion. It may carry us so far towards a sense of real unity with them as to produce the kind of loyalty which is illustrated by "honour among thieves."

Loyalty as a moral sentiment rests on one or other, or on both, of these. But so far as there is a duty of loyalty its foundations are different, and it is the relation of the ethical to the psychological aspects of loyalty about which so many people seem to be confused, and it is partly, though not wholly, from this confusion that the difficulty arises in resolving a conflict of loyalties.

Loyalty to parents or family is a duty because it is an expression of gratitude, and a recognition of the wisdom of the tradition we inherit. Loyalty to our country has the same roots, with the added obligation of conserving the public order on which the realisation of so many of the higher goods depends. Loyalty to the Government of the day (if that is a correct expression at all) would rest upon this last obligation almost alone. Loyalty at its highest pitch, where it becomes unlimited trust and obedience, is due only to the Supreme Good, or in other

words to God; and here all the root-elements traced elsewhere come into play.

II

Now we leave the abstract account of the matter and pass to some concrete instances. Two men are engaged in burglary, and one is caught by the police. If he conceals the identity and whereabouts of his companion, that companion will escape. What does loyalty require of him? No doubt loyalty to the State requires that he should give his friend away, and the officers of the State will encourage him to do so. But if he complies, public opinion will not commend him for loyalty. Even if he is held to have done the right thing, loyalty is not the word that would be used to describe it. And the reason is that loyalty is not first a duty, but first a sentiment; and we should not believe in the existence of that sentiment in any pronounced form as directed to the general good in a man caught in the act of burglary; whereas if he kept his mouth shut or even lied, we might say that he was showing loyalty to his friend.

No doubt a philosopher of the Hegelian school might say that the "real will" of the escaping comrade was to be caught and punished, or at least that this would be good for him, so that in assisting the police to capture him, our friend was showing loyalty both to the State and to his colleague; but if he made this claim we should at once say it was humbug, because this lofty and selfless morality comports ill with the act of burglary.

In other words, "honour among thieves" is the only loyalty that we regard thieves as being able to show sincerely. For the habitual thief there is no conflict of loyalties. Of course we are not here raising the questions that arise when a usually honourable man is suddenly tripped into a dishonourable action. The principle is that of those whose moral level is low we ask a lesser

loyalty. At that level the man who does what is in itself, apart from the special circumstances, "the right thing," by helping the State, we regard as more contemptible than the man who sticks to his "pal." On a higher level our judgment is reversed, and though we may feel it hard to love the Brutus who condemned his sons to death, we certainly approve; and if after acting so as Consul he wept as a man and a father, our approval would be mingled with love.

The conclusion to which all this points is that, however much we may regard loyalty to King and Country as a duty, our own moral judgments show that we regard that duty as capable of fulfilment only when certain psychological conditions are present; and while we rightly deplore the absence of loyalty when those conditions are not present, it is idle to resort to denunciation. Not everyone has apprehended even that simple truth. But many of those who have think that the only way to deal with disloyalty is to suppress it by force. That may, indeed, become necessary; but it does not cure the disease. The most fundamental need is to search out the causes of disloyalty and to remove them. Disloyalty is not chiefly due to special wickedness in the disloyal; it is chiefly due to the lack of conditions which foster the growth of the sentiment of loyalty.

III

The political temper, or variety of tempers, which is discoverable in England to-day is such as to give ground for a certain amount of alarm. We have already protested against the view that the "General Strike" of May 1926 was revolutionary in character; but it certainly had revolutionary tendencies, and there were some revolutionaries among those who promoted it. A great deal was said about the spirit of revolt and the duty of loyalty.

Some of this, as we have pointed out, rested on a confusion between loyalty to the State and loyalty to the Government of the day. What is necessary is to inquire into the causes of the disloyalty, or (to speak of a more widely spread phenomenon) the divided loyalty, of so many of our fellow-citizens.

The great and alarming characteristic of recent years is the rapid growth of militant class-consciousness. To the outsider who tries to take an interest in the Labour Movement it is alternately amusing and irritating to discover how completely the "class-conscious worker" takes class-consciousness for granted and assumes its powerful presence in the upper and middle classes. All who are acquainted with the facts are aware that this is rubbish. Members of those classes show the tendency discoverable in all human groups, as also in wolves and sheep, to hold together when attacked. But there is among them singularly little class-consciousness. There is often a deep unconscious and uncriticised class-pride, but that is a very different kind of thing. Efforts to bind them together in societies based on class-consciousness always appear to most members of the class concerned to be a trifle ridiculous and entirely uninteresting. But this is not so with Labour. There a new force in English history has made its appearance. Dr Inge, in his recent book on *England*, has called attention to this. He quotes Professor Santayana as saying, "It is astonishing with what docility masses of Englishmen, supposed to be jealous of their personal liberty, will obey a revolutionary junta which taxes and commands them, and decrees when they shall starve and when they shall fight." And the Dean appends this comment: "In truth this is a phenomenon of very great and sinister import, for there has been nothing like it hitherto in English history. It has not been possible to induce any other class in the community to submit to this kind of discipline in defence of its own interests."

But it is plainly outrageous to accuse blankly of disloyalty men who let their leaders tell them "when to starve and when to fight." Plainly they are intensely loyal—to those leaders, and to the class whom those leaders represent and for which they are paid to think and decide. Such men are full of loyalty, but their loyalty is directed to their comrades rather than to the whole State.

IV

What is the cause of this redirection of loyalty from the State to the class? Marx is its prophet and Lenin its apostle. But it is a curiously naïve trust in the power of exhortation which supposes that a handful of theorists could accomplish so great a transformation. Marx would never have formulated his doctrine if he had not seen facts establishing its truth before his eyes. The root of this new and bewildering phenomenon is mass-production —or (to use the familiar name for the historical emergence) the Industrial Revolution.

Loyalty in its completest form rests, we said, on two instincts, the filial and the gregarious. Loyalty to the country, and to the Government which acts for it, should rest on both. The old village community, before railways and motor-cars came to disintegrate it, was a society comprising all sorts of citizens. They grew up together, played their games together when young, shared one another's joys and sorrows when old. No doubt there was much to say on the other side, but this much was true. And, in the better instances, the squire who represented the governing class showed a really paternal interest in the villagers, so that their filial instinct could respond. The village was a school of loyalty in its completest form.

Contrast with this the modern industrial town. The wealthier and more educated folk have mainly left it, to live in the country outside. It consists of acre upon acre

covered with mean streets of little houses. There is scarcely enough room in each house for a large family to make it a home in the proper sense; and often two families, or even more, share one such house. Here is a vast multitude of people with hardly any privacy, all living close packed together, and all sharing the same economic interest. Class-consciousness is the inevitable result. When the professional man returns from his office to his home, he is free for the time from his profession and from other followers of it. He can be alone with his own family if he likes; or he may spend the evening with personal friends who may have no interest in his profession. All this hinders the formation of a professional, or at any rate of a merely professional, consciousness. Moreover, he is not conscious of antagonism against another class, because he either does not think about it at all (unless its activities are incommoding him at the moment) or else he deliberately tries to understand and to sympathise.

But the working-man has scarcely any society but that of other working-men—wage-earners like himself. The lawyer and the artist both live by fees of sorts. But they earn their fees very differently, and cannot be said to have a common financial interest. All wage-earners have a very real common financial interest. By herding them together in communities composed of wage-earners alone, we have created the new and alarming phenomenon which Dr Inge deplores. We have created a situation in which the gregarious instinct is brought into full play among persons of almost identical economic interest, while the filial instinct is utterly inoperative.

This means that our social conditions are such as inevitably to produce an intensely strong class-loyalty of an aggressive type (for it is the filial instinct in loyalty that makes it a principle of stability), while there is very little in present conditions to draw loyalty towards the State.

Because the State represents the nation, and the nation is a real fellowship of present with past and even with future, the State still draws the loyalty of the masses. The new class-solidarity, based in reason upon identity of economic interest and in sentiment upon compact association, has not yet prevailed over the solidarity of the nation, based alike in reason and sentiment upon common tradition, common culture, common speech, and common aspiration. But it has gained upon it in a dangerous way. This cannot be corrected by sermons, though they may help to revive the flame of the older loyalty. The only way to resist the forces which have produced class-loyalty is by steadily redirecting them. Our need is for steady, gradual, yet perceptible conservative reform. To that process Tories and Liberals and Socialists must each contribute so much as the criticism of the others allows to pass. The only people who increase the danger are Diehards and Revolutionaries—who create, and largely depend for existence upon, one another.

V

What is at stake is something more than the survival of habits and customs which many have learnt to love. There is danger of an ethical set-back in political and social life. For the national loyalty is wider than the class-loyalty, and less narrowly self-centred. It rests upon more factors, and upon less self-regarding motives. And the essential vice of Bolshevism is precisely its substitution of the narrower and more superficial for the wider and deeper loyalty. No doubt the whole multitude of wage-earners throughout the world may be more numerous than the population of a single country; but numbers here are not very important. The bond of unity in class-consciousness is identity of self-interest. The great solidarity of Labour shown in May 1926 was avowed by

spokesmen of Labour to rest, partly at least, on the belief current in all sections that if they let the wages of the miners be reduced, their own would be reduced soon after. Of course a loyalty resting even on this foundation may lead to real self-sacrifice on the part of individuals, and often does so. But it remains true that the basis of such a loyalty is a common self-interest in a narrower and more limited sense, than the basis of a loyalty which rests on our common inheritance in the fields and lanes of rural England, in the spirit which shook off the Armada, in the expansion of our country into a Commonwealth of Nations, in the profundity of Shakespeare, the austerity of Milton, the fervour of Shelley, the humanity of Browning. If our care for these is still called self-interest, at least the self interested is larger and richer than the self pre-occupied with wages and conditions of labour.

That is true, and supremely important. But we must turn back to the conditions. Men are bound to be pre-occupied with wages if these are uncertain and precarious. It is true that loyalty is a duty, and that our duty is to be loyal to the highest (that is, the morally most comprehensive) object that claims our loyalty; but loyalty is first of all a sentiment having psychological roots of its own. Where those roots cannot strike into congenial soil the sentiment cannot grow. Because loyalty to the highest is a duty, we must provide conditions which make possible the fulfilment of that duty. It will not do for those whose conditions have fostered it only to censure or repress those whose conditions have killed it. Nor may we justly be impatient if those whose conditions compel a pre-occupation with the physical basis of life are thereby also drawn into the bonds of a loyalty resting on that pre-occupation. We must rightly order the physical before we can fairly call men to fellowship in what is higher. "First that which is natural, afterwards that which is spiritual."

And we must recognise that national loyalty, though morally superior to class-loyalty, may become an evil force in just the same way, by resisting what is higher than itself. Only to God is an absolute allegiance due; only to His Kingdom, wherein all the nations of the world are provinces, should an unlimited loyalty be directed. The State owes loyalty to God and His Kingdom as truly as the citizen or social class owes loyalty to the State. If the State fails in its duty to God, it forfeits the right to claim loyalty from the citizen. We need a graded loyalty —first and without reserve to God Himself, and to His Universal Church (for thus the filial and gregarious elements in loyalty find their appropriate objects), then to the State, then to our own class or family. And as the Christian citizen desires for his own family, not first that it may be rich or powerful, but first that it may be devoted in service of the nation, so the Christian patriot will desire for his country, not first that it may be able to impose its will on others, but that it may use all its resources in the service of God's Kingdom, in the beneficence of whose sovereignty all citizens of all nations are partakers.

DEMOCRACY: ITS CLAIMS AND PERILS

Democracy was regarded by many English folk before the war as something so established and assured that neither its claims nor its perils received very much consideration. We tended to suppose that the most "advanced" nations—meaning, of course, ourselves and those whose political constitutions most nearly resembled ours—had adopted Democracy once and for all, and that the sheer pressure of that automatic Progress, in which so many then believed, would gradually bring all other countries into line. The war was hardly what was generally envisaged as part of that automatic Progress, though it has brought Germany nearer to Democracy than it was; but it has destroyed Democracy in Italy, whose citizens are liable to hail our General Strike or the financial and political entanglement of France as signs that Democracy is dying in the two countries that gave it birth. Meanwhile Russia would have us believe that it has leapt from the rear to the van, and, omitting the stage of Democracy, has established that socialised Republic for which in other countries Democracy is the preparation. There is plainly some need to reconsider the case for Democracy, and to take stock of the dangers that threaten it.

I

Nothing does so much damage to any human institution as to make on behalf of it exaggerated claims. Early

enthusiasts for Democracy based it on two claims, neither of which can be substantiated; one was that there resides by right in the People an inherent sovereignty, the other was that the People is always right. As regards the first of these it has to be said that all theories of sovereignty break down which do not recognise that sovereignty as a real fact is always correlative to actual loyalty. No sovereign can impose his (or its) will on a community except so far as that community either by choice or by acquiescence or from fear assents to this. The despot who by force either exterminates his opponents or terrifies them into submission appears to provide a refutation of this view; but in reality he confirms it, for the force on which he relies consists of other men, usually soldiers, ready to obey him. All government rests in the last resort on consent; and this is the measure of truth that resides in the belief that there is an inherent sovereignty in the People. As soon as we go beyond that, we are faced with insoluble difficulties. For who, in the first place, are the People? In a country like ours, with natural frontiers, the upholder of the sovereignty of the People may define his sovereign as all inhabitants of the island of Great Britain, though even then he will presumably have to limit these to citizens who are of age. But what would he do about Ireland? or about Alsace-Lorraine before the war? or about India? And if he replies that he does not offer his theory as an account of actual facts, but as a statement of an ideal, we must answer that his ideal can only be sound as an ideal if it does perfectly co-ordinate the facts.

In the French Revolution men believed in this dangerous nonsense fanatically. Wholesale lynchings and indulgence of the blood-lust by men and women lost to reason would be gravely described by saying that the People had resumed its sovereignty and had itself administered Justice. Indeed the most astonishing feature

of the French Revolution is the quantity of cant plainly believed by men who were accomplishing so vast a transformation.

Inherent sovereignty is an attribute of no human person or collection of persons; it is an attribute only of the Moral Law, and of God who is Himself the Moral Law in personal form. Only to God and to Right is an absolute allegiance due. Our earthly contrivances of Government are makeshifts at the best.

But to make a shift is necessary; and we believe that of all the possible makeshifts Democracy is the best. This, as need hardly now be said, is not because the People (if you can once settle who they are) is always right; the mob who carried out the September massacres in 1792 were a fair proportion of "the People"; does anyone now pretend that they were right? Moreover "the People" seldom has a single mind or purpose. Democracy always means in effect the rule of the majority. On what depends the right of the majority to rule? Cynics say that we nowadays count heads to save the trouble of breaking them. In a battle the majority, other things (like courage and ammunition) being equal, usually wins. Is it that the two armies have decided to count the combatants and allot victory to the greater number? That would be very prudent on their part, but hardly the basis of a right in the majority so distinguished. What is the basis of that right, or in other words what makes it right that the law should be made by the majority?

Certainly it is not that the majority is always wise, or that the justest and most correct opinions can always obtain most votes. We may indeed be sure that on most difficult questions, and on all novel questions, the best opinion is held by a small minority. Perhaps it is true that though the majority is pretty sure not to be quite right, it will be more often nearly right than any particular minority would be. And that is as far as it

seems safe to go along this road in asserting the claims of Democracy.

Another modest defence of Democracy is that laws made by a majority are likely to reflect public opinion sufficiently to be obeyed and enforced. That also is true; but it is a gross exaggeration, or rather perversion, of this truth to say that obedience is due only to those laws about which we have been directly or indirectly consulted. Our obedience is due supremely to God and Right; secondarily it is due to the law as being on the whole an embodiment of Right and as the bond of public order on which, as a general rule, public welfare depends. The authority of any given law does not depend on the assent of the citizens to that particular enactment, but on their consent to the general constitution whereby the legislature, whatever it is, is entitled to make laws. For Law, though most august, is not an ultimate tribunal; our duty to God, and even our duty to the State in its highest interests, may require us to rebel against the actual enactments of the State.

We must therefore repudiate three frequent defences of Democracy: we must deny that there is any inherent sovereignty in the People; we must deny that the People as a whole, or any majority, is of necessity, or even probably, right—*vox populi* is by no means identical with *vox Dei*; and we must deny that our obligation to obey the Law is derived from our having a voice in making the law. But if all these impressive foundations of democratic doctrine are removed, is nothing left except the two meagre considerations set forth above, that a majority is more likely to be nearly right than any particular minority, and that laws passed by the majority are likely to receive obedience and enforcement? For if this is all that can be said, a popular dictatorship may do as well as a democracy, and even better; for it will be more efficient. Is the type of Government represented

by the three names Napoleon, Lenin, Mussolini really as good in itself as a representative Democracy? We are convinced that it is not; but the grounds of that conviction lie in another sphere than those which we have considered hitherto.

II

We have alluded to certain episodes in the French Revolution. The watchword of that volcanic upheaval was "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity." The last did not exercise any very great influence, except perhaps in the cynical sense attributed to it by M. Clemenceau when he said, "Fraternity is the oldest passion of mankind: Cain and Abel, Cain and Abel." But Liberty and Equality were ideals passionately held. Unfortunately they are incompatible, unless Equality is understood to mean equality of opportunity; and then it becomes one form of Liberty. The early Republicans meant by Equality very much more than that: they meant the spirit which expresses itself in the saying, "One man is as good as another, and a great deal better too." For ten years, from 1789 till 1799, the struggles between Liberty and Equality convulsed France, till Napoleon suppressed both together. On the whole, Equality had won the day. It was entirely supreme under Robespierre, in the days of whose supremacy Liberty counted for less than perhaps in any other period of European history. After the close of the Terror, Liberty had some scope, and Licence a great deal. But the Government of the Directory was too feeble and too corrupt to secure that public order which is the breath of life to Liberty, so the fall of the tyrant was not a birth of freedom.

Now the passion for Equality as shown in the Revolution and at many other times has been a self-assertive passion. It has not frequently appeared in the form of one who was rich becoming poor that others through his

poverty might be made rich; that passion is indeed divine rather than human, and men receive it only from God; such a passion for Equality on a large scale would heal the worst sicknesses of mankind. But there was none of this about the men who made the Revolution; with them it was the claim of Tom, Dick, and Harry to be the equals of the King, who was called for the purpose Citizen Capet, though Capet was not his name. From such self-assertion little good could come. Various gross evils were cleared away, and the space was left for reconstruction; but the Revolution could not reconstruct until it threw up the genius who was at once its child and its master.

Yet the Revolution, though its prophets were inconceivably muddle-headed, was necessary; for there was something of priceless value for which the old *régime* made no allowance—Liberty. More and more clearly, as the years have passed by since the essence of the Revolution was affirmed in the Oath of the Tennis Court, it becomes evident that the deep unconscious clamour of men's hearts was not for Equality but for Liberty. Outraged by Privilege in its most insolent form, they thought Equality was what they wanted. It was not then; it is not now; for it is not a reality. But Liberty they needed and all that hindered it had to go, because Liberty is the political and social expression of the greatest reality in the world—the spiritual personality in man.

Here is the real root of Democracy. We must find some way of recognising that each individual citizen is no tool to be made use of for the attainment of some prosperity in which he will not share, still less mere cannon-fodder, but is a living personality, with mind and heart and will, who can only be himself so far as he freely thinks and feels and plans. The root of Democracy is respect for individual personality.

At this point Democracy closely touches Christianity which teaches the infinite worth of every individual.

Democracy is just one, almost certainly the fullest and best, way of showing respect for the individual in the political constitution; majority rule is the one device for giving constitutional weight to the judgment of the ordinary man. Its justification is not that the majority is sure to be right, for it is much more likely to be partly wrong; nor that it is efficient, for up to date that has not been conspicuously true; but that it does honour to the ordinary citizen and helps to develop his personality. In short, its justification is its educational efficacy.

III

Now if the root and the value of Democracy are to be found in respect for the individual, it is clear that Democracy itself, if it become perverted, may destroy its own foundation and the purpose for which it exists. Human beings are not yet fully rational, and instincts tend to sway them more powerfully than reason. Plainly Democracy gives great opportunities for the herd-instinct; plainly also the herd-instinct is destructive of that individuality for which Democracy exists. Here is a peril of the most alarming kind. For Democracy of necessity works through mass meetings, demonstrations, and other machinery which inevitably calls the herd-instinct into full play and makes it very difficult for the individual to preserve his independence of feeling or judgment. Moreover it is hard for the majority to show sympathy or even toleration to an individual who takes a contrary view. It is no easy matter for one member of a trade union, for example, to defend the employing class against what he thinks unjust accusations which have just been received with loud applause. In such a case there is great need for charity in the majority and for courage in the dissentient minority or individual. But if that courage and charity is not forthcoming, Democracy will have destroyed

itself; it will have crushed out the individuality, respect for which is its very life-blood, and it will give place to Bureaucracy or Despotism. Napoleon was the inevitable result of the course taken by the French Revolution. That he was a genius made his despotism both brilliant and in the main beneficent; but the despotism had to come.

Obviously this means that while Democracy may be the ideal form of constitution it makes very special demands on the moral qualities of the citizens. It rests on respect for their individuality; but unless they respond to that respect, it will itself crush out their individuality and so destroy itself.

Undoubtedly the danger is greatest in the working classes, who also stand to gain most by the full establishment of Democracy on its own basis. The danger is greatest here for two main reasons. First there is on the whole far more sense of a fight to be fought among working-class people than among the salaried or shareholding classes. They feel a necessity to stand together if they are to escape defeat and oppression. And their past history gives ample warrant for this feeling. Consequently the herd-instinct tends to be developed among them in its keenest form; for it is always strongest in conflict. But besides this, the members of the working classes live far closer to one another than do members of other classes; the good opinion of his neighbours matters far more to a working man than to a well-to-do citizen who has some space in his own house, opportunity to gather his own chosen friends round him, and a motor in which to escape to other scenery and other faces. So it is bound to be among the working class that Democracy is put to its supremest test.

If it is to emerge from that test approved for a long period of activity, two conditions must be fulfilled: first, there must be a great development of working-class

education—so great as to make the working classes zealous for individuality; secondly, it must find its strength in spiritual power, not in concern for material benefits.

The whole forward movement of our social life turns on the development among the great mass of the people of that kind of education which makes men eager both to think for themselves and to appreciate the truth in any opinions from which they dissent. This is something totally different from propaganda. There may quite well be a place for propaganda as well as for education; but it is not the same thing. Those who are strong supporters of propaganda among the working classes are chiefly people who wish to recruit an army for the successful prosecution of the class-war; the object to be gained is primarily a better organisation of the material side of life, and thereby also a fuller realisation of human brotherhood. Such a policy rests on a radically false psychology. No doubt the organisation of society has an immensely strong suggestive influence, and is one of the main factors in the formation of character. But it is not the only one; and passions aroused for purposes of war cannot be laid to rest because the fight is won. If the whole policy of this school could be carried out, the instincts of pugnacity, aroused to create the state of brotherhood, would begin to destroy it before it was established; but even if it were established, its unity would be that of the herd of animals, not the free fellowship of individual personalities.

It must not, indeed, be supposed that it is only to the working classes that the value of individuality needs to be preached. There are those who sheepishly follow the *Morning Post*, just as there are those who sheepishly follow the *Daily Herald*. And there is a political school of thought which deprecates the development of individuality on aristocratic grounds, just as another deprecates it on communistic grounds. But the strength of

Democracy is in the working classes, and if there its roots are sapped, its decay must be rapid and ruinous.

The second condition, besides the development of true education, is the reliance upon spiritual power. This is partly because true spiritual interests are always a uniting force; the good things of the spirit are such that the more one has, the more there is for others; so it is with knowledge, appreciation of beauty, loyalty, courage, love, joy and peace. But it is also because, if humanity is to rise to the level of character requisite for true Democracy, it must be by the infusion of the Grace of God, whose universal and all-loving Fatherhood is the one true ground of that respect for the personality of the ordinary man on which Democracy rests.

Why, after all, should a triumphant majority respect the minority it has defeated at the polls? Why should a Sovereign People respect any rights in an individual who sets himself up against it? Why should the State have regard to the claims of some handful of citizens that make themselves a nuisance? There is only one reason; it is that these individuals or little groups are, equally with the other component units of the Sovereign People itself, children of God. Here, if we want it, is the ground of that true and deep compatibility that exists between Monarchy and Democracy. Here also is the one inspiration of true Democracy and the one influence that can keep it wholesome.

By three tests it can be known whether Democracy is true to its own root principle: by the depth of its concern for justice to individuals; by the careful regard which it pays to the rights of minorities; by the scrupulous respect which it offers to whatever can present itself in the name of individual conscience. Of these the last is the most vital of all. Society may have to protect itself against fanatical faddists; but respect to the conscientious objector is, broadly speaking, a hall-mark of true Democracy.

IV

But if Society as a whole is to maintain such a character, when its members are absorbed in the engrossing claims of politics, business, industry, and the like, there must be a spiritual society interlaced with the secular society keeping it true to its highest ideals. Here is the function of the Church in relation to public life. Its main work now as always must be the conversion and sanctification of individuals. On that everything depends; if that goes, all goes. But the Church must also have its direct impact upon the ordered life of the community—its politics, industry, and all the rest. It will not pretend to expert knowledge, or offer to settle technical disputes. But it will constantly affirm the spiritual principles which are involved in any department of public life, and it will try to bring together in mutual good-will those who are at variance, that together they may find the solution of their problem.

Above all the Church will perpetually insist that no question touching human life is ever merely secular, merely economic, merely material. All that touches human life is fundamentally spiritual, and can only be rightly settled under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

Democracy may degenerate into mob rule, which is the worst of all tyrannies. But it is capable of being the political expression of man's nature as a free spiritual being. Nothing political in our generation matters quite so much as the realisation of the spiritual roots of Democracy, and the determination to keep them vigorous and strong.

This task may be rendered difficult by historical circumstances, but in principle it should not seem other than obvious. It is no accident that Democracy in the modern sense—that is Democracy not based on slavery —should have grown up only in Christian countries. We

have seen that the root of Democracy is respect for personality; and this is so truly a Christian principle that it is from Christianity that our whole idea of personality has sprung. As Professor Webb has lately shown in his Gifford Lectures, this idea was gradually formed out of the Christian teaching about God, and was then applied also to Man because of his experienced personal fellowship with God. It is not the fact, as is commonly supposed, that men first reached the thought of personality in Man and then transferred it to God; on the contrary, they first reached this idea in their doctrine of God, as they formed this in the light of Christ's revelation, and then transferred it to Man, whose personality they felt to be guaranteed by his personal intercourse with the personal God.

Of course, the ancients were not without any conception of personality. Very much of that Christian conception of it which we inherit comes from Plato and Aristotle. But the conception was so far incomplete, indistinct, and foreign to ordinary thought that the ancients in fact had no word for it. The apprehension of it is a part of the Christian enrichment of human thought and life.

From this it is plain at once both that there is a close relationship in principle between Christianity and Democracy, and that the Church can best discharge its task of spiritualising Democracy by insisting on those elements in it which are closest to its Christian root. Thus on the one side the Church should steadily stand for the rights of personality in preference to those of property when these two conflict. It will not indeed suppose that humane sentiment can alter economic facts, and it will remember that respect for economic laws is the best way to befriend those who are dependent on their operation. But this will not hinder its protest against all that tends to reduce persons to mere instru-

ments of production. So far as the Labour Movement is claiming a fuller recognition of the rights of personality, the Church will be its ally.

But the Church will also perpetually insist that personality in men is derivative, not original, and only deserves the recognition claimed for it so far as it recognises itself as dependent on the Personality of God. Consequently its exercise must correspond with the known character of God. The revelation through which we know God as fully personal, also sets Him before us as righteous self-sacrificing love. Now what has mainly spoilt democratic movements in the past has been that they have rested on the assertion of rights rather than of duties, and even where the rights asserted are true and just, the assertion of them creates an ungodly, because unlovely, frame of mind. The whole notion of rights belongs to the world of claims and counter-claims, the world below the level of fellowship. But the notion of duties at once lifts us to that level, and increasingly so as the divine spirit of love becomes the mainspring of our performance of duty.

Democracy is akin to Christianity; but Christianity is a great deal more than Democracy. It lifts it to its true origin which is faith, not primarily in Man, but primarily in God, and in Man because he was made to be a child of God and member of God's family. Nothing in Democracy itself needs to be changed in the process of its spiritualisation; but very much in most democrats must be changed. And only in the degree in which that change takes place, only in the degree in which democrats put duty before rights and recognise that the rights of human personality are derived from its dependence on and relation to the divine Personality, can Democracy become the ideal form of society or be secured against the danger of degenerating into the worst.

II
MISCELLANEOUS

TRUTH AND TRADITION

The Christian Church is entrusted with a body of teaching about the nature and acts of God and the nature and destiny of man; this body of teaching, which of course involves practical consequences covering the whole field of life, is handed on from one generation to another; it is, in fact, a tradition. Christianity itself comes to us by the way of tradition and by no other way. On tradition the Church rests. If its tradition is proved to be false, either altogether or in some point demonstrably vital to its character or structure, then the Church falls. But knowledge constantly grows, and in its growth it perpetually challenges this tradition to vindicate itself. Moreover, under the influence of this persistent and constantly changing challenge, the tradition submits to modification, so that while it is continuous it is not unchanging. The result is that in every age new questions arise concerning, first, the truth of the tradition as a whole; secondly, the modifications in it that are called for by new knowledge; and thirdly, the extent to which (if at all) these modifications discredit the tradition itself.

I

The claim of truth is paramount: there is no dispute about that. The dispute concerns the kind of evidence that is admissible and the weight that may rightly be attached to the various kinds. There are some who

would rule out as inadmissible all evidence derived from the tradition itself or from the experience on which it rests. The tradition, they say, is on its trial; its truth is the very matter of dispute; it is therefore quite unreasonable to allow its existence to be pleaded as evidence of its truth. They go further, and say that the alleged experience on which the tradition rests must also be ruled out, until the tradition has been vindicated; for if the tradition is false, this experience can be accounted for as hallucination due to self-suggestion. Hence it is urged that reasonable ground for the religious interpretation of the world should be produced without reference to religion itself; for the fundamental question is precisely the question whether religion as a whole, and the Christian religion in particular, is true or false. So the whole religious tradition is ruled out by this class of inquirers until an investigation of the other facts accessible to us has shown independently that the tradition is sound, or at least credible.

There is a value in this approach to the matter, for it is a very good thing to discover how far the mind is led towards a religious view of life apart from all reference to specifically religious beliefs or practices. If it turns out (as I hold) that an entirely non-religious philosophy leads by purely intellectual processes to a belief in the supremacy of Spirit, that is worth finding out, and Christians will return to their own traditional belief and practice greatly encouraged by this result. If, on the other hand, it appears that, apart from religious belief and practice, no evidence for the existence of a supreme Spirit is obtainable, that will only lead to a stronger insistence on the value of the tradition to which we owe such belief and practice.

For it must be insisted that the method of excluding from the evidence for religion all that is derived from religion can only be admitted as strictly provisional.

If it is really followed, we have a repetition of the absurdity of the Dutch judge in the legend, who is reported to have given sentence as soon as the case for the plaintiff was ended; when told he must hear the arguments on the other side, he said, "That would be ridiculous: now it is all as clear as daylight; but if I let the other people begin, it will all be confused again." It may be possible (though I deny this) to construct a complete and coherent philosophic system which says of God, with the astronomer, "I had no need of that hypothesis." For astronomy this is justifiable enough; but for philosophy it will not do. The religious beliefs and practices of mankind, and the experience which both originates these and issues from them, are part of the data, and cannot be ignored without committal of the gravest of all intellectual crimes—neglect of the facts.

For the religious believer will always say: "The main support of my faith is not any process of reasoning, but the verification of my belief which experience constantly brings to me as I act upon it. I cannot communicate this to you. If you ignore it, and tell me that you can explain the world, including this experience of mine, without recourse to any belief in God, you will not impress me. For I am more sure of my real intercourse with God than of my intercourse (O philosophic friend!) with you Therefore I must suppose that, if one or the other is a figment of my imagination, it is yourself. More readily, however, would I assume that you (O competent Agnostic!) have never so much as begun to understand the nature of the experience of which I speak, and this explains the ineptitude of your so-called explanation and, in explaining, deprives it of all force."

But, if this answer be allowed, we find ourselves in this position. We are challenged to prove that the religious experience is valid; we discover the necessity of calling in that experience as evidence of its own validity; and

the experience is at once the origin and the result of a tradition, for the tradition arises out of that experience and then reproduces the experience in those who accept and act on the tradition. What this amounts to is simply that the religious experience must be accepted, like any other, as a real basis for our inferences. "He that believeth hath the evidence in himself" (or "in Him" on whom his faith is set), as St John puts it. The religious life does not depend for its legitimacy on the validity of inferences from elsewhere. It has exactly the same credentials as the scientific, the æsthetic, the moral. It arises out of an aspiration inherent in human nature, which justifies itself in the experience of those who act upon it.

Having been accepted, the religious experience proceeds to colour all other departments of experience and to suggest its own view of the world. Here again it comes into conflict with all theorising which has not accepted its testimony. For when it has been admitted, as it is by nearly all competent thinkers, that the religious experience is valid in its own department, it is still often claimed that historical events must be considered only in the light of presuppositions altogether independent of religion. Thus it is often asserted that we can only accept as true such parts of the religious tradition as square with the rest of our knowledge; and as a general proposition this cannot be disputed. But it is generally assumed that "the rest of our knowledge" includes such general negations as "Men cannot walk on the water"; "Human beings cannot be born apart from human fatherhood"; "Dead bodies cannot be resuscitated." In other words, it is often assumed that there is some conflict between the so-called nature-miracles of Christian tradition and the knowledge of the world that comes from natural science. It is impossible to use too much emphasis in denying the existence or even the possibility of such a conflict. Natural science makes no pretence

at all to tell us by what process God might become incarnate in human nature or in a human being, nor to predict the results of His incarnation. It is indeed very probable that spirit, even as we know it in ourselves, has far greater power over matter than our recent exercise of that power would suggest, or than scientists, taking such limited exercise as their starting-point, would have, until lately, considered possible. But what Incarnate God will do is a question upon which inferences drawn from ordinary human experience can throw no light whatever. The Christian is therefore obliged to insist that his experience, bound up as it is with the tradition he has inherited, compels him to employ presuppositions, in dealing with acts purporting to be acts of God, which might well be ruled out in relation to acts for which no such claim is made.

If God once became incarnate, that event must itself be the most revealing fact in history; it will reveal, not only the actuality of God Himself, but also the potentiality of the medium in which the incarnation takes place. St John is careful to call this "flesh"; it is not merely what is possible for man as a spiritual being, but also what is possible for matter when fully indwelt or controlled by spirit, that is revealed. The Christian will not reconstruct his faith to suit the demands of a non-religious physics: he is much more disposed to insist on a reconstruction of physics to suit the demands of his faith.

II

It does not follow that the Christian tradition is to be regarded as sacrosanct and inviolable, or that science is always to accommodate itself to any traditional belief of the general body of Christians. That such a conclusion seems to follow from what are in themselves sound contentions is the excuse (so far as there is one) for

obscurantism such as Christians have often displayed. But there is also a tradition of the natural sciences; and this tradition also has been vindicated by experience. And there is a very real collision from time to time between the two traditions. There can be no conflict between the results of natural science and any tradition claiming to record divine acts; but there can be a very real collision of claims set up on behalf of different intellectual methods when any matter of inquiry falls within the sphere of both methods. That is what happens with the histories of the beginning of Christianity. Because they deal with alleged acts of God, they come within the sphere of the methods of inquiry appropriate to religious subjects; because they claim to be history, they fall within the sphere of the methods accepted in other departments of historical study.

But it is possible to relieve the tension. The religious consciousness has nothing whatever to say to textual criticism, nor to questions of authorship, except so far as general presuppositions may be involved in these, as they are in the question of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel. No amount of traditional belief in the Church is of the smallest weight in deciding such a question as the authorship of Isaiah xl.–lxvi., or of the Epistle to the Hebrews, or again such a question as the literary relation of the First and Third Gospels to the Second—unless the tradition can be traced back to a date almost contemporary with the writing of the books concerned; and even then it is strictly not the tradition as tradition but the contemporary testimony which has weight. It may therefore be said that with higher, as with lower or textual, criticism the religious consciousness has, broadly speaking, nothing to do.

It is not here, however, that the battle chiefly rages. When we come to such a controversy as that about the Virgin Birth of our Lord, we have to disentangle various

strands. If a student tells us that, apart from all estimate of possibilities, he finds more actual documentary evidence on the negative side than on the positive side, the religious consciousness has nothing to say about that. The Churchman may still say that he is sure God would not let the Church incorporate in its creed what was false, and therefore may believe in the event despite the documentary evidence; he is most assuredly not entitled to say that he knows by some spiritual process that the documentary evidence for this event is good documentary evidence. Now, this negative view of the documentary evidence has in fact been seriously propounded; to me it seems quite fantastic, but it must be judged by the ordinary canons of historical evidence.

More commonly the view taken is that such documentary evidence as exists is preponderatingly in favour of the event in question, but that the event is, though not impossible, yet so immensely improbable that only overwhelming evidence could make it credible; and the evidence is not overwhelming. But here, it is to be noticed, the decision is avowedly given against the documentary evidence on general grounds of improbability, and the matter is, by the negative critic himself, transferred from the realm of positive evidence to the realm of presuppositions. Here the Christian who stands by his tradition is fully entitled to argue that such general presuppositions are part of a theory of the universe; that religion, if it is valid at all, offers its own clue to the problem of the universe and its own basis for a theory of it; and that from the religious standpoint the antecedent probabilities suggest an affirmative rather than a negative position. For it is certainly possible (if the Christian view of the universe is true) that God should work miracles, in the sense of doing exceptional things on exceptional occasions; and if it is possible, then it is even natural, as conforming with nature's uniformity,

that so unique an occurrence as the life of the God-Man should have a unique inauguration. The Christian, who works out his religion into a philosophy, finds that unity of the universe, which the mind postulates in all its activities, not in a series of invariable reactions, but in the Logos, the thought of God expressed in creation, which he believes to be fully revealed in Christ.

We can see plainly enough, from every point of view, why nature should be generally uniform in the workaday sense in which we usually think of its uniformity. Logically, it is necessary that the same cause should always have the same effect (provided, of course, that it really is the same cause; if it is not, there will be a different effect, which will sometimes be called a miracle). Morally, it is necessary to all reasonable action that we should be able to count on a general constancy in nature: if material particles every now and then repelled instead of attracting each other, or if the revolution of the earth were liable to capricious variations, there could be no reasonable calculation, no adjustment of means to ends, no purposive action. If man is to have moral freedom, nature must be generally constant. But both these arguments leave room for what will seem like variations in the fixed order on sufficient occasions. If the divine will is active in any special or unusual way, then plainly the cause in question is profoundly modified and the effect will be modified also; and the constancy in nature which is needed for effective moral freedom is sufficiently secure if variations in the normal order are exceedingly rare and only occur on occasions which can be appreciated as adequate to account for them. This leaves the field clear for all purposes of science and of ethical conduct; and all that is to be set against it is the sheer dogma of a mechanical uniformity, as distinct from a spiritual unity—a dogma which can only be held by those who ignore the testimony of religious experience.

Yet the Christian must needs confess that what men have learnt by the methods of science, alike in physics and in history, is itself a revelation from God. And the principles which have guided, and been vindicated by, scientific discovery must be affirmed to have so general a truth that apparent exceptions will only be admitted if the sufficiency of the occasion is evident. Moreover, it is apparent that in many respects the general body of Christian opinion has been profoundly modified by the influence of scientific inquiry. Remembering this, the orthodox Christian should never be indignant when the questioning spirit challenges some point in his tradition hitherto left untouched; should always be prepared for every question to be discussed on its own merits, provided only that the presuppositions of the inquiry are compatible with the testimony of the religious experience which is the root of his tradition; and should be very patient and sympathetic towards those who, sharing his fundamental convictions, find themselves driven by the force of the argument to differ from the common tradition of Christendom at one point or another.

III

Hitherto we have considered chiefly the collision that sometimes occurs between orthodox Christians and scientific students. There is another conflict to be considered: it arises within the society of Christian believers themselves. A Christian inquirer may come to the conclusion that in some respect the accepted Christian tradition is untrue to its own source and spirit. Thus a belief in the equal authority of all the books of the Bible would be false to the Christian's experience of God and involve contradiction of some of the teaching of Christ. This is a type of criticism to which every Christian must give earnest attention, lest he should make the command-

ment of God of none effect by the tradition which he has received. Here that tradition is being criticised, not by some outside standard, but by the criterion of its own inspiring principle. The doctrine of the Virgin Birth is assailed, not only on grounds suggested by scientific study, but also on the ground that it makes the life and death of the Incarnate less spiritually valuable than it is for those who believe that our Lord was born in all respects as other men are born. I do not believe that this is so, and on another occasion I may be able to suggest an answer to this argument. But it is in itself an argument of the most serious kind; and it is prompted by religious devotion and fervour. Again, there is a widespread criticism of the formulas, traditionally accepted, which declare the union of divinity and humanity in our Lord. Some of the critics are, on general philosophic grounds, objecting to the whole conception of a real Incarnation; but some believe that the traditional formulations—such as the decree of Chalcedon, embodied in part in the second of the Thirty-nine Articles—do less than justice to their own theme, and that by the help of modern psychology a fuller understanding of the Incarnation can be reached. This is a contention which must be met, not only with patience and charity, but with cordial approbation of its aim. It is to be found especially in those who, believing that our Lord is both perfect God and perfect Man, consider that his perfect Manhood must include a human personality, and that to conceive of the Person of the Divine Word as taking upon Himself human nature, without assuming also a human personality, is in fact to make His humanity something less than perfect. This contention may or may not be sound—for myself, I believe that it is sound; but its origin is not to be found in any impulse (whencesoever derived) to disbelieve or depreciate the central article of the faith, but to be more fully loyal to it; and orthodox people who are content with

the old tradition should not treat this energy of loyalty as if it were incipient infidelity. To take one more instance: the Catholic doctrine of Apostolic Orders is attacked on the ground that it implies an unspiritual conception of God, and has the effect of denying to the individual soul the freedom of direct and immediate access to the Redeemer. That is a serious argument; I think it is mistaken, but I see how easily the mistake may arise; and, eager as I am for the organic unity of Christendom, I can easily conceive that the non-episcopal ministries are, in the providence of God, a necessary factor in the life of the whole Church until we are secure against the danger of accepting a magical interpretation of orders and sacraments.

IV

One point remains to be noticed. The Christian tradition must of necessity be cast in intellectual form and be expressed in language. But words change their meaning under the influence of successive phases of thought. The word "substance," which occurs in the Nicene Creed, has conveyed different thoughts to men's minds at different dates; the word "person" has a similar history. And when by study we ascertain approximately the meaning of such terms in the minds of those who embodied them in authoritative deliverances, we find that we cannot simply make that meaning our own, because it is bound up with a whole philosophy which we do not accept. Therefore the expression of the spiritual experience which is offered by God to men in Christ must vary from age to age; and no one who has seriously considered the relation of expression to thought will suppose that if the expression is changed the intellectual content can be quite unaltered. What remains unaltered is the historical facts and the kernel (at least) of the spiritual experience—*e.g.* "suffered under Pontius Pilate"

and "the forgiveness of sins." It is noteworthy that the Creeds are almost entirely concerned with these; and, though the adoption of the phrase "of one substance with the Father" by the Nicene Council marked the triumph of an indispensable truth, yet the Conservatives of the time had serious grounds for resisting the innovation of inserting into the Creed a phrase not found in Holy Scripture, and already condemned by a Council of the Church.

There is only one truth, and all its parts are mutually interdependent. Progress in knowledge at one point always may involve revision of the whole system. What the Christian must be concerned about is that the deliverances of his religious experience and that of the saints shall be allowed their due influence, and that changes of belief are such as to promote a fuller understanding and appreciation of that experience, and in no wise explain it away.

FAITH AND AUTHORITY

FAITH usually changes its own basis as it develops. At first it is based on authority—whether it be of parents, or teachers, or generally accepted opinion. As conduct is guided by such faith, experience is gradually accumulated which becomes increasingly the evidence to which faith turns. When the development is complete and the believer can say, "I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me," faith becomes independent of any basis outside itself and entirely self-sufficient. But this certainty is not communicable, though it is the main element in the authority on which faith in its initial stages rests.

I

All life rests on faith. No conceivable activity can take place without it. Reason itself, as a guide to action, depends upon the faith that the world is rational. No doubt this article of faith, like others, finds perpetually fuller confirmation in the experience of life; but it never receives proof. The most agnostic science has this element of faith at its root. More conspicuous is the part that faith plays in our relations with other people. The most hardened cynic is bound to act on faith ten times as often as he acts on the distrust which he makes his boast. Every time he eats a meal he acts on the faith that the cook does not intend to poison him. Faith, in the sense of practical action deliber-

ately based on undemonstrated convictions, pervades all life.

Childhood is conspicuously dependent on faith, both consciously and unconsciously. The unconscious faith is the earliest and remains the deepest; it is an instinctive disposition to accept what elders, especially parents, tell us, and a little later the principles on which they seem to act. There is an altogether unconscious imitation of the habits and standards accepted in our surroundings, which just because it is unconscious is immune from criticism when the critical powers come into play. So is formed a great body of prejudices which seem to the man who holds them to be self-evident certainties inevitably accepted by all right-thinking men. Education, if it is effective, forces the critical mind to examine some of these prejudices; but their influence in actual life is hardly ever eradicated. They are accepted in faith, in sheer unquestioning trust, which is none the less trust because it is unconscious and there is no act of choice between one object of trust and another.

It is a platitude to insist that no influence can be so potent as that of home life. It is certainly true that most people who display in their maturity a passion of religious conviction ascribe the strength of their religious life mainly to the influence of a good mother. Psychologists may give the process what name they like; the fact is clear. And the authority on which faith rests is in such cases plainly that of father and mother and others who by love have won the love and trust of the child.

It is quite true that in the individual child this faith is as yet entirely unrationalised; but it is not necessarily irrational. It may be capable of very strong rational defence; and it may represent one of those vast inductions from experience which are gathered up in the various conventions that govern the life of societies. Nor is it irrational in the child to accept the guidance of his home

with this unwavering trust. Some guidance he must have, and this is far the best available.

The child, then, draws in his religious belief from the atmosphere of his home. His faith in God depends on and follows from his faith in his parents. Faith at its outset rests on authority.

II

What is the real nature of this authority? To the child, at least while childhood lasts, it seems ultimate. But it is not so. The faith of the parents nearly always has the same background as that of their children; it too goes back to a parental authority. And in every generation the faith of each separate pair of parents is part of, and is known by them to be part of, a great body of faith which exists in a vast multitude of believers. Thus the parents are to every child the representatives of the Church both in the present and in the past, and the medium through which the faith of the Church is presented to the child. And the authority of the religious home is really the authority of the whole Church focussed in that place.

The true authority of the Church is to be found in the immense, the overwhelming, weight, which in the judgment of any reflecting mind attaches to the unanimity of many thousands in successive generations who, having made trial of the Christian way of life, declare that they have found the blessings promised to it to be real and beyond price. It is an unformulated authority; and its testimony does not constitute cogent proof; it is always possible that in one point or another new light may lead to a modification of what has been traditionally received. But in its broad impact it is irresistible. We are confronted with a great multitude of people whose lives show the presence of some uplifting power beyond the experience of other men; and they assure us with one voice

that they find this power through their faith in God as He is made known in Christ.

This is the basal authority of the Church; the authority of General Councils with regard to specific points of doctrine is less august than this, and is derived from it. Indeed, it is a sound Catholic maxim that the findings of a General Council derive their authority from the *consensus fidelium*. The special questions on which Councils give their decisions arise from the experience of the Christian life; and the decisions are formed by consideration of what is involved in and necessary to that life. The authority of the Church is the testimony of the lives of the saints.

III

As the child grows in understanding he begins to perceive that this is so. He finds that what he had tacitly accepted from his home is, in fact, the deliberate conviction of thousands; that this faith has been formulated in definite propositions and developed into a coherent body of thought; and that his own experience tends to confirm it in the degree in which he puts it in practice.

But by this time his own questioning faculty is awake; he wants to know for himself the reasons for what he believes; and he becomes aware that while there is a great volume of authority supporting his inherited belief, there is also a great body of opinion which rejects it and is disconcertingly articulate in expression of the grounds for this rejection. From this point onwards there are three main lines of development that he may follow.

(1) He may find that, in spite of criticisms from without, his own certainty remains unshaken. The tradition of the Church so perfectly fits in with and completes what is suggested by his own inner experience that he accepts it as a whole without any misgiving. He may express this by saying that he has an initial conviction

of the infallibility of the Church which carries with it acceptance as a matter of course of whatever the Church is found to teach; but it seems probable that this conviction is more common in those who follow the second line of development. Plainly this first type is delivered from many spiritual anxieties and struggles; the deliverance may be due either to superficiality or to depth.

(2) In characters where either the emotions are more rebellious or the intellect more critical a precisely opposite development takes place. The instinct to discard whatever relies largely on the authority of elders, or the instinct to reject any belief which cannot actually be established by proof, causes a repudiation of the faith of childhood altogether. This may be only a phase from which the growing soul passes on to the third line of development; but if it be more than a phase, one of two things is likely to happen. Either faith is permanently discarded, or else the religious instincts are found imperiously to demand what the intellect is utterly unable to provide; in the latter case there is a period of inward struggle, at the end of which the man often surrenders himself to a religion of authority consciously and deliberately accepted as such. Rome owes some of her most intellectual and sincerest converts to this process. Their minds remain sceptical; their hearts demand assurance; quite deliberately they go to the authority which, as authority, is most definite and most imposing, determined to accept its dictates. Such souls do in very truth put their faith first in the authority of the Church and secondarily in what the Church teaches.

(3) Where faith survives, however, it is usually by a more complicated process. The young man or woman never loses sight of the power of faith as it was seen in those from whom he or she first learnt it. But the strength of the opposing argument is keenly felt. If in the early training there had been no recognition of this

argument, there is great danger lest the discovery of it may suggest that the religious life of home had been a fool's paradise. But if those who gave the first religious teaching are known to have made allowance for the full force of the case against faith so far as it seemed to have truth in it, its onset finds a resistance already prepared. To know that the Church itself has faced one's problems and deliberately made a decision on them has a steadying influence; but most of us are so constituted that this influence is far more powerful when it comes through the personal experience of people well known to ourselves. If we know people who know our own problem, and have honestly studied the arguments, and still hold to the old beliefs, that fortifies us more than anything else in the world. But still it settles nothing. The inquirer still feels bound to pursue his own investigations. Authority, which was formerly an all-sufficient ground for the faith of childhood, can now do no more than prevent a light-hearted repudiation and secure that its own case is given as fair a hearing as the adversary's.

Much now depends on the wisdom with which authority is exercised. If parents or other representatives of traditional belief and practice exhibit either alarm or annoyance, their influence is at once diminished. Wisdom for them is shown in a patient faith in God, in a sympathetic readiness to hear and to speak when consulted, and in an equal readiness to be ignorant if the young soul is uncommunicative and to avoid all intrusive advice. After all, it is God Himself, and not either parents or teachers or clergy, to whom the soul must learn to turn; and He has His own plans for each. What is asked of authority is very difficult; for authority is, or ought to be, inspired with a yearning love, and that love is very conscious of its tenderness. Youth tends to assume a self-reliant aspect and to be rough in speech; often it is deeply unsympathetic; but in truth it is youth, not

age or authority, whose destiny is in the balance. If the aim of parent or priest is quite free from the self-assertiveness which desires agreement more than truth, they will watch the struggle in the soul of youth with sympathy and also with awe. They will have no ready-made methods. They will be there to help if called on. And they will rely on the Holy Spirit to tell them, as each occasion for advice arises, what they shall speak.

If authority acts thus there will be no hostile reaction in the sensitive young soul. And one piece of advice that will be offered when any advice is asked will be this: "Do not, unless your conscience absolutely demands it, abandon the practices of your devotional life. You may have doubts about their intellectual justification, but never abandon them merely because of doubt; do not abandon them unless you come to feel sure that they are, in fact, without justification. For you are weighing evidence. And a great part of the evidence which justifies the devotional practices of the Church is found in those practices themselves."

It is almost certain that a growing soul of the type that we are now considering will for a time deny, or at least so doubt as definitely not to believe, some part of the traditional belief of the Church. Recovery is likely to begin through activity of some practical and unquestionably Christian character. As a man persists in the practice of prayer and communion, and engages in Christian activities, he comes to a definite and firm conviction that some parts of the Christian faith are certainly true. Then it may be that he will perceive how completely all of it is of one piece, and will accept the whole on the strength of what his own experience has confirmed, though he still has to await any personal appreciation of the spiritual value of some parts of what he thus accepts. Gradually, as spiritual experience widens and deepens, he may come to a personal apprehension of the whole,

or even if that never happens he may come to so vivid a sense of those aspects which have come home to him that he is now independent of all authority for the substance of his religious life.

IV

Meanwhile, authority is confronted with a very difficult problem. If it could ever be certain that all who follow the third course of development which we have described will arrive before their death at a full and complete grasp of the whole Catholic faith, or even at deliberate acquiescence in the whole on account of sure conviction concerning some parts, the problem would be relatively simple. But this, in fact, does not always occur. We find a very large number of people who are genuine disciples of Christ, saying their prayers and seeking to use their lives in whatever way may best prepare the way for the coming of that Kingdom of God which He proclaimed. But at one point or another they find themselves bound in conscience to dissent from the traditional Christian belief. The dissent may concern fundamental principles or particular historic facts. A man who believes with all his soul that the only right way to live is the way that Jesus Christ taught and followed, sometimes finds himself unable to believe that Jesus Christ is God incarnate. He is a disciple and a follower; but he cannot accept the fundamental article of the Christian Creed. Again, there are many who whole-heartedly accept that article but are unable to assent to the doctrine of the Virgin Birth or to that of our Lord's physical Resurrection. What is the Church to do in relation to such classes of people?

Two things would seem to me to be equally fatal: to modify the Creeds, and to ignore the people whom we are considering. I could not assent to any proposal to

modify the Creeds, because I believe that our present difficulties are largely due to elements in the intellectual atmosphere of our time which will pass away in the course of one or two centuries—not a long period in the life-history of the Church. The mind of our age is obsessed with physics as that of some earlier ages has been with metaphysics, and most people are unconsciously influenced by the thought of the physical world as a closed system, incapable of modification by spiritual forces; they therefore think that the uniformities observable in our everyday experience must hold good universally, even though the spiritual conditions be varied. I am convinced that the dualism implied in this conviction will pass away in a relatively short period, and that any modification of Creeds due to sympathy with those who are influenced by the prevailing tendencies of the moment would be a disastrous blunder.

But only less disastrous than that would be a failure to do anything to help the "modern" (that is, the exclusively contemporary) man to find a home in the Church of Christ. Hitherto, if he were an "adult" and not baptised in his infancy, we required of him an explicit assent to the several articles of the Apostles' Creed, including the Virgin Birth. If it is suggested that he should say, "All this I stedfastly believe," meaning only "I believe the Christian faith," and accepting the Creed as a traditional formulation of it, he is liable to be shocked in conscience. For part of the difficulty arises through what is in itself an excellent thing—a meticulous intellectual honesty. A man who, having been brought up in the Church, would by no means feel obliged to leave it because of doubt concerning some articles of the Creed, will very likely feel unable to affirm the Creed as a condition of being received into the Church. Yet he may be a zealous and devoted disciple; and he may be one who, if brought within the Church, would then

through breathing its atmosphere come to accept the doctrines which he had felt bound to disbelieve.

And, apart from this particular problem, we have to recognise that the forms of worship which are most expressive, and therefore most spiritually helpful, to those who have been trained to appreciate them, may be quite unsuitable to those who, though mature in intelligence, may be very near the beginnings in their devotional life.

It seems that we need in the home Church something corresponding to the catechumenate in the Church of early times and in the missionary Church to-day. We need a recognised means of association with the Church which shall attach to the Church those who have the right spirit but are unable to accept the whole doctrinal position of the Church. They would, of course, be welcome—as all persons whatsoever are welcome—at the public services of the Church; but there would also be arranged services specially adapted to their needs, as to the manner of conducting which they should be fully consulted. We rejoice that the revised Prayer Book provides some modification of the credal requirements made of those who, being "of riper years," present themselves for baptism. It is right to undertake that an infant received into the Church shall be brought up to believe the whole of the Church's faith; it is very difficult, and very hard, to demand of a thinking man, as a condition of his becoming a member of the Church at all, that he shall have formed a clear conviction on points about which he knows that eminent Christian scholars are divided.

But the Church must not let go its own corporate faith, even though by upholding it she excludes from her organised membership some of the most devoted followers of Christ; for her business is to transmit the knowledge of the way of salvation from one generation to another, and this can only be done by means of doctrine. Devotion is worth more than orthodoxy; but it is harder to transmit;

it tends to lose quality in the process; and after all it is always from the soil of some portion of orthodox belief that devotion can spring up. The different generations find their inspiration in different articles of the Creed; but the Church of the ages needs the whole of the Creed.

V

The soul grows to spiritual maturity under the protecting influence of authority. But when maturity is reached, authority is no longer needed.

> "He that has felt the Spirit of the Highest
> Cannot confound nor doubt Him nor deny;
> Yea, with one voice, O World, though thou deniest,
> Stand thou on that side, for on this am I."

This unshakable assurance does not mean that the believer is already made perfect.

> "Lo, from afar I summon you anigh Him,
> Lo, to the multitudes I call and say:
> This is my King, I preach and I deny Him,
> Christ whom I crucify anew to-day."

But though sin is not yet driven out, the believer knows quite certainly that he has found the power that will drive it out. His intercourse with God is a reality of which doubt is for ever impossible. And such faith becomes the very substance of authority for others. For the authority of the Church is the authority of countless multitudes who can say each one of them: "I know God hears prayer, for He has heard mine; I know the Lord offers Himself in the Holy Communion to be the life of our souls, for I have received Him thus; I know that He forgives sinners, for I have sinned and have been received back into the tenderness and intimacy of His love."

So faith becomes authority, and, as authority, produces faith. Authority is the means and faith the end, and no man's faith is yet complete until he can say even to the Church itself: "Now I believe, not because of thy speaking: for I have heard for myself and know that this is indeed the Saviour of the world."

CHRISTIANITY AND MARRIAGE

No institution is more vital to the well-being of society than the family; and the well-being of the family depends upon right relationship between the husband and wife, father and mother, who are its head. It is for this reason that the laws governing marriage are supremely important to the State. There are other aspects of Marriage with which the State is not specially concerned, though they may be of grave consequence to human life, and therefore also to the Church. If Christianity has any clear light to throw on the proper regulation of Marriage, it has in that alone a signal service to render both to civilisation and to human life. No one denies that Christianity has a great deal to say on the subject, but there is some dispute both about what it says and about the practical application of what it says. It is worth while, therefore, to attempt some further elucidation of both these points.

I

In seeking to determine what Christianity has to say, we may well begin by setting out in full the relevant passages in the New Testament.

(*a*) *St Mark x.* 2–12. "And there came unto him Pharisees, and asked him, 'Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife?' tempting him. And he answered and said unto them, 'What did Moses command you?' And they said, 'Moses suffered to write a bill of divorcement,

and to put her away.' But Jesus said unto them, 'For your hardness of heart he wrote you this commandment. But from the beginning of the creation, male and female made he them. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and the twain shall become one flesh: so that they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.' And in the house the disciples asked him again of this matter. And he saith unto them, 'Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her: and if she herself shall put away her husband, and marry another, she committeth adultery.'"

(*b*) *St Luke xvi.* 18. "Every one that putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery: and he that marrieth one that is put away from a husband committeth adultery."

(*c*) *St Matthew v.* 27, 28; 31, 32. "Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt not commit adultery: but I say unto you, that every one that looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart."

"It was said also, Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement: but I say unto you, that every one that putteth away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, maketh her an adulteress: and whosoever shall marry her when she is put away committeth adultery."

(*d*) *St Matthew xix.* 3–9. "And there came unto him Pharisees, tempting him, and saying, 'Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?' And he answered and said, 'Have ye not read, that he which made them from the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and the twain shall become one flesh? So that they are no more twain,

but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.' They say unto him, 'Why then did Moses command to give a bill of divorcement, and to put her away?' He saith unto them, 'Moses for your hardness of heart suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it hath not been so. And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and he that marrieth her when she is put away committeth adultery.'"

(*e*) *Romans vii.* 1–3. "Or are ye ignorant, brethren (for I speak to men that know the law), how that the law hath dominion over a man for so long time as he liveth? For the woman that hath a husband is bound by law to the husband while he liveth; but if the husband die, she is discharged from the law of the husband. So then if, while the husband liveth, she be joined to another man, she shall be called an adulteress: but if the husband die, she is free from the law, so that she is no adulteress, though she be joined to another man."

(*f*) 1 *Corinthians vi.* 15, 16. "Know ye not that your bodies are members of Christ? shall I then take away the members of Christ, and make them members of a harlot? God forbid. Or know ye not that he that is joined to a harlot is one body? for the twain, saith he, shall become one flesh."

(*g*) 1 *Corinthians vii.* 10–15. "But unto the married I give charge, yea not I, but the Lord, That the wife depart not from her husband (but and if she depart, let her remain unmarried, or else be reconciled to her husband); and that the husband leave not his wife. But to the rest say I, not the Lord: If any brother hath an unbelieving wife, and she is content to dwell with him, let him not leave her. And the woman which hath an unbelieving husband, and he is content to dwell with her, let her not leave her husband. For the unbelieving

husband is sanctified in the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified in the brother: else were your children unclean; but now are they holy."

Dr Charles has closely examined most of these passages, and is, in my judgment, successful in demonstrating that St Matthew is here independent of St Mark.[1] From this he proceeds to argue that the Marcan account is here dependent on the authority followed by St Matthew and that St Mark has edited it rather clumsily. For this I see no shred of evidence. It appears to me that the Marcan passage is certainly original. Doubt has been cast on verse 12, because it is held that no Jew ever heard of a wife divorcing her husband. But, as Professor Burkitt has shown, those to whom our Lord spoke had certainly heard of it, for such an event had just taken place in the royal family of the Herods. This verse, far from being a difficulty, is strong confirmation of the authenticity and accuracy of the Marcan record. But Dr Charles does, as I think, make good the claim that the passages in St Matthew are also original, though he has to admit from his own premises that the exceptive clauses are an interpolation. Dr Charles holds that our Lord accepted the Jewish law that the unfaithful wife should be stoned, and that adultery dissolves marriage. He therefore regards the exceptive clause as an interpolation which is true to the meaning of our Lord's teaching, but irrelevant where it is introduced.

The passage in Romans vii., Dr Charles sets aside as only an illustration; it is true that it is only an illustration, but that does not detract from the force of the statement; rather it increases it. The appropriateness of an illustration depends on its being, in itself, uncontroversial. St Paul could not speak as he did unless he knew that in the Church to which he wrote, the statements made would be accepted as beyond question.

[1] Charles, *The Teaching of the New Testament on Divorce.*

Dr Charles is driven to postulate interpolation once again in 1 Corinthians vii., where he regards the parenthesis which forms the first clause of verse 11 as out of place. I am constitutionally ill-disposed towards theories which have to eliminate part of their own data before they can be reconciled with the facts. There is no textual ground whatever for rejecting either the exceptive clauses in St Matthew or the parenthesis in 1 Corinthians vii. We are bound to see if we can find an interpretation of the teaching given by our Lord and His Apostle, which gives due weight to all the passages in their entirety. If we can find this, we shall have good ground for supposing that it is correct. We also have to ask whether this teaching was to be understood as "legislative," and then how we are to come nearest to conformity with it in our own day.

II

The whole controversy is usually conducted as though our Lord's words were certainly intended to afford legislation for enforcement by the Church, if not also by the State, and dealt exclusively with the question of infidelity after marriage. I believe that both these assumptions are baseless. I see no reason whatever to suppose that our Lord is legislating in this case any more than when he says, "If any man would go to law with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also" (Mt. v. 40). Everywhere He is concerned with the spirit rather than the action. In one of the passages bearing on the subject this is emphasised unmistakably. "Ye have heard that it was said, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery': but I say unto you, that every one that looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart. . . . It was said also, 'Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement: but I say unto you, that

every one that putteth away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication (*παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας*) maketh her an adulteress: and whosoever shall marry her when she is put away committeth adultery'" (Mt. v. 27, 28, 31, 32). I can see no reason for thinking that in this one passage the earlier pair of verses is to be taken as a spiritual injunction, the latter as legislation. And it seems to me contrary to our Lord's whole method that He should have given any legislation on the matter. No doubt the people who propounded conundrums wanted to induce Him to legislate; no doubt many desired out of curiosity, and some in all sincerity, to know whether He sided with the laxity of Hillel or the severity of Shammai. But it would be most in accordance with His usual method if in answer to such questions He went behind all legislative enactments to the principle involved. And this is what, as I read the Gospels, He did in this case as in others. I see no need to tamper with the texts. Dr Charles objects to Mark x. 2—"And there came unto him Pharisees, and asked him, 'Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife?' tempting him"—on the ground that "the law expressly allowed divorce."[1] But, of course, they knew that Christ was claiming to re-write the law; and if they heard that in His teaching divorce was ruled out, they would very naturally come on some occasion with just this question, and follow it with an inquiry how He reconciled His teaching with the clear precepts of Moses. And they received the same answer as those who asked whether He agreed with Hillel, who had virtually said that a man might put away his wife "for every cause" (Mt. xix. 3)—as, for example, "if she burnt his food."[2] Always He is concerned to lay down the true principle, and not to dictate our method of applying it or approximating to it.

[1] Charles, *op. cit.*, pp. 29, 30.
[2] Charles, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

III

What is the principle? It is that sexual intercourse is implicitly a pledge to life-long union and mutual love. That is the principle that links up all the sayings in the New Testament which bear on the subject. That act of sacred intimacy in the nature of things implies such a union of personality as must be life-long; it is a sacrament of mutual love, at once expressing and renewing that love. It has, properly, this significance of intimate union even when it is illicit and is prompted by mere lust for pleasure (1 Cor. vi. 16 (*f*) above). And where such intercourse has once taken place, true marriage with another becomes impossible. Hence if a man has ground for the conviction that his wife has had intercourse with another man before marriage with him, he may put her away, because she really belongs to that other. The exceptive clauses in St Matthew's Gospel do not refer to "adultery" (*μοιχεία*) but to "fornication" or "unchastity" (*πορνεία*)—though the latter term clearly covers the former and is sometimes used as a substitute for it.[1] In St Matthew v. 32, the effect of putting away the wife, "saving for the cause of fornication," is to "make her an adulteress"; and in fact the divorced Jewess had hardly any choice but to become a woman of the city (Luke vii. 37). But if she was already "one flesh" with another man, the husband who divorced her was not making her an adulteress, for she was one already; and if he married another, he was not committing adultery (Mt. xix. 9), for his first "marriage" had been a sham.

Here we must remember that we are dealing with principles, not with legislation; and there are other principles to be borne in mind. In every actual case

[1] The exceptive clauses are: *παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας* (Mt. v. 32) and *μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ* (xix. 9).

we have not only the offended husband and the guilty wife (or *vice versa*), but also the possibilities of repentance and forgiveness. It is true that the earlier misconduct makes impossible the perfection of marriage, but it may yet be a beautiful thing which should be maintained. And there may be the claims of children to consider. And if Christ uses the term "adulterer" of him who divorces his wife and marries another, he uses it also of him who "looks on a woman to lust after her" (Mt. v. 28). No: it is not legislation, it is the statement in concrete terms of the one true principle; sexual union means life-long union.

This accounts also for St Paul's teaching. It is plainly the implication of 1 Corinthians vi. 16 ((*f*) above); and it covers all the cases dealt with in 1 Corinthians vii. 10, 11 ((*g*) above). The husband is bidden not to divorce his wife, and the wife is not to leave her husband; but (failing that ideal) she is to remain unmarried—where St Paul means, of course, that she is to remain unmarried even though the husband should divorce her for this "desertion."

IV

There is the principle: sexual union means life-long union. But the problem of application remains. The Church never has converted this principle into legislation, or declared that when illicit intercourse has taken place, marriage becomes impossible. It has always (like Moses) made concessions to the hardness of men's hearts. And, like Moses, it has been right to do so. It is important to observe that Moses is in no way blamed for the concession that he made. The blame plainly rests on those whose moral state required it. But the whole situation in which divorce is either sought or granted is one which is alien from the divine intention. The true principle has already been deserted, and the question

arises how the resulting situation is to be dealt with. If the true principle is observed throughout, its claims never conflict with those of charity or general social expediency. But when it has been deserted, there is a conflict of principles, and no course of action is free from evils.

Now one of the chief causes of difference among people of high moral standard concerning the Marriage Law of Church and State is that some are mainly occupied with the maintenance of the best possible normal level, and some are mainly occupied with the best treatment of those who have fallen below the accepted standard. And this is the reason why each party is so totally unmoved by the arguments of the other. Those who wish to maintain the existing law (or to amend it only so far as is necessary for equality between the sexes), are mainly thinking of what can be done to help those who are or shall be married to act up to the true principle as Christ laid it down, at least nearly as may be. Those who advocate "reform" are mainly concerned with the hardship done to those who, whether by their own fault or otherwise, are incapable of living by that principle. Thus if one party to the marriage is an incurable lunatic, "personal union" is become impossible.

It is desirable to discuss separately the action of the Church and of the State, because even if it turns out that the same rules should be applied by both, the reasons for this will be different in the two cases. The Church is commissioned to uphold as effectively as it can the divine principle, and its method is the appeal to conscience; the State is responsible for getting the best results out of a given mass of human material within any period that it is reasonable to contemplate, and its method is that of sanctions and penalties.

V

Should the Church permit divorce, with right of re-marriage: (*a*) for adultery, (*b*) for any other cause? And if not, what should be its action in relation to those who take advantage of any facilities allowed by the State but forbidden by itself?

First, it must be recognised that the one cause of adultery stands on a different footing from any other. It can be argued with at least some force that adultery dissolves the marriage bond; and in any case the doubt about the precise authority and meaning of the exceptive clauses in St Matthew's account of our Lord's words makes this a case where dogmatic utterance is especially to be avoided, and special discussion is called for. Lord Birkenhead, some time ago, delivered a plausible speech complaining of the Church for laying so much emphasis on the physical aspect of marriage, while its spiritual aspects were at least equally important. What the Church is always concerned about is the expression of the spiritual in and through the physical, and the subordination of the physical to the spiritual. Marriage can be the means of bringing a special sacred and precious thing out of that physical impulse which, uncontrolled by spirit, is the most destructive of everything good and beautiful in human life. This is its meaning. Marriage is not needed to sanction an intimate friendship, though convention limits the expression of intimacy between the sexes for fear of the eruption of emotions based on this impulse and all that may result from them. The whole conception of Christian marriage is sacramental; it is concerned not with the spiritual alone nor with the physical alone, but with the expression of the spiritual in and through the physical.

The actual vows in the Marriage Service are "till death us do part," not "till death or the infidelity of

one or other of us do us part." And this is the right vow. For at least the intention of the parties at the time of Marriage must be that of life-long union. But if this is the right vow, it is impossible to allow that its obligation is dissolved by the infidelity of either partner. Marriage is not only a contract; neither party takes the vow conditionally; and to allow it to be conditional would destroy any resemblance between actual marriage and Christ's ideal. It may become psychologically necessary that the husband or wife should leave the unfaithful partner; but that cannot give liberty to marry another, and the Church (as I hold) ought not to bless such a union, however completely it may have the sanction of the State.

Yet inasmuch as adultery strikes at the very heart of marriage, and the State does sanction divorce with freedom to re-marry on this ground, those who re-marry after obtaining a divorce are not to be treated as morally on a level with those who are guilty of infidelity in the first instance. They fall short of the true ideal, but cannot be called "notorious evil-livers" except by abuse of language. Consequently, though the Church should refuse to bless the union it should not excommunicate. To do this is to destroy moral perspective, and that is a far more prolific source of moral blindness and indifference than a deliberate laxity on grounds easily intelligible. The "guilty party" is, of course, properly excommunicated for his "guilt," whether he re-marries or not.

Here I must insert two remarks parenthetically. The difference between the "innocent" and the "guilty" is sometimes technical only; but the rule has to be applied according to the best estimate of the facts that is available, and this is likely to be that of the courts of law. Secondly, it is common knowledge that sometimes a man perjures himself because it is thought less disreputable for a man to be "guilty" than a woman; but it is

disreputable to be a perjurer: this is merely the evil fruit of our evil acquiescence in a "double standard" for men and for women.

After what has been said, it appears plain that the Church cannot tolerate at all re-marriage after a separation due to any other cause than adultery; in such a case, not only should the union not be blessed, but the parties to it should be regarded as having defied the Church's law, and should be liable to any censure or spiritual penalty that the Church may determine. They have shown that they are ready completely to throw overboard the one true principle which our Lord laid down.

It remains to add that the Church has no right to make its judgment final. A union may be contracted which involves excommunication; it may begin by the adulterous action of a partner to a former marriage. Children may come and all go happily. The other partner to the former marriage may be dead. In the care of their children those who wrongly came together may come to a fuller sense of God and desire to be in the full fellowship of His Church. For such there must be a place of repentance; and it is merely silly to say that they must show their repentance by separating. That would be a new sin against their mutual love and against their children. If they have been proved, the Church must be ready to admit them again to complete fellowship; and for this and similar discretionary acts there should be some person or tribunal capable of acting with real authority in the Church's name.

VI

What should the Church desire the State to do? In other words, what should the Christian citizen seek by his vote to make the law of his country? As has been

said, consideration how to foster happy marriages points to one conclusion; consideration what to allow where marriages are unhappy points to another. The latter class tends to concentrate attention on itself; it stirs the emotion of pity, and supplies good "copy" for journalists and novelists. If all that can be said of a married couple is that they lived, or are living, happily ever after, there is no material for the sensation-monger. It requires a poet of consummate genius, like Browning, to reveal the beauty of the deep peaceful happiness of married love. But *One Word More* evokes a greater flood of emotion, in me at any rate, than *Modern Love*. The fact that most writers of newspapers and novels are something less than men of supreme genius confines them to unhappy marriages in their search for copy. Moreover, this is an age of revolt. Popular sympathy is with the rebel, not with the upholder of law. The argument for allowing persons separated from their wives to marry others is chiefly that they very much desire to do so. And our generation tends to think that if anyone wants very much to do a thing, he ought to be allowed. The upholder of law against passion is regarded as stuffy, conventional, tyrannical. This is wholesome as a reaction from a conventionalism that ignores human values; but it is disastrous as a basis for public policy. When once the question is asked, it is clear that the fostering of happy marriages is socially far more important than the remedying of unhappy ones. That does not mean that the latter can be ignored; but, while it claims consideration, it should come second and not first.

No one doubts that the New Testament principle—sexual union means life-long union of personality—points the one sure way to happy marriage. If self-control has been acquired and maintained, if perfect chastity has been preserved, the husband and wife will come together as certain as the conditions of human life

admit, that they are entering a union whose inherent quality ensures its permanence. But this ideal cannot be secured by legislation; and the special sphere of legal sanctions is to be found where ideal conditions are not present.

There can be no doubt that the permanence of the marriage bond exercises considerable influence in checking reckless marriages, though these are still contracted often enough. But perhaps its chief effect is seen in its influence on those who are married and for some reason or another are out of harmony. Over and over again, beyond doubt, husband and wife are kept together and find again their mutual love, because the impossibility of escape has checked the word that would have caused a lasting breach or the precipitate action that could not be recalled. There can be no doubt that the permanence of the marriage bond fosters happy marriages.

Now it can be urged that such causes as desertion or incurable lunacy fall outside these considerations. But this is emphatically not true of desertion, and if incurable lunacy is to count as a sort of legal death, there is the appalling difficulty of saying who is really incurable. A recent play has vividly set forth the suffering of the wife who felt tied to such a man, and the suffering of the husband who returns to find that, taking advantage of a reformed divorce law, she has married again. If we are to decide by a balance of suffering, there is little to choose. But there seems little reason to doubt that every modification of the rule that marriage is for life diminishes the power of marriage as an institution to foster the ideal.

Further, it is important to avoid any confusion of the issue by exaggerated language. An assimilation of the English law to the Scottish law would be, as I think, a step in the wrong direction, but it would be mere exaggeration to speak of it as a great moral disaster, likely to

result in a wide-spread demoralisation. A wrong step in a matter so vital ought to be strenuously resisted; but if those who offer this resistance use language of inappropriate alarm they damage their own cause.

One ground for divorce with right of re-marriage is now allowed, and the Christian ought not to wish the State to remove this ground. Our Lord's teaching is not by all authorities interpreted as I have interpreted it, and many think that He gave explicit sanction to divorce and re-marriage in the case of adultery. The State has to legislate for many who are not Christians at all and who make no use of the Christian means of grace. The Christian citizen cannot wish to impose on them, under sanction of legal penalties, a stricter law than some authorities find in the teaching given by Christ Himself to His disciples. It is never wise to enforce an ideal under penalties. Moreover, adultery does strike at the heart of marriage as no other offence or circumstance can do. That for this cause the State should permit divorce and re-marriage is reasonable and even right; but it is best that this should be the only cause.

VII

I have written this article as a contribution to sober thinking about this question. I know how inadequate is the study of it that I can offer. I hold myself ready to change my opinion about every main position taken up. But sober thought is badly needed, and perhaps my failure to satisfy the demands of the conscience or intellect of my readers may lead others to make a more successful attempt. Meanwhile I may summarise the main points that I have put forward:

(*a*) Christ did not legislate concerning marriage and divorce, but here as elsewhere laid down the one true principle.

(*b*) That principle is that sexual union rightly implies life-long union of persons.

(*c*) The Church is mainly concerned to uphold the ideal by appeal to conscience. To this end it should refuse to pronounce its blessing on any union where a partner to a former union with one of the parties is alive. It should not subject to any further spiritual censure or penalty the "innocent party" to a divorce suit under the present law, who re-marries as permitted by that law. It should so treat parties to a divorce who re-marry if the divorce was on any other ground than adultery. [The "guilty" party should be regarded as *eo ipso* excommunicate for his "guilt," not for re-marriage.]

(*d*) The State is concerned to maintain as high a standard as can be established under penalties. It must aim rather at the fostering of happy marriages than at the remedying of unhappy ones. It should allow divorce with right of re-marriage for adultery, but for no other cause. If, however, other causes are allowed, the point to be chiefly considered is how far they make impossible, or any proposed concession will make less easy, that personal union of which the sexual union sanctioned by marriage is the expression and sacrament.

GAMBLING AND ETHICS

The discussion which was set going by the proposal to institute a tax on Betting has revealed the fact that very few people have acquired the habit of thinking about moral issues. Plenty of people feel, and feel strongly; very few seem to think. As a result, obvious distinctions are ignored. It is clear that in the public mind, phrases of moral description or classification are regarded as an index of feelings of approbation or disapprobation, rather than of any clear judgment. This makes moral discussion almost futile. I propose in this article to set out some of the principles of ethics as I understand them, and to illustrate them by reference to the question of Gambling. But, of course, I realise that there are different "schools" of moral philosophy, and that my statement of principles would be challenged at many points by some students of the subject on perfectly reputable grounds. But all "schools" seek to articulate the theory of the moral life by means of intelligible distinctions; none leaves it to be the sport of gusts of feeling.

I

First, then, I would insist that the moral judgment is, or at least claims to be, a real judgment of fact; it is not a mere expression of disturbed or outraged feeling. Even the upholders of a distinct "moral sense" would claim that the perception of this sense is, or should be,

proportionate to, and determined by, the moral fact. This is important, because many people tend to judge the degree of evil in any act by the intensity of their own disgust at it. So one noticed, during the war, that in some cases (though by no means in all) conscientious objection to military service really rested on æsthetic disgust. This is in fact a most insecure criterion, for it depends largely on the vividness of imagination. Suppose a man, transported by some passion which has its roots in indignation, murders the object of his indignation with horrible mutilations; suppose another, moved by a coldly calculating self-interest, skilfully administers poison to someone who blocks his path. Plainly, the latter is the wickeder of the two; but his act is likely to be the less disgusting. We are disgusted chiefly by what horrifies the imagination, and this most easily happens with what is physically horrible. The artist in crime is not disgusting; "the Devil is a gentleman."

Moral judgment, then, is not concerned with the feelings of the critic, but with the quality of the act or the agent. And here we come upon a host of popular confusions.

II

It is commonly said or implied that there are two kinds of wrong act—those which are wrong in themselves and those which are wrong because of their consequences; and the question is often asked whether Betting is wrong in itself. Further, it is apparently assumed that every act which is "wrong in itself" is worse than any act which is wrong because of its consequences. So those who have said that Betting is wrong in itself are told that it is nonsense to put playing for low stakes on a level with murder or prostitution. Of course it is. But an act may be "wrong in itself," so far as that phrase has any meaning, and yet be only a very little wrong; while an

act may be wrong only for its consequences, and yet be a very great wrong.

An act, however, cannot, strictly speaking, be wrong in itself, apart from both motive and consequence. So isolated, it is a mere physical fact devoid of moral value. The moral value, positive or negative, lies always in personality—that of the agent and that of anyone affected by his act; but it must be tested by inquiry into three things: the character expressed in the act, the principle involved in the act, or the consequences resulting from the act. If I kill a man with a poker, it is not the mere swinging of the poker which is evil; it is the resultant death of the man, and (unless I act in self-defence) the intention to hurt or kill.

On the whole, people usually seem to mean by acts "wrong in themselves" those which directly express an evil character; and as, in the last resort, it is only personal characters that are morally good or evil, this is the most justifiable use of a very obscure phrase. Thus any form of illicit sensual indulgence exhibits a character that cares more for pleasures of sense than for the interests for whose sake that indulgence has become stamped as illicit; and this is a bad character. But the indulgence itself mostly consists of acts which, under certain conditions, are permissible and even necessary—such as eating and drinking. The evil here is, therefore, the acceptance of a wrong scale of values. And the act which is already evil because it springs from an evil state of character, is generally also evil because by force of example it encourages that evil state of character in others. Such an act has moral evil, both in its source and in its result; and no doubt that is the most absolutely immoral kind of act. But even here there are degrees; an act of this general type may be a gross or a trifling instance of the type. The second type of wrong act is that of acts which in the given circumstances have bad effects, though in

other circumstances they might have good effects. Here the evil is in the consequences only; but it is certainly a duty to abstain from such actions.

The third main type of wrong act is referred indiscriminately to each of the two categories in the popular classification. Hence it is generally not observed at all. It is the type of act which is wrong, because it is based upon a wrong principle; that is to say, a principle which is contrary to the principles of well-being. The kind of lie which a man may tell from good motives is an illustration of this. His intentions are good; that is to say, he wishes to promote general well-being as he understands it; he realises that to speak the truth will give pain; there seems to be no balancing advantage; so he says what he knows is untrue. But his principle is false. Veracity is essential to that full social intercourse which is part of human good. Every lie diminishes the trust which men put in one another; and this is its evil—as St Paul recognises when he gives as a reason for truth-speaking, that we are members one of another. And on the whole it is a safe rule that the maintenance in their integrity of the principles essential to human welfare is more important than the particular advantage to be obtained from breaking them on any special occasion. But it is not held in quite all cases. Thus the "medicinal lie," where a doctor gives good news to a patient hovering between life and death, because the bad and true news would kill him, is generally recognised as justifiable. Here the special character of the occasion is obvious, and the "lie" does not in fact at all diminish the general trust which men put in one another; all that the doctor has weakened is his power of using the "medicinal lie" quite as effectively another time. Most of us, again, would regard as justifiable a lie told to a murderer by which his victim is enabled to escape.

But the very nature of the exceptions proves the

general obligation of the rule; and it has to be noticed that many actions which rest on a wrong principle, but do not represent any scandalous kind of character, are actually worse by one of the two standards of judgment than are some of those which directly express a debased character. Of course such acts represent imperfection of character, but not necessarily a character below the average.

III

For there are two standards of judgment—one referring to motive and the other to consequences. If the act proceeds from a character in which love of sensual pleasure is stronger than sense of duty, it is bad with the badness of that sort of character. If it proceeds from a good state of character misled by ignorance of the consequences likely to ensue, it is bad with the badness of those consequences. With the first type we are not here concerned. No doubt there are in the world moral sceptics who profess to see no difference in value between a life of devoted service and a life of sheer self-indulgence; we are not now arguing with these; they can usually be trapped into a repudiation of their own position by anyone who knows the gambit. We are concerned with people who do pronounce moral judgment and, at least by profession, accept the Christian scale of values. We need not, therefore, argue that acts in which personal health or social fellowship are sacrificed to sensuous pleasure are wrong.

But acts are also wrong when they have the tendency to destroy social well-being, even though the agent is quite ignorant of this tendency. A person who, with the best intentions, acts so as to do harm is commonly described as "well-meaning"—a term which has in it far more of blame than of praise. Where the ignorance, which led the well-meaning person wrong, is avoidable, such an act

is a direct expression of a bad character—a character so enamoured of its own amiable feelings that it takes no trouble to acquire accurate information; this is one form of the vice of sentimentalism. Where the ignorance was unavoidable, the agent is free from all blame. *But the innocence of the agent does not prove the innocence of the act.*

It is necessary to insist on this with something like violence. The subjectivism everywhere rampant has led many people to affirm that if a man sees no harm in what he is doing, there is no harm in it; or, at any rate, that if he thinks it right, it is right. This is sheer confusion. A man is indeed bound to follow his conscience, but he is also bound to take care that his conscience is as enlightened as possible. What a man's conscience condemns at any time depends very largely on his previous habit of life. Acts are right or wrong quite independently of anyone so judging them; in that sense, they are right or wrong in themselves. Their moral value does in fact reside in the character that prompts them and the social consequences involved in them. Part of a man's duty is to see that his own sense of duty corresponds to these two standards. A man must obey his conscience; and if, in doing so, he acts wrongly, his guilt depends on the trouble he had taken fully to inform his judgment; if he had done all he could, he is blameless—but the act is still wrong.

IV

The current controversy about Gambling illustrates the whole matter admirably. No one disputes that the man who is a victim to Gambling, and stakes the money that is needed for his children's food, is acting wrongly. Many people hold that to Gamble in moderation is completely innocent. They compare Gambling to Drink, and say that evil lies only in excess. It is a plausible view; but I believe it to be false.

The motive of moderate gambling seems to be the desire to purchase a certain excitement. If a man can afford it, why should he not spend, or risk, his money on the pleasure of that excitement as another spends his on going to a concert or a play? That can only be answered if we first inquire what is the occasion of the excitement? It is not the hope that an opinion (for example) about the winner of a horse-race may be vindicated; no money need pass to secure the fun of being right when someone else was wrong. The special excitement of gambling is the hope of winning money in one contingency and the fear of losing it in another. This may be largely make-believe, inasmuch as the amount at stake may be insufficient to create any very genuine hope or fear; but the excitement none the less resides in the hope and fear of winning or losing money, according to some unknown contingency largely determined by luck or chance (that is, by forces not rationally controlled).

Now the distribution of money by chance is a socially wrong principle. If it were only done to an extent that was socially negligible, the evil would be negligible too. It is wrong in principle to eat otherwise than to satisfy the need for nourishment; but the actual evil involved in eating one chocolate for the mere pleasure of eating it is so small that it is strictly negligible. The principles of ethics have as their end the perfect character and the perfect society; and in this spontaneity finds a place, so that the end of ethics itself condemns a rigid and mechanical application of its principles. It is even a good thing to realise mastery of these principles by occasional deliberate breach of them, if only to escape from slavery to them.

But gambling is, in mere fact, a source of immense moral and social evil; so that, if its principle is false, it ought to be altogether repudiated. And its principle is certainly false. We see it, not in the cases where gambling

has ruined the happiness of a family (that proves it evil by consequence, not in principle); we see it when someone wins a big sum for no service rendered. It is bad for the winner, who is encouraged to live idly; it is bad for society, within which wealth, with its labour-directing potency, is so distributed. Wealth ought to be distributed in accordance with (*a*) need, (*b*) service rendered, (*c*) service expected; the last is the justification for inherited wealth. No one proposes that wealth should be distributed in accordance with chance. That is a false principle; if it were an almost inactive principle, there would be no harm in allowing it a strictly negligible sphere of operation. It is in fact exceedingly active to the great hurt of individuals and of society; therefore it ought to be altogether repudiated.

V

It might well be argued that while it does so much harm it ought to be discountenanced altogether. The practice of gambling among "respectable" people undoubtedly encourages it in all quarters; and its total discontinuance might be urged on the ground that, even if innocent in principle, it is doing harm in present conditions. That would be to class it under our second type of wrong actions described above—those which are wrong solely because of their actual bad results. And the argument from results is a great part of the case against gambling. But if it belonged altogether to this type, it would be plausible to argue that better than complete abstention is the exhibition of self-control in the practice. But we have shown reasons for holding that gambling is wrong, not only because of its desperately evil consequences, but because it rests on a principle contrary to the principles of social well-being. In that sense it is wrong in itself.

The journalistic defender of play for low stakes is liable, when this is said, to cry aloud and say: "You are classing a harmless flutter with murder and prostitution; it is ridiculous." But we are doing nothing of the kind. Some actions which are wrong in principle, and (in that sense) wrong in themselves, are only a little wrong; while some actions which are wrong only for their consequences are very wrong indeed. The strength of the case against gambling is that it is wrong in both these ways at once. The advocate for it will try to pin us down to one or the other: if we insist on the principle, he will point out how little the evil is apart from consequences; if we insist on consequences, he will point out that these are only bad when there is excess, so that in moderation the practice is innocent. But we hold that it is wrong for both these reasons at once. The evil consequences of excess lead us to examine the principle; and the discovery that it is wrong in principle forbids us (in view of the hideous effects of excess) to tolerate it in moderation.

VI

The advocate of gambling in moderation usually appeals in fact to a profoundly anti-social principle, which is conspicuously dominant to-day. The moderate gambler is very liable to say that he does no harm with his gambling, and if others do harm with theirs, that is no affair of his. But that is, in the strict and theological sense of the word, damnable; and to that form of damnation we are just now very prone. In the war the need for putting public interest before self-interest was so great that most of us were artificially braced up to a level far above our real moral attainment; as a result we have slipped back below the level that we had previously reached. There is still some sense of social obligation in our serious pursuits; men wish to banish it altogether from their amusements.

This reversion to ethical individualism cannot last; it cuts too fatally at the roots of social life; but it is now prevalent and widely pernicious. To take your pleasure in a way which encourages your neighbour in a course so noxious for him is wicked. To repudiate responsibility for one's influence is as profoundly wicked as anything can be—far wickeder than most crimes of passion—for it denies one of the springs of all obligation.

We may, therefore, sum up as follows:

(1) Gambling is not necessarily a practice springing directly from an evil character; it is compatible with a high level of moral attainment;

(2) None the less it is wrong in principle, though the evil immediately involved in moderate and self-controlled gambling is very small;

(3) Excess in gambling is doing immense harm to individual character and to social well-being, so that any countenancing of gambling is encouragement to a great evil, and is therefore itself a great evil;

(4) A defence sometimes put forward for gambling is profoundly wicked—certainly much wickeder than the moderate gambling in defence of which it is offered.

COUÉ AND ST PAUL

The controversy of Faith *versus* Works is both perennial and fundamental. To some extent each successive phase of it is due to misunderstanding on both sides. No intelligent person is now perplexed by the apparent conflict between St Paul and St James; but St Paul shows in his own writings that he was often misunderstood, and the author of the Second Epistle of St Peter shows that he at any rate was not surprised at this being so. Misunderstanding, however, does not account for the whole controversy. There is a really deep division; and the division is so sharp that it is hard to believe here what is true of most controversies—that both parties are right and both one-sided. No doubt each of the opposing points of view in this controversy has some relative justification; but as contradictory principles of action are urged, we must necessarily hold that, whichever is right, the other is wrong. M. Coué has revived the old controversy with reference to a new sphere of application, and it seems worth while to review the principles which are at issue.

I

The distinctive feature in M. Coué's doctrine is not the possibility of healing by suggestion—of which neither priests nor doctors have ever been ignorant—but his theory of the respective parts played by Will and Imagination in the process. "Coué's most original contri-

bution, his stroke of genius, was, I consider, his discovery of the law of reversed effort." [1] The formula of this law as stated by Coué and quoted by Baudouin is as follows:—

> "When the will and the imagination are at war, the imagination *invariably* gains the day.
>
> "In the conflict between the will and the imagination, the force of the imagination is *in direct ratio to the square of the will*." [2]

Passing over for the moment all questions of terminology, we can hardly fail to notice that, apart from the mathematical language (which cannot be precisely applied to what is plainly not a measurable quantity), this formula is a summary of the experience recorded by St Paul in the Epistle to the Romans:—

> I had not known sin, except through the law: for I had not known coveting, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet: but sin, finding occasion, wrought in me through the commandment all manner of coveting: for apart from the law sin is dead. And I was alive apart from the law once: but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died: and the commandment, which was unto life, this I found to be unto death: for sin, finding occasion, through the commandment beguiled me, and through it slew me. So that the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and righteous, and good. Did then that which is good become death unto me? God forbid. But sin, that it might be shown to be sin, by working death to me through that which is good;—that through the command-

[1] Baudouin, *Suggestion and Auto-suggestion*, p. 125.

[2] Coué, *Self-Mastery by Conscious Auto-suggestion*, p. 12; Baudouin, *op cit.*, p. 125.

> ment sin might become exceeding sinful. For we know that the law is spiritual: but I am carnal, sold under sin. For that which I do I know not: for not what I would, that do I practise: but what I hate, that I do. But if what I would not, that I do, I consent unto the law that it is good. So now it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me. For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me, but to do that which is good is not. For the good which I would, I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I practise. But if what I would not, that I do, it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me. I find then the law, that, to me who would do good, evil is present. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man: but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members. O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of this body of death?

Here we see that trouble began through the stimulation of the righteous will by the prohibition of the law. St Paul was "alive" in the sense that he could control and direct his conduct along right lines until he became conscious of a commandment prohibiting actions to which he had a natural, though apparently inhibited, tendency. Becoming conscious of this prohibition, he increased his determination to repress that tendency; what Coué calls his "will" was strengthened. But the result was not enhanced self-mastery, but loss of the self-mastery hitherto enjoyed. For with the strengthening of the "will" came a still greater strengthening of the "imagination"—(whether in direct ratio to the square of the former or not)—so that, whereas the man

had been "alive" or self-directing, he was now "dead" or moved by the blind force of an impulse. "When the commandment came, sin revived, and I died."

On this basis the moral problem is found to be insoluble. The more the man struggles against the chain of his sin, the closer it binds him. It is the very earnestness of his effort to do right which ensures his doing wrong. "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of this body of death."

St Paul finds the solution, not theoretical but actual, through being caught in an experience which lies outside the scope of this conflict between "the evil that I would not" and "the good that I would." The division of chapters is unfortunate, and the reader who wants to submit himself to the full impact of the Apostle's declaration must read continuously from Romans vii. 5 to Romans viii. 39. We may here quote the passage in which the transition from the stage of the conflict to the stage of security is set forth:—

> "The good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I practise. Now if what I would not, that I do, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I find then the law,[1] that, to me who would do good, evil is present. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man; but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from this body of death?
>
> I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord. So then I myself with the mind serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin. There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ

[1] The "Law of Reversed Effort."

> Jesus. For the law of the Spirit of Life in Christ Jesus made me free from the law of sin and of death. For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and as an offering for sin, condemned sin in the flesh; that the requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. . . . For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God. . . . And in like manner the Spirit also helpeth our infirmity; for we know not how to pray as we ought; but the Spirit himself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered. . . . If God is for us, who is against us?"

Now it is perfectly clear that the transition at the point where I have divided the paragraphs in that quotation is not effected by any mere reinforcement of the righteous "will" in its conflict with the indwelling sin. What is described is an experience in which, just so far as it is appropriated, the conflict is over and done with. If we imagine a man vainly toiling up a steep ascent on which he makes no headway because his footing slips down beneath him every time he strains upward, he would be helped, no doubt, by some pressure supporting his back and enabling him to make his strides longer and more rapid in succession; but the struggle and effort would remain. It is so that many Christians think of the assistance of divine grace. It is exactly not so that St Paul describes it. What he describes is much more like the discovery that close beside the steep and stony ascent there is a moving staircase, on to which the man must step of his own motion, but on which, when once he is there, he is borne without further struggle to the summit of the ascent. The essential act of the will in Christian experience, as St Paul describes it, is surrender.

II

Difficulties arise in connection with terminology. Neither Coué nor his more technical interpreter Baudouin offer any definition of the two terms Imagination and Will. And it soon becomes clear to the reader that the sense in which each is used is a special one. "Imagination" usually stands for the power of forming mental copies or "echoes" of sense-experience. The commonest form of this is the power of visualising. But people have this power in very varying degrees, and some do not possess it at all. No doubt there is some "image" whereby any thought is held in the mind; sometimes this is simply the word commonly used to express that thought. But we seldom use the word "Imagination" to express the connection of words with thought. Yet it is clear from M. Coué's general formula of wholesome auto-suggestion [1] that he is not primarily concerned with any image, visual or auditory, but with fixity of attention upon a certain idea. Repetition of the formula serves to fix the attention. The motion of the lips and the sound of the words assist in this. If the formula is repeated silently and without motion of the lips, the sound may be "imagined." But it is clear all along that Imagination really has nothing whatever to do with it, except in so far as a vivid imagination may facilitate concentration. If the imagination is restless as well as vivid—a very common combination—it will not even do this. The conflict is not between Imagination and what Coué calls "Will," but between this latter and any rooted or fixed idea. It is much more nearly a conflict of "Will" with Thought or Belief—in short, of Works with Faith.

But the confusion is still worse which results from the

[1] "Every day, in every respect, I am getting better and better." *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

special but undefined use of the term Will. What will M. Coué or M. Baudouin make of this declaration?—"The essential achievement of the will, when it is most 'voluntary,' is to *attend* to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind. . . . Effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will. . . . The terminus of the psychological process in volition, the point to which the will is directly applied, is always an idea."[1] In short, what Coué calls Imagination is almost indistinguishable from what James calls Will. This is bound to cause perplexity when the conflict of Will and Imagination is presented as the fundamental psychological fact!

I am not now concerned to establish William James in a position of special authority or to discuss his theory of volition, though I believe it to be sound. It is enough for our present purpose to call attention to the fact that what Coué and Baudouin call Imagination is not what most people mean by that word, but is something almost indistinguishable from what a competent psychologist calls Will, while their use of the term Will is equally remote from that of many inquirers. If we are to grasp their real meaning we had better leave behind their terminology.

III

As we come to the restatement of what I take to be fundamental in Coué's position—which is the Law of Reversed Effort—I will take an illustration from an altogether different sphere from the moral and hygienic spheres chiefly dealt with by St Paul and M. Coué. It was my good fortune several years ago to take the chair for Dr Walford Davies on an occasion when he was teaching about two hundred working men and women to sing songs in unison. The result of his method

[1] William James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii. pp. 561, 562, 567.

was something astounding. We began by singing a well-known song, and we did it very badly; the quality of tone was harsh, the rhythm was uncertain, the pitch was various, and the expression non-existent. Two hours later we were singing songs that we had never heard till that evening, and we made a truly glorious row. There were still technical faults in plenty; but the rhythm was perfect and the pitch not far short, the tone (in spite of some curious "production") was round and full, the volume was noble, and the expression spontaneous. By what method was this transformation wrought?

As soon as we were convinced that we sang very badly a song that we all knew, we were switched off to songs quite new to us. Dr Davies told us to listen as hard as we could while he played the tune to us; he called for a real effort of concentrated attention. Then he said—"Now sing it. Don't *try* to sing it, but just sing it. All you have to do is to enjoy it, and the music will sing itself." (I can't pledge myself to the exact words, but that was the exact sense and the words were not very different.) So we sang. And if things went wrong he stopped us and said, "Now you are trying; I am sure you are trying. Don't try; just enjoy it." And the result was the glorious noise to which we attained after an hour and a half, and revelled in producing for the last half-hour of available time.

"All you have to do is to enjoy it, and the music will sing itself." This brings us to the root of the matter. In all activity self-consciousness is the enemy. If we are thinking about our performance, we perform badly. So some people are unable to play a game if there are onlookers, because they think about their performance—the way they do it and what they look like—instead of letting the whole mind be concentrated on the thing to be done. Vanity and pride both ruin excellence because both are self-occupied. "Mr Proud says, 'I don't care what you

think of me'; Mr Vain says, 'I wonder what you are thinking of me.'" Both are occupied with their relation to other people's opinion of them. The humble (which means "objectively-minded") man does what has to be done with all his attention fixed upon it. He is neither consciously indifferent to other people's opinion nor consciously anxious about it. If his task is to act upon other people he will be very much concerned with their opinions, for to mould (or help them in moulding) their opinions is the task in hand; if his task is to "kill the ball" at lawn-tennis, or to sing a great song, or to win a war, his mind will be utterly given to the task and spectators or critics will be as though they were not. But the last illustration introduces a new element, in so far as to win a war it is necessary to retain the confidence of the people; so criticism will receive attention, not because the man is interested in other folk's opinion of himself but because he has to carry them with him if he has to accomplish his task. For all achievement some measure of humility or self-forgetfulness is indispensable; for the highest achievement the humility must be perfect. And humility was the first part of the lesson that Dr Walford Davies was teaching us.

But it was only the first part, though it must be remarked that any real humility is enough to abolish the earnest and conscientious striving which seeks salvation by "works of the law." But humility alone will not tell us how else to seek it so far as it lies beyond our present reach.

Dr Davies, when things went wrong, said, "I know you are trying. Stop trying. Just enjoy it." But I have also heard conductors say with manifest justification, "You are not trying a bit." What is wrong is not the effort but the direction of the effort. The effort should be not an effort to perform but an effort to attend. It is often hard to keep the mind fixed on the job in hand,

but it is the essential act of will and the condition of all success. The singer should think steadily of the beauty of the music and enjoy it; then the performance will spontaneously be as good as his natural and technical qualifications permit. The seeker after health should fix his mind on health, and (if he has visual imagination) picture himself moving healthily, and he will become as healthy as conditions permit. The Christian should fix his mind on the beauty of the Holy Love, which is God and is set forth for our adoring contemplation in Jesus, and Holy Love will both possess his soul and govern all his actions.

The crucial question has nothing to do with Will and Imagination; the crucial question is, "Am I thinking about the achievement or about myself achieving?" The conflict of which M. Coué speaks is not between Will and Imagination, it is between the idea that we take for granted and the idea that we picture ourselves realising [1]; the idea that we take for granted will always win, because whatever attention is given to it is given without anxiety or what St James calls double-mindedness. The ideas that we take for granted constitute our faith; the ideas that we picture ourselves realising, even with great effort, are our works. And faith always beats works. The supremely important need of man therefore is to learn to take the right ideas for granted, or, in other words, to have true faith and not false faith. For as it is by faith (if it is true) that we are saved, so it is by faith (if it is false) that we are destroyed.

IV

MM. Coué and Baudouin have been misled (as I think) by the popular association of Will with conscious effort

[1] What Coué calls Imagination, I call Will; what he calls Will, I call Self-consciousness. It is the Will which wins.

and struggle. Volition is no doubt usually concerned with effecting changes, and as to leave things alone is effortless, it is supposed that effort is always exercised in changing them. So Coué accepts a contrast between the quietly accepted idea and the conscious effort to make changes, and very naturally calls the latter Will. But a further analysis shows that the sense of effort or struggle is only present when there is opposition, either within or without; there can be volition without any effort. If the opposition is internal, it means that the Will is imperfectly formed [1]; for the complete Will is the concentration of the whole personality upon the object purposed; if there is internal conflict there is not yet perfect Will. We may give the name Will to the more permanent intention over against momentary desires which threaten it, but this is only Will potentially. Will, when it is fully formed, brings perfect internal peace.

But there may be struggle against outward opposition, and there is struggle while the Will is being formed; and this struggle is the centre of interest. It is just here, at the point of vital importance, that Coué's doctrine is so valuable, when once we have escaped from the confusion of his terminology.

If I am struggling with a bad physical tendency or a bad moral tendency, what am I to do? Am I to fight it in my mind, concentrating attention upon what I can do against it? Or am I mentally to turn my back upon it and concentrate attention upon the good of which my bad tendency is the repudiation? If I bear malice, am I to seek out my enemy with the deliberate intention of feeling friendly when I meet him? or am I to fix my mind on whatever quickens love in my heart and so expect

[1] *Cf.* my lectures on *The Nature of Personality*, III and IV, and the classical passage from St Augustine's *Confessions* (Bk. VIII, §§ 20, 21) there quoted.

(without conscious effort) that I shall in fact be friendly when the occasion comes? Coué and St Paul agree in commending the latter method. And this is plainly right for the reason given above—that this method is free from the distraction always accompanying self-consciousness.

V

The question therefore is not one between Will and something else, but of the proper use of Will. No doubt circumstances may compel a decision before we are ready, and while the Will is still only partly formed. I may meet the man towards whom I feel malicious before my soul is cleansed by contemplation of love and lovely things, and then I must do my best with an imperfect instrument. But even so, deliberate expectation is more fruitful than deliberate effort, provided we are able to make the expectation genuine. It is here that the various methods outlined by Coué and more fully sketched by Baudouin have their place; they are ways of making the expectation genuine. But there is plainly an activity of will in directing attention (whether conscious or subconscious) towards the desired result more than towards the suggestion of present experience. In fact everything turns on the act of Will by which we fix our mind on certain things rather than on others, and hold it there. This is the formative moral choice. While my Will is but partly formed it cannot wholly control my conduct; if it is partly evil, it cannot cure itself. But it can, in deliberate moments, deliberately subject itself to influences that will cure it. The essential act of Will is to choose the right influences and surrender itself to these to be moulded by them.

Hence in a passage where his mind is fixed on the God of peace and the peace of God, St Paul writes: "Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things

are august,[1] whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue and if there be any praise, occupy your minds with[2] these things."[3] The Will has to choose its master or its absorbing interest, and to maintain its loyalty by a perpetual act of choice.

VI

Coué's method has, however, one difficulty from which St Paul's is free, and St Paul's has one crowning merit which Coué's lacks. The difficulty about Coué is that we are apparently urged to tell ourselves lies in the hope that this may make them true. The crowning merit in St Paul is that he has an object for our contemplation beyond our own achievement, and thus there is made possible a complete escape from self-occupation which Coué cannot provide. Coué bids me tell myself tales about myself which will come true for the telling. But then he fixes my mind on myself, even though it be my daily improving self. And this may easily cause as much evil as is cured.

St Paul does not merely trust to the tendency of an idea to realise itself, powerful as that tendency is. He relies upon that force of goodness in the nature of things and in our own nature to which we give the name God. Those who are in harmony with God will find all experience conspiring for their welfare. "To them that love God all things work together for good. . . . If God is for us, who is against us." At the root of our own being is something which is not ourselves, or at least is not merely ourselves—though it is most truly what constitutes us persons, capable of fellowship with one another and with God. What lies at the root of Nature and what lies at

[1] σεμνά. [2] λογίζεσθε.
[3] Philippians iv. 8.

the root of our personal existence is one and the same; it is God the Spirit.[1]

Bodily health was not a pre-occupation with St Paul. But we may legitimately apply his thought to physical as well as to spiritual health, and our Lord encourages us to do so alike by His action in healing bodily diseases and by the frequency of the words, "Thy faith hath saved thee." But the Christian formula will not be either self-centred or doubtfully true. It will be: "God's will is my welfare, God's will is my welfare." For the Christian God's will is the sovereign power; it accomplishes its purpose except so far as it limits itself to leave scope for the free action of created wills. I can shut God almost entirely out of my life; but if I open my heart and mind towards Him, He will work in me what he pleases, which will be better than I could have hoped for myself. But the heart and mind must be truly open; there must be expectation; and the limits of expectation will set limits to the full working of God in me. We have mostly excluded the whole bodily side of our nature from our expectation of divine blessing. This is false to the Gospel and implies a disastrous dualism in our philosophy. There is only one universe; and God is the life of it.

Now we see why for the Christian the way of ascent to the spiritual heights is more like travelling up a moving staircase than climbing a steep and stony path. We fix our thoughts on the Holy Love which for those who have seen God in Jesus Christ—in His life, His Passion, His Death, His Resurrection—is the open secret of the Universe; so fixing our thoughts we surrender ourselves, not in a single act, but in a series of choices that express one constant purpose. The Will has found for its Master One who desires for us more than we can dream and has power to accomplish what he desires, so that bond-slavery to Him is perfect freedom.

[1] *Cf.* Romans viii. 14–31.

Here is all that Coué requires, and much more besides. There is indeed an activity of will; but it is not chiefly the effort to *do* things, though that has its place; it is chiefly the effort peacefully to *think* the eternal goodness and beauty and truth. What we have to do is to enjoy the divine loveliness, and the music will sing itself in and through us. "In His Will is our peace." Our prayer may be a wrestling with self, as Christ wrestled with the desire that the Cup might pass from Him; but so long as it is a wrestling with God it is imperfect. That may be all that we can rise to. But His power will flow most freely into our souls when we trustfully rest in Him.

When we try to do things, we fret over our incapacity and are anxious. When we try to fix our minds on the eternal goodness, we gain both strength and peace; and the peace which we find becomes a protection against all that would distract or debase. So in the words immediately preceding the exhortation to occupy our minds with all that is true or lovely or of good report—the divine loveliness diffused through the creation—St Paul writes: "In nothing be anxious; but in everything by prayer and supplication with thanksgiving let your requests be made known unto God. And the peace of God, which passeth all understanding, shall mount guard over (φρουρήσει) your hearts and your thoughts in Christ Jesus"—who is the very loveliness of the Love Divine.

ST JOAN, SHAKESPEARE, AND BERNARD SHAW

A FEW years ago there occurred one of those literary events which cause the current of thought to pause and then move onward with a new direction. This was the production and publication of *Saint Joan*, by Mr George Bernard Shaw. I have no doubt at all that this is in the true sense a great work. It has been suggested, with some plausibility as I think, that it provides the psychological explanation of *Back to Methuselah*. That was a plea that mankind should, by biological processes, evolve a race of men who would live three hundred or more years, on the ground that it is only as men approach the usual age of death that they now acquire sufficient wisdom to guide their own fortunes and destiny. The suggestion is that Mr Shaw was subconsciously aware of his having, after many years of writing plays, begun to fashion a bigger conception than any to which he had previously given birth.

But it is not with any ordinary dramatic criticism of this great play that we are now concerned. It is with certain principles manifest in its construction and enunciated in the Preface. The figures in the play, while truly human individuals, are yet the vehicles of forces which use them as means of utterance and of action; and these great forces are intelligible, determinable, almost definable. Thus the Inquisitor and the Bishop of Beauvais are spokesmen of the international Catholic

system; Warwick is spokesman of the international Feudal system; Joan is spokesman of the new forces of spiritual Individualism and political Nationalism.

Mr Shaw pleads justly that this is true to the actual life of the Middle Ages. It was a period of intense rationalism; the scholastic philosophy, accepted by the Church, applied definition and logical connection to things spiritual as no other intellectual movement has ever set out to do. The effect of this was, no doubt, to stereotype a phase of development and to check the free movement of thought. None the less the force which imposed this check was intellectualist in the very highest degree. Mr Shaw is right, as I believe, in his fundamental conception of the Middle Ages.

But in developing this he works out a contrast between his play and the Middle Ages on the one side, and Shakespeare's treatment of human nature on the other; and this he does in a way which seems to have made clear to me where he is wrong in his comments on Shakespeare, which I have never before been able to determine. That those comments, scattered through several of his Prefaces, are not only wrong, but wrong-headed, I have always been sure. Now for the first time I think I see the source of the error. If I am right, the point is one which deserves some investigation; for what is at stake is the value of inarticulate mysticism.

I

It is necessary to quote in full the passage in the Preface to which I refer. It runs as follows:—

> "A Void in the Elizabethan Drama
>
> "I have, however, one advantage over the Elizabethans. I write in full view of the Middle Ages,

which may be said to have been rediscovered in the middle of the nineteenth century after an eclipse of about four hundred and fifty years. The Renascence of antique literature and art in the sixteenth century, and the lusty growth of Capitalism, between them buried the Middle Ages; and their Resurrection is a second Renascence. Now there is not a breath of medieval atmosphere in Shakespear's histories. His John of Gaunt is like a study of the old age of Drake. Although he was a Catholic by family tradition, his figures are all intensely Protestant, individualist, sceptical, self-centred in everything but their love affairs, and completely personal and selfish even in them. His kings are not statesmen: his cardinals have no religion: a novice can read his plays from one end to the other without learning that the world is finally governed by forces expressing themselves in religions and laws which make epochs rather than by vulgarly ambitious individuals who make rows. The divinity which shapes our ends, rough hew them how we will, is mentioned fatalistically only to be forgotten immediately like a passing vague apprehension. To Shakespear as to Mark Twain, Cauchon would have been a tyrant and a bully instead of a Catholic, and the inquisitor Lemaître would have been a Sadist instead of a lawyer. Warwick would have had no more feudal quality than his successor the King Maker has in the play of *Henry VI*. We should have seen them all completely satisfied that if they would only to their own selves be true they could not then be false to any man (a precept which represents the reaction against medievalism at its intensest), as if they were beings in the air, without public responsibilities of any kind. All Shakespear's characters are so: that is why they seem natural to our middle

classes, who are comfortable and irresponsible at other people's expense, and are neither ashamed of that condition nor even conscious of it. Nature abhors this vacuum in Shakespear; and I have taken care to let the medieval atmosphere blow through my play freely. Those who see it performed will not mistake the startling event it records for a mere personal accident. They will have before them not only the visible and human puppets, but the Church, the Inquisition, the Feudal System, with divine inspiration always beating against their too inelastic limits; all more terrible in their dramatic force than any of the little mortal figures clanking about in plate armor or moving silently in the frocks and hoods of the Order of St Dominic."

II

This is the passage which struck me as both staggering and illuminating. It attributes to Shakespeare a belief in naked individualism and free-will in its extremest form; in fact it represents him as a Pelagian. This is so utterly remote from the impression which I receive from reading Shakespeare's plays, or from seeing them acted, that I have been driven to analyse this impression and try to see exactly where and why I differ so totally and so vehemently from a writer whose work I admire as greatly as I do that of Mr Shaw. And first I find it necessary to dispute his evidence. It is surely significant that the assertions of "free-will" in Shakespeare are all put into the mouths of villains, like Edmund and Iago, or at least of such an antipathetic character as Cassius. The less objectionable characters usually exhibit and sometimes confess an almost total blindness and impotence. Further, the particular bit of ethical absurdity—"to thine own self be true," etc.—which Mr Shaw quotes as a typical

Shakespearean maxim, is put into the mouth of his most priceless and most tedious dotard; and the very bourgeois morality of the speech which it closes is certainly that of Polonius, not of Shakespeare. Is it really conceivable that the author of *Henry IV* and *Antony and Cleopatra*, with his flamboyant imagination and riot of colour, seriously approved the recommendation that a young man's dress should be "rich, not gaudy"? It is always hazardous to attribute to Shakespeare (or to the genie who inhabited the soul of the worthy citizen of that name and wrote plays to keep the worthy citizen in funds) the opinions expressed by his various creations; but we are certainly wrong if we pick out and attribute to him the opinions which he himself attributes to Edmund or to Polonius.

My first point, then, is that Mr Shaw is in so fundamentally wrong an attitude towards Shakespeare that his sense of evidence is perverted. My second point is this. The impression made upon me by the great Shakespearean dramas is not that of a group of manikins playing their self-chosen parts; it is that of a vast, brooding fate, luring and driving almost helpless mortals to their catastrophe. As truly as with Mr Shaw, the characters derive their chief interest from the fact that it is in their speech and actions that these great cosmic forces actuating them are divined.

Now it is perfectly true that in Shakespearean Tragedy the great impelling forces are vast, formless, indeterminate, without either names or defined character. In this they are very unlike the governing ideas of the intellectualist Middle Ages. Shakespeare represents the flower of the Renaissance in this country; and the Renaissance was largely a recrudescence of the more mystical elements of Greek culture against the highly systematised Christianity of that period; more particularly, it was a resurgence of Platonism against the Aristotelianism

which had been utilised for giving system to the Christian civilisation of Europe. Thus the atmosphere of Shakespeare is far closer to that of Æschylus than to that of the Middle Ages. That he is, accordingly, profoundly pagan in general outlook I for one could not deny; on the contrary, I believe that this kind of Paganism is essential to the highest Tragedy. There is Tragedy in Christianity; but Christianity as a whole is not tragic. Nor is Mr Shaw's *Saint Joan*, though it, too, includes Tragedy within it.

Probably it is true that Shakespeare, as a product of the Renaissance, was wholly unable to understand the Middle Ages, and that Mr Shaw understands them a great deal better. It is quite easy to see why Shakespeare fails as an interpreter in the Middle Ages; the puzzle is concerned with the question why Mr Shaw fails as an interpreter of Shakespeare. I believe the reason to be that he is so completely a scholastic that he is unable to apprehend—or at any rate to handle—what he cannot define. Of course I speak of Mr Shaw the writer of plays; I know nothing of the thrilling raptures and shuddering fears that namelessly inhabit the soul of the private citizen who goes by that name; I suspect that they are many and formidable; no man could be so intellectually dapper unless he was concealing from himself as well as others a psychic chaos. Mr Shaw avoids the indefinite in his plays. That is, perhaps, how he came to write a most illuminating discussion of "Getting Married" without more than a passing reference to the occasionally concomitant process of getting in love. The passing reference is undoubtedly emphatic; but it is hardly more than a flash. How far is it true that the really important spiritual forces are those which have become articulate and definite? Or how far are the most important those whose presence is made known by groanings which cannot be uttered? The question

affects both the enthusiasm that perplexed the later eighteenth century and also the value of theology in the life of religion.

III

It is clear that there are two types of temperament in relation to this matter, which may be roughly described as the mystical and the scholastic, though these terms must not be regarded as mutually exclusive; it is perfectly true that many mystics employ a dialectical thoroughness equal to that of any scholastic, and the great scholastics are almost invariable mystics in their ultimate conception of Reality; the system of St Thomas Aquinas, for example, culminates in a most unmistakable mysticism. None the less, there are two types represented by these two epithets, and the distinctive characteristics are that, in the one case, special value is attached to the definite, the articulate, the proportioned; in the other, special value is attached to the formless, the unutterable, the measureless. The distinction is parallel to that familiar in æsthetic criticism between the Classical and the Romantic, which Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch has equated with concern for "line" and concern for "colour." It is recognised that the greatest artists cannot be classified under these categories, because they are strong in both qualities; but in lesser artists the distinction is almost invariably easy to apply. In the sphere of religion the number of those who are fully appreciative of the values inherent in both types of experience is extremely rare, and the conflict between the adherents of each is perennial and sometimes bitter.

For most people the emotional element in religion greatly preponderates over the intellectual, though they would recognise that their emotion is generated by ideas which must be either true or false. Such people

are liable to resent even fiercely any attempt to lay bare the intellectual structure implied in their emotional experience. Profound emotions may become associated with particular formulæ; the formula may be at first the summary of a whole scheme of thought; it may then be detached from that scheme of thought and come to be interpreted as representing a different system of ideas. The emotion persists, almost unchanged, in spite of all changes in the thoughts behind it; and there is a bitter resentment against the disintegrating effect of any effort to reintroduce the definiteness of coherent thought. The history of the Doctrine of the Atonement abundantly illustrates this point. But what is easily seen in relation to specific doctrines is equally true of the whole course of religion—not merely of Christian religion, but of the whole of human religion conceived as man's attitude towards "the Determiner of Destiny." For great masses of people religious faith is something accepted on authority and received by what is now called suggestion. The intellectual system which gives it such justification as it has may have never been presented to their minds at all; they profess their belief in the terms of certain formulæ, which were framed to represent an intellectual system, but which they have never connected with anything of the kind; and when someone either points out to them the ideas that belong to their formulæ, or objects to quite other ideas associated by themselves with their formulæ, they complain that religion itself is attacked.

So far, the problem raised is not very difficult. It may indeed be difficult enough in relation to particular individuals and groups. But the remedy in general terms is plain; it is the more thorough thinking out of the foundations and implications of religious belief and experience. Nothing is so perilous to religion as to discourage the application to it of the critical faculties

of the mind; but this application must be constant, and must begin as soon as thought is active in any field.

The other type is rarer but no less definite. For such persons religion is primarily intellectual or doctrinal, and their religious emotion is chiefly aroused by the impact upon their minds of a whole massive argument or mental structure. They are comparatively free from the danger that their religious position will be undermined; but they pay for this advantage in the relative paucity of their most exalted moments and in the limitation of their apprehensions. For it is not often that any man's mind is freshly reacting to the impact of a great intellectual system; the actual philosopher seldom actually enjoys the "spectacle of all time and all existence." And inasmuch as he only apprehends emotionally what he first apprehends mentally, such a man's emotional life is reduced to the scale not only of what is become intelligible to the human mind in general at that date, but of that fraction which is become intelligible to him individually.

IV

Now the spiritual health of mankind very largely depends on the possibility of establishing a harmony between these two types. The first type that we have described is the commoner, and that is well. For through sympathy and imagination men may receive spiritual apprehensions which are almost constant, and which have a range not to be limited by human measures. But left to itself this type tends to the various perversions known as sentimentalism, obscurantism, fanaticism. The second type contributes little impetus, but is indispensable for guidance and control; yet if it does not accept the impulse which the former type supplies, it becomes pedantic, hypercritical, obstructionist. Therefore, if these two types become impatient or intolerant of each

other, the total movement of the human spirit becomes an alternation of senseless leaps and stupid stagnation. Only as each learns to value the other, and both discharge their different functions in conscious co-operation, can we have spiritual health. The irreligious theologian may easily kill religion; but religion is no safer in the hands of the devotee. Our need, as always, is for harmony and right proportion. Alike in the individual and in the Church there must be a readiness to welcome the strange new movements of the spirit; but thought must follow close behind, not to discredit what seems uncouth, but to relate it to the field of experience already mastered and so render it both stable and effective in the economy of human life.

THE RESOURCES OF LITERATURE

Dulce et decorum est desipere in loco is not a Horatian motto, for though the two phrases of which it consists were both composed by Horace, he never put them together. But the fact that Horace never said it does not prevent it from being true. Indeed, holding Horace, as I do, in rather slight regard, I should feel that his failure to compose this Alcaic line is a reason for thinking at once less of him and more of it. Certainly its truth is singularly evident to one who is abruptly summoned from a fortnight's session of the House of Bishops engaged over Revision of the Prayer Book to the editorial chair of a Quarterly Review. A truce to this exacting earnestness! Let us "indulge in trifling" (for so Messrs Lewis and Short translate the latter half of our motto, though the unwary should be warned that *desipere* does not mean "indulge" and *locus* does not mean "trifling." One remembers the candidate for ordination who confidently translated St Paul to the examiner saying, "μή God, γένοιτο forbid"). Such indulgence, we feel, is at the moment both "sweet and decorous."

And if we would trifle, where can we hope to find a theme so inviting as Literature, the widest of all the arts at once in its own scope and in the width of its appeal? If some consideration of it illustrates the truth that the resources of literature are adequate for every human mood, that will be justification enough for the discussion of such a topic; for it may encourage the more

eager devotion to the Muses. Let us begin, in the spirit of our motto, with the simplest and most elementary kind of literary pleasure. I exclude from this field, of course, those verbal compositions which give pleasure to some persons only by stimulating a sensual imagination. No doubt great skill may be shown in, or rather prostituted to, this object; yet if the pleasure created is not due to the skill but to the sensuous imagination thereby stimulated, I should deny to it the name of Literature.

I

The simplest of literary pleasures I take to be the pleasure in verbal dexterity. Of course this may appear in writing which has higher qualities as well; Mr G. K. Chesterton abounds in it, sometimes to irritating excess, but it certainly is not his chief claim to literary eminence. It can be used in any connection, but is in fact out of place where the theme is noble or exalted. For appreciation of it we do best to turn to compositions in which it is the chief quality. Its true home is the Limerick. Something here may turn on the humour of incongruity or suggestion; but the main quality, always indispensable to success, is dexterity. This mainly shows itself here in two ways: the less artistic, though sometimes the most amusing, is the contrivance of curious rhymes; the purer form, as I think, is the composition of lines which scan and rhyme without the displacement of a single word from the position that it would occupy in prose. I give an example of each—both given to me by Etonian dignitaries. The first I heard from the present Headmaster:

> There once was a *gourmet* of Crediton
> Who ate *pâté-de-foie-gras*. He spread it on
> A chocolate biscuit
> And said, "I'll just risk it";
> His tomb gives the date that he said it on.

The other I heard from a former Vice-Provost:

> There was a young man of Madrid
> Who fancied that he was The Cid;
> When they asked of him, "Why?"
> He could only reply,
> That he didn't know why, but he did.

On the whole, I think it must be held that the Detective Story belongs to the same class as the Limerick, on the ground that in both the essential virtue is dexterity. Here, however, it is dexterity not of words but of plot. Of course there are other ingredients, such as sheer excitement at the dangers faced; the best Detective Story is always also in greater or less degree a Shocker. But this is a subsidiary element. In the Detective Story the primary interest is in the game played between the author and the reader; the perfect story would be one in which the reader had before him all the evidence on which the criminal would at last be convicted, and yet was led to suspect someone else until the moment of arrest. When the author leaves us in the dark by keeping out of the story either the criminal himself or the clues which point to his guilt, he is cheating, and spoils our pleasure in defeat; for in this game defeat, if only the author plays fair, is the condition of the highest pleasure.

II

At a low level in the ascent from simple to complex, yet calling for a very high degree of skill and capable of achieving exquisite beauty, is the poetry which depends on the interweaving of rhythms and rhymes. The most perfect example of this known to me is Shelley's *Cloud*. Of course it is full of dainty fancy, but the essence of its transcendent success lies, I am sure, in the see-saw swing of rhyme and rhythm, which produces a state of mind very like the slight giddiness induced by a garden-swing

—a pleasing monotony which, though it has no particular feature to fix the attention, we should always wish to go on a little longer. So is induced the state of detachment from all other concerns which is necessary to any really artistic experience. A great theme, worthily handled, can induce such concentration of the mind upon itself that detachment from all else follows; then stylistic contrivances become vexatious, for being unnecessary they constitute a distraction. But a slight or fanciful theme cannot secure such concentration, and if there is to be detachment at all, it must be because we are lulled into a torpor which makes us happy to give our minds to so small an object. There are instances of perfect beauty in this type of literature: *The Cloud* is one of them; and therefore it has a claim, through some of its specimens, to rank high. But the pleasure given is very simple, requiring for its enjoyment a sensibility to verbal music and delicate fantasy rather than elaborate thought or depth of feeling.

III

This seems to be the place to introduce romantic fiction—the novel and the drama. Here some element of feeling is indispensable, but it may be very slight if the workmanship is very delicate. I do not know what the critics said of *Monsieur Beaucaire* when it first came out—I mean, of course, the novel with the artistically appropriate "sad ending," not the play with its ludicrous "lived happy ever after"; but I know that it gave me intense delight, not through stimulating any strong emotions, for indeed I cared little for any of the characters, but by the fine craftmanship which contrived to bathe the characters and episodes in the soft glow of a dreamy melancholy, so that what one enjoyed was not the story as a story but the general atmosphere in which it was wrapped about. There is of course an immense class of

books about which this could be truly said. And the quality which makes them attractive is something closely akin to that dexterity of which we have already spoken.

Heretical as it will appear to some, I should hold that FitzGerald's version of *Omar Khayyam* belongs essentially to this type. At a certain stage of development one rejoices in it because it has the air of profound thought and is yet easily intelligible, so that it flatters the reader with the sense that he is appreciating profound thought. One is reminded of the comment made by Dr Jenkyns, Master of Balliol, on the more commonplace remarks of Aristotle: "Profound thought! I have often made the same observation myself." But FitzGerald's *Omar* is not profound, whatever Omar himself may have been; he only gives us the first pre-occupations of any tyro in meditation or in refined sensuality, and expresses them with a supreme dexterity, so that our mood is attuned to his by the lure of verbal harmony.

Some musicians have this capacity in a high degree. Spohr is perhaps the most conspicuous; but much of the charm of Mendelssohn has the same origin—and perhaps that is why he is so much more successful with melody than with counterpoint, and also explains why he so often states a magnificent subject at the beginning of a chorus, but becomes ineffective when he sets out to develop it.

Contemporary criticism is very impatient of this type of composition; but it has its place—a perfectly legitimate and useful place. There has lately been published a collection of *The Hundred Second-Best Poems*, and though Gray's *Elegy* does not appear among them, the editor appears in his preface to feel that it belongs there. The *Elegy* is in fact a good example of what I have in mind. Both in thought and in feeling it is commonplace; but the expression is so perfect that it really does reveal the beauty of those common thoughts and

feelings which inspire it. And to bring out the beauty of what is so familiar is a high service to mankind.

For fear of misunderstanding let me hasten to add that it is not the commonplace subject which makes a poem second-rate. Many of the greatest poems have very ordinary subjects. Laughter and tears, love and death—these are the most ordinary of all things, and they are the very stuff of the immortal songs. What makes the difference is the depth of feeling in the author. There is the sort of feeling revealed in *Enoch Arden*; and there is the sort of feeling revealed in the second chorus of the *Agamemnon*. Whatever the subject, as it might be stated in a synopsis, the former is not first-rate (I speak with restraint); whatever the subject, the latter is first-rate.

But my present concern is to vindicate the right of this whole class of literature to a place among literature's resources for bringing boons to the human soul. And as long as no one claims for it that it is more than I have said, I believe the claim would be almost universally admitted. Its appeal is to sympathy—not to the mighty emotions or the volcanic passions, but to the quieter feelings which give the tone and colour to everyday life. To evoke sympathy with these is artistically a lesser thing than to express the storms of soul which are the stuff of tragedy; but it is at least arguable that socially it is more useful. No doubt that is a horrid defence of a work of art; the artist will repudiate it altogether; adopting the pose of Ajax when confronted with lightning, he will say:

Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis.

But while the artist fumes, the human being may applaud.

IV

The next main class of literary work seems to be that which adds to the attractions of the last the element of

reality: this is Biography. It has as many shades and variation as there are types of personality. But it is certainly true that what makes the enjoyment of reading biography is interest in, and sympathy with, the person whose life is described. The writing may be artistic, but the highest art is to make the subject stand out clear and vivid. Of course there are some biographies which are essentially collections of essays hung on to the lay-figure of a subject like coats on a peg; they must be enjoyed accordingly; their biographical form is really accidental. Or again there are some which are really political pamphlets, like Disraeli's *Life of Lord George Bentinck*. But true biography depends for its attraction upon the evocation of real personal interest; that is, upon sympathy. And some of us find it easier to exercise sympathy towards real (that is, of course, historically real) persons than towards fictitious ones. And this exercise of sympathy is both agreeable and beneficial. To my mind, the most delightful of all kinds of reading for ordinary times and ordinary states of mind is historical or political biography, where there is often the excitement of a novel of adventure linked with the zest of reality and the added interest of practical importance. It is, as we know it, a comparatively modern art. Perhaps Mr G. M. Trevelyan is its greatest master, though Carlyle handled it before him on a higher plane of spiritual apprehension. But Carlyle used this as he used all other literary mediums, to be the channel of prophecy, and he must not be read at ordinary times by people who wish to preserve an ordinary frame of mind.

V

The last section led us to the border of History, that great field where Science, Art, and Philosophy meet and are at one. History is a department of Science, because

it is always engaged in the search for truth both general and particular; it is part of Philosophy, for it must both select and arrange its material in accordance with some outlook on the world which determines the relative importance of things; it is Art, because its aim is so to present the Past that we not only receive information concerning it, but enter into its feelings and passions, its joys and griefs, its hopes and fears. But in its essence it consists in a wide and comprehensive intellectual grasp, so that it calls for an effort quite out of comparison with that required by the other sorts of literature that have been mentioned. This article is not concerned with intellectual effort, and will therefore only touch on this and the still higher ranges of literature for the sake of completeness.

History is the most all-round of literary exercises; in it Science, Art, and Philosophy are all equally involved. And universal history may well be in itself the noblest drama ever conceived. But no man can see it all or contemplate it as a whole. Therefore in order that the deepest meanings may be expressed there must be concentration on certain aspects of the whole reality. Science, which came in with Biography, now drops away again, except for Psychology which remains indispensable, provided that its technical apparatus is kept carefully out of sight. So we come to Great Fiction—to High Comedy (like that of Aristophanes and of Shakespeare the creator of Falstaff); to the deeply human novels of Dickens, Meredith, Dostoievski; to the epics of Homer, Virgil, Dante, Milton; to the culmination of literature—Tragedy.

All these have this in common, that whether they take for their theme the ordinary or the unusual, they express and elicit emotions deeper, vaster, more potent, than those by which the ordinary affairs of life are energised. Here we are admitted for the moment to behold the

generating station of the cosmic forces; we are in presence of what is close akin to divine creation; "and there—ye have heard and seen; consider and bow the head."

What I believe Tragedy to be, and to signify, I have tried to say in a book called *Mens Creatrix*. Here I would only plead that literature at this level is something to be treated with reverence and awe. The temper of mind in which we may reasonably go to see, say, *Macbeth* on the stage is the same as that in which we ought to go to church; we should go as those who are to be in touch with the Eternal Verities. And such communing will have its effects. The man who has really faced the terror of life in *Macbeth*, or its horror in *Othello*, or its dim mystery in *Hamlet*, or its vast grey gloom shot through with fires of anguish in *King Lear*, and has seen all this redeemed by beauty so that its very fearfulness becomes a mere element in its sublimity, should be a braver man from that day forth.

VI

Well, well; we have trifled enough, and even our trifling has led us to the eternities. For literature is so varied and rich in its resources for soothing or rousing the human spirit, that to speak of it at all is to be led over the whole gamut of human interests and emotions. If this sketch, in which I have uttered so many dogmatic opinions on points where my opinion has no weight whatever, has illustrated afresh that rich variety, perhaps it has some justification; but a truer plea would be that I have turned to this field for the recreation and refreshment that all can be sure of finding there.

Cras iterum nos fata jubent perferre labores
Fortiter ; ast hodie desipuisse juvat.

III
VARIOUS ADDRESSES

TRADITION AND MODERNISM[1]

It is inevitable that from time to time the progress of research, and the variations in the general outlook of men upon the world should call for readjustments in the terms employed for the exposition of the Christian faith. At times these give rise to anxiety lest the restatement should not really state the old faith at all. Not long ago a conference of Modern Churchmen held at Girton College, Cambridge, led to an outbreak of such anxiety, and only now are we beginning to see that controversy in its true perspectives.

I should like, now that we are reviewing it a little more calmly, to say something of a quite general kind about the whole situation in which we find ourselves and in which we are likely still to find ourselves for a considerable time to come. We have first to recognise that these controversies are part of a general interplay of religious experience with the movements of thought that are going on in the world, partly under the influence of religion and partly detached from it, and that this is nothing novel. This interplay has been going on in the history of the Church from the very beginning, and nothing can possibly stop it. It is quite impossible that religion should be kept in a separate air-tight compartment, even if it were desirable, as it is most certainly not desirable. If religion is to pervade life, then, of necessity, it comes into contact and intercourse with all the other forces that

[1] Delivered to the Manchester Diocesan Conference of 1922.

are shaping life. It must be able to state its message in such a way that those whose minds are mainly shaped by other forces will be able to understand it, and in that process there will inevitably be some misunderstanding and some quite unintentional modification and sometimes diminution of the original message. That has always been an attendant feature of the processes by which the Church has been making itself intelligible to the world, and it will always continue to be so. The interplay itself, then, is inevitable, and is even wholesome, even though it causes perplexity and more than perplexity from time to time. The interplay of religion and the general movements of thought is both inevitable and desirable, and it has been a feature of the Christian Church right through. It tends to give us confidence and stability when we remember through how many such controversies the Christian Church has passed, and how often it has seemed that vital issues were being obscured or overlaid, or even abandoned to the enemy; while as we look back we can see, all through, one constant witness to one unchanging faith.

The first great change, of course, was due to the intercourse of religion with Greek philosophy, and the first supremely great name in that connection is the name of Origen. I must not embark on a lecture on ancient theology on this occasion; but there were two great intellectual currents at that time, one under the ægis of the name of Plato, one under that of Aristotle, and in the period of the Great Councils—in the period when the Nicene Creed, both in its original form and in the extended form in which we now repeat it, was drawn up —Platonism was regarded as the firm ally of Christianity, while merely to prefer Aristotelian methods of thought was to invite suspicion. It was partly on this ground that the theological school of Antioch was suspect. Yet not so very long afterwards we find the Aristotelian way

of thinking coming to its own and establishing itself in the Church in the person of a theologian, on whom much stress has been laid recently, called Leontius, of Byzantium, until it finally attained a quite dominating position in the East in the writings of St John of Damascus. We, looking back with our detachment, are able to see what is certainly true, that the Platonic method was the more appropriate in a period mainly given to probing and discovery and pressing forward into new apprehensions; while the Aristotelian was the more fitting in an age which needed to consolidate, to systematise, to present in a form that could be easily communicated from one generation to another. Then the course of thought moves to the West, and the dominating considerations are those that are drawn not from any ultimate philosophy, but from the immense influence of the Roman system of law, and you find that very strongly marked, for example, in St Anselm. Let us remember that when St Bernard secured the condemnation of Abelard for heresy, partly because of his teaching about the Atonement, St Bernard was insisting that it is absolutely necessary to any wholesome doctrine of the Atonement that you should believe that a ransom was paid by Christ to the Devil; and this is the doctrine which, in fact, has held sway in the Church for a greater number of centuries than any other doctrine that has ever been propounded on that subject. As far as I know, no one holds that now, and it was St Anselm who gave it its death-blow. The influence of Greek philosophy in its Aristotelian form then came into Western Europe through the Arabs, and that teacher who is now regarded as the main central pillar of orthodoxy, St Thomas Aquinas, was in his day regarded as a most dangerous innovator; and if you will study that most fascinating book of Dr Wickstead on *Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy*, you will see how careful St Thomas had to be in the statement of his position because of the

suspicion with which he was surrounded for his modern way of teaching. Under his leadership and that of the other schoolmen, this method of thought, already established in the East, became established in the West, until the works of Plato, then nearly unknown in the West, again flooded the thoughts of men with that glow of intellectual aspiration which is one of their great features; the scholastic system was mainly overturned by the influence of a revival of Platonism. So the process which you watch in the East takes place in the West, but in reverse order; and on each occasion it was felt that those who were trying to interpret the Christian faith in the terms of a philosophy that was becoming natural and habitual to the minds of contemporaries were giving it away. We look back and know they were not giving it away, but were bearing witness to one and the same truth. They were engaged in a perilous enterprise, and many of them may have made mistakes on the way, but, broadly speaking, they were serving both God and man, because they were interpreting the one unalterable Gospel in the language that the new generations were able to understand.

Let us skip a long way and come down to the nineteenth century, and let us remember that almost in our own time the Evangelicals were condemned by the authorities inside the Church, and reinstated by the civil courts, in the Gorham case; the Catholic Party was condemned and reinstated by the civil courts in the Bennett case; and the Liberal Churchmen were condemned and reinstated by the civil courts in the Essays and Reviews case. In regard to each one of these, the general feeling within the Church was that the representatives of these great movements in the Church's life were false to the Church's tradition. We look back and know that if those three condemnations had been allowed to stand, if there had not been some authority which was able to

reverse what was the expressed prevalent opinion of theologically-minded Churchmen at that time, the Church would now be infinitely the poorer by the loss of every one of them. That has a bearing on the question of the supremacy of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, concerning which there are also other considerations to be adduced.

With that general survey before us of what the process has been whereby the unaltered, everlasting Gospel has been made vivid to the thought of successive ages—through a process which was fraught with peril, which in particular thinkers involved serious error and mistake, yet which was, in the main, absolutely necessary to the vitality of the whole Church—let us turn to a similarly brief and sketchy review of the position in which we find ourselves to-day. Our problem is rather complicated by the fact that it is twofold. It is not, I think, as it was in the early Church, a problem only in philosophy. It is also a problem in history. We are aware that the main controversies which have been vividly present to the public mind have been controversies affecting historical questions, particularly the questions of the two miracles which are referred to in the creed. Therefore, we have to consider two aspects of the problem, and not only one.

In considering it in its philosophical aspect I believe that we are presented at the present time with a singularly great opportunity, because there can be no doubt that the philosophical world is in a greater state of chaos than it has been for an exceedingly long time. There is no one philosophy of which we can say, broadly speaking, that it holds the field. Fifty years ago we could have said that some form of Hegelianism held the field. That is not so now. Neither that nor any other view of things commands anything like a universal assent among the students of philosophy. If, therefore, it is possible to come forward with a dominating conviction which can

be taken as a clue to the understanding of the world, and which will so serve a purpose for philosophers themselves, it must go far towards carrying conviction of its truth. And that is what Christian theology sets out to do. There is always this difference between philosophy and theology. Philosophy, from its very nature, begins with a survey of all the facts that can be gathered and tries to see what can be made of them; so far as it deals with the Being of God its task is what in geometry is called a problem—to construct a conception of God adequate to the facts. Theology begins at exactly the other end. It starts with a supposed revelation of God; it believes that God has made Himself known by His own act, and so the task of theology is, what in geometry is called a theorem—to show that this revelation of God is adequate, and very much besides, to the Universe—to show that this conception of God solves the problem. The solution is given first. We are given the key and have to fit it into the lock; philosophy begins with the lock and tries to construct the key. That, broadly speaking, is the difference between them.

Therefore, it is for us to start from the Christian end. The revelation that has been given and is still being given in the continuous experience that men have of God in Christ, as they are faithful to the revelation given once for all, is the clue. We start by taking that as our interpreting principle with regard to all questions, theoretical or practical, that can be raised. We do not expect to be able to produce a neat and tidy theory, with no loose ends, that accounts for every conceivable fact, nor do we expect to be able to give anything like a minute and exhaustive analysis of the Divine Being who is made known to us in Revelation. If the Revelation is what it claims to be it must transcend the power of our understanding. If it did not do that it would not be what it sets out to be at all. If anyone could say: "I now completely understand

the Incarnation," he would have proved that the Incarnation never took place. It can never be completely intelligible. But if it is true, then it must be something which we can understand more and more fully, something which will never present a complete blank barrier to thought, something in which we are perpetually discovering a greater wealth of illumination. And we should be able to apply it progressively as a solving principle to all the problems that confront the mind. Not that we shall expect in any one book or in any one lifetime to find and give the solution, but we may expect to go steadily on, getting nearer to a complete grasp, though the final solution must be beyond us in this earthly life.

We have a right to demand that our theologians should be taking advantage of this immense opportunity. It is not true to say that people are not interested in theology. Theology is the English form of a Greek word which means "thinking about God," and there was never a period in the history of the world when there were so many people passionately interested in thinking about God. What is quite true is that people who have not had the opportunity of making a specialist study of the history of theology are not interested in minute details of doctrine before they have got a broad outline. That is perfectly true; and theology has been to an undue extent occupied with the minute working out of special doctrines and insufficiently occupied with presenting on a broad scale the Christian interpretation of the world and of life; it is to that that we must call our theologians; and, indeed, in books that have recently been appearing there is evidence that this call is being answered. There is an opportunity for us to come forward and say that our religion, our "system," meets the requirements that none of the contending "systems" can meet.

Then we turn to the other limb of the subject—the historical problems. When we look at them, unless I am

mistaken, we find that those problems only arise because people approach the historical evidence with pre-suppositions which belong to the sphere of philosophy already in their minds. Of course, if you go to the Gospel narrative with a pre-supposition in your mind which might be expressed in the phrase, "Miracles don't happen," you will say that the evidence is insufficient to make you believe that they do happen. David Hume raised the question whether any evidence could ever prove the occurrence of a miracle, and that question is involved in a great deal of the controversy that goes on concerning these points; and this leads you back to your ultimate conceptions. It leads you back to the question whether the ruling power in the Universe is a System or a Person.

If it is a Person, then, no doubt, He will reveal His omnipotence mainly in the constancy of the laws which He has made, but He will never be bound by his own laws. We are all familiar with the thought. If it is a System, then, of course, its own laws are the beginning and end. But if it is a Person, and if we are allowed to suppose exceptional actions in which the law-giver departs from His usual method of acting, if such suppositions are able to be tolerated in thought at all, and if we believe that there is a unique revelation, complete and final, given at a moment in history, then, of course, we shall expect to find what are usually called miraculous occurrences surrounding that unique event. So far from being improbable, they became probable *a priori*; and if you hold the Christian view at all it would be more odd that there should be no miraculous event than that there should be. I cannot for a moment doubt that the mind of our generation has been so dominated by the magnificent success of physical science in its own sphere that it has done what the mind of man has always done whenever any one group of the leading conceptions has just revealed its full power, and has applied its principles far beyond their proper

sphere. It is perfectly natural, and it always happens; but there is no reason why we should give way before habitual tendency to error.

I believe that the real enemy to-day is not materialism; materialism as a philosophy is as dead as a door nail. The real enemy is a spiritual interpretation of the Universe which gives a place to the supreme values of the spiritual life—beauty, goodness and truth—but which does not give full value to the fact of Personality.

If you read such a book, an indubitably great book, as Professor Pringle Pattison's Gifford Lectures on *The Idea of God*, you are left at the end with the feeling that God is the name of a very large number of qualities which are discoverable in the Universe. They are the supremely important qualities, no doubt. They are the qualities for the sake of which the Universe no doubt exists; but they are not a Person. They are not a Being with whom personal fellowship and communion is so much as possible. Whether that is a fair account of Pringle Pattison's book or no is an unimportant question, but that kind of thought is exceedingly prevalent, and finds its cruder expression in the systems that go under the name of Theosophy. So the battle of the Church in the realms of thought at the present time is a battle for faith in the living God and, therefore, we are right back on the basis of the old Hebrew revelation.

Well, now, in face of all that, what is our task mainly to be? Our problem arises through the relating of our current thought to a constant fact, the fact of God in Christ, and let me call your attention to a matter no doubt familiar to all Churchpeople, which is perpetually misrepresented by those who attack the Church from outside. The creeds in which our faith is formulated are not documents based on any kind of philosophy. There is one phrase in the Nicene Creed which does derive its origin from Greek philosophy, the phrase "of one

substance," but we know perfectly well that S. Athanasius and the Nicene Fathers were not concerned with any particular doctrine of substance. Their concern was to assert what must be true if Christians are right in their conviction that when we hold intercourse or fellowship with Christ we are in intercourse or fellowship with the Eternal God Himself. The creeds are partly records of historical facts—which facts, of course, may be historically called in question—and are partly proclamations of facts of religious experience and hope; in neither case are they statements of philosophical ideas. With the exception of that one phrase they are wholly independent of all particular systems of philosophy. The followers of Aristotle and of Plato can unite in saying them together; so can the Idealists and the Realists of the new philosophical controversies. None of these controversies are in any way touched, and it is extraordinarily important that people should realise it. We are perpetually asked how we can go on formulating our faith in the terms of an antiquated philosophy. Our answer is that we don't do it and never did.

But there remains always in every generation the task of making this one unchanging fact, the fact of the life and death and resurrection of Christ and God's work in Him, vividly intelligible to the people of the time. Now, for people who have been brought up in a Christian tradition, the language in which they have been trained will be the most natural vehicle of expression and they will be at home in it; but we have to speak to a host of people to whom that language is almost unmeaning. They have to learn it, as one has to learn Hindustani. If you are to convey a message to anybody, you must first of all know what the message is and be able to speak the other man's language; and then you must be able to represent the one in the other. All these are requisite. We all know the difficulty of all forms of translation even when we are

merely translating words, and when you are adjusting a great dominating fact like the revelation of God in Christ to a whole method of thinking, you must expect to find that there will be theories formulated and statements made which seem to you to be exceedingly dangerous; and you must even expect to find that some statements will be made, and phrases used, which will be found afterwards to have failed in the purpose for which they were conceived.

The men who are doing this work must themselves be convinced of the responsibility they undertake; but that must not prevent them from trying. We must remember the difficulty of their task, and be very patient with those thinkers who are struggling forward to reach a fuller apprehension of the truth, or to convey a truth so familiar to us to the minds which at present regard it as altogether alien and unintelligible. There is need for great patience, and great considerateness.

I don't think that in our teaching work we do enough to show people how the whole Christian scheme of the world and of life is one thing. We teach the separate articles of the Creed, but an "article" means "a little limb" of a "body of truth." The articles of the Creed are the different sections in which the one body of the Creed is articulated, and we must be able to show that one body of thought which is the Christian way of looking at the world and life; and we shall commend our message to men's minds if we are able to present the connection between all parts of it more than we do, even at the cost of separate exposition of the separate parts. That is one need of the thinking world to-day; and I don't mean the educated world, because part of our problem comes from the fact that these matters are discussed in magazines and newspapers which are read by everybody. That lends added responsibility to those who are trying to express the old message in the changing language of

different generations. It also involves us in the necessity of giving a fullness of teaching on the intellectual side to congregations and individuals who would not at one time have needed that kind of teaching.

If I may, then, turn for a moment to my brethren of the laity, I would say: If your parish priests are to do work of that kind, you must set them free for real study. It is quite impossible for a man who is perpetually burdened with the social organisation of his parish to be keeping himself abreast of the phases of thought that are being presented to the minds of his people in magazines and newspapers, and impossible for him to know how to interpret freshly and vividly the message of the Gospel to those minds. And, therefore, there is a more urgent need than ever that the lay members of the Church should, as far as possible, accept responsibility for those Christian works undertaken by the Church which are not specialists' work; let us have our specialists for their special tasks.

And to my brethren of the clergy I would say: Never suppose that any social work can be so urgent in its importance as to prevent your continued study of the Gospel entrusted to you and of the way by which you may commend it.

Then, besides that, there is the opportunity and need, of which I have already spoken and which must necessarily be the work of comparatively few, for a constructive philosophy which takes the revelation of God in Christ as its starting-point and constructs a complete philosophy round that as its pivot. That is already being done; but the need is greater than can be expressed.

Here, however, as always, the supreme answer to critics and above all to cavillers, is to be found in a deepened earnestness to manifest the moral power of the faith we have received to transform both character

and society. If we can effectively show that the faith which we have received is capable, when we are loyal to it, of transforming us, and through us the world in which we live, that will in fact be the greatest witness to its truth that we can offer or the world demand.

THE MINISTRY OF HEALING[1]

MANY movements of our own time make it incumbent upon us to consider with fresh earnestness the relation of our religion to all forms of health. The spread of Christian Science, the development of healing ministries in our own Church, and many other signs of the times press this theme upon our attention. Most of us probably think that much of this interest in health is itself unhealthy. But we are told that we are neglecting a real part of the original Gospel, and we are bound to inquire carefully whether there is ground for such a statement. Naturally we shall wish, at the outset, to go back to consider the example of our Lord Himself, and His precepts. Plainly for Him disease was an enemy. It was not something to be accepted with a passive resignation. I emphasise the word passive, for resignation in itself—that is, the acceptance of what comes to us as coming under the Providence of God—does seem to me to be both a part of Christian virtue and also a means to the peace of mind most likely to ensure recovery. But it must be resignation resting on faith in God's goodness, and not a mere acquiescence in something imposed by an inscrutable power. There is all the difference in the world between these two things. If we face the trials of life, and of sickness among them, in the spirit of real faith in the goodness and love of God that will bring to us a quietude of mind and a repose of spirit which are in their

[1] Delivered to the Manchester Diocesan Conference of 1924.

effect conducive to recovery. But if our acquiescence is merely the acceptance of what some power whose methods are beyond our knowledge inflicts upon us, and if we accept because we feel helpless and can do nothing else, that frame of mind tends to despair and to a tightening of the grip of the disease.

Let us be quite clear, then, when we speak of anything like the mood of resignation, exactly what is in our minds. The word, perhaps, does suggest to some people merely laying ourselves passively before an almighty power which, because it is almighty, is irresistible. That is not a Christian frame of mind. The thought of God's power to the Christian is never separated from the thought of His love, and therefore our resignation must be only the setting aside of our own more selfish will in order that we may repose completely in the love of our Father.

But we must not argue that because our Lord regarded disease as something to be cured, or, if you like the phrase, to be attacked, that therefore the existence of disease on any given occasion is contrary to God's will. There are many things which come to us in life which it is God's will we should struggle against, and yet you cannot say the coming of them is contrary to God's will. The whole process of our discipline consists very largely in being placed in circumstances where we have to struggle, and where the circumstances of the struggle can be understood by any man of faith to be part of God's schooling of him. It is never safe to say that because we have to resist something God never wished that thing to be there; just as it is never safe to say that because we feel a call to work for a cause God wishes that cause to succeed. God has His work for us, and He also has His plan, which goes far beyond anything we can apprehend. Our task is a loving obedience, leaving the issue with Him. It may be that we are to contribute by our very failure to something greater than the success of the cause we support.

If you doubt that you must go back again and study the meaning of the Cross. And so we shall not say, as I think has been much too easily said, that in a world such as we know it must always be contrary to God's will that anyone should in fact be ill. What is certainly the will of God is that in their illnesses men and women should be able to trust in His love and power. That trust will be one condition disposing them towards recovery.

Our Lord, as He moved about, healed multitudes, and He bade His disciples do the same. And He is recorded to have said of His works: "Greater works than these shall ye do, because I go to the Father." You cannot read the Gospels and cut out the ministry of healing without tearing them to ribbons. The whole of that ministry is embodied in our Lord's activity. It is part of it. But, on the other hand, there is no evidence of any general campaign to abolish disease. He does not of Himself go and seek out sick people that he may heal them. He heals those who come, and on the whole, as you follow the story of His ministry, you find that the activity of healing diminishes as the ministry goes on. In fact, we find that He turns away from the excitement which His healing miracles created. When the whole city was astir because of them He withdrew, rising very early in the morning, for solitary prayer; and when told that men were seeking Him, instead of going back to that scene of welcome and excitement, He said: "Let us go into the villages that I may preach the Kingdom of God there also." The kind of excitement that comes through the public ministry of healing does not seem to have commended itself to His mind, or to have been the spirit on which He could count. He withdrew from it. And as a rule He asks those whom He heals to keep it quiet and not excite people about it. He withdraws from it all in order to concentrate upon the directly spiritual mission. I think we can summarise what we find on the subject in

our Lord's ministry by saying that we see Him conscious of a power to heal, and being possessed of love He must put forth that power when He is face to face with need. But it is none of his primary purpose. It is a necessary incident, but only an incident, and healing is never His primary aim.

Between that time and our own there has come the great development of medical and surgical science. Let us have no hesitation whatever in proclaiming that these are gifts from God; that undoubtedly the knowledge we have acquired in these fields, as in others, is acquired according to God's will, and that these are agencies given by God for discharging the task of healing. When we speak of the ministry of healing in the Church let us not forget the existence of hospitals, which are a Christian institution. They did not exist in Europe until Christianity founded them. They are in themselves, with all the skill that they command, a part of the Church's ministry of healing. We shall desire that to the utmost extent those who have the privilege of helping their suffering fellow men and women in the hospitals shall realise the spiritual basis of their activities. But even when they do not realise them it remains true that what built the hospitals was the Christian view of God and man, and that they are one part at least of the method by which the Church discharges its ministry of healing.

But we shall go on to reflect that human nature is one thing. You cannot draw a sharp line between what is physical and what is mental. The two merge into each other in most baffling ways. Plainly surgery is concerned only with what is physical, so far as the surgeon exercises his activity through what are called operations. But it is also true that the influence of the surgeon in calling out the trust of his patient has a great deal to do with the power of the patient to survive the shock of the operation, and while the method of surgery is purely physical, there

is a great deal of the surgeon's work which is more than physical. We are all aware in our own experience of the close inter-connection of body and spirit. We do not usually pause to analyse these things, but everyone knows how the action of the heart is in fact affected by various emotions. One of the most powerful emotions in its effect on the physical system is fear. Some people flush with fear, more people blench with fear. Both of these are activities of the heart, of the purely physical heart. Some of us may remember occasions in our lives, at school if not since, when we thought we were going to be found out. There is a tendency at such times for the physical system to exude a certain kind of perspiration. I am assured that that perspiration is totally different in chemical qualities from what comes out of you when you are hot. You cannot exaggerate the extent to which the life of the soul and the life of the body are intertwined; therefore it is hard to conceive that there is no relation between the state of the soul and bodily health.

So we come to ask what, in outline, is the connection of faith with health. Now I do not think it is at all possible to say that if you have faith enough you will never be ill, or that if you are ill it shows some failure in your faith. That would seem to me to be going clean beyond the evidence, and, indeed, contrary to it. We all know instances of really saintly people who are suffering constantly from physical disabilities that bring them great pain. All here reverenced Dean McCormick, and I have sometimes wondered whether something of the triumphant joy that there was in his character was not due to the fact that he was daily, or almost daily, triumphing over attacks of real pain due to physical illness. Once you have reached that point of real supremacy over your body it is at least possible that the spiritual power may be increased by its constant exercise against something physical which to others would seem to be weakening

and even debilitating. So, then, we shall not say that faith and health go literally hand in hand, but we shall say, I think, that a living faith is a predisposing cause of health, or one of the predisposing causes of health. The causes of health, as the causes of sickness, are very many, but among the forces which will tend to keep us in health will be a faith which is extended to a real expectation of God's goodness in every department of our being. That will bring us either actual health or a greater power of triumphing over ill-health, and either of these are great blessings. Moreover, when we triumph in the way that I have described over ill-health, the result is, in fact, that our health is somewhat better than if we were merely lying passive in the grip of our disease, because owing to the exaltation of mind there is a real access of vitality which tends to combat the disease itself. The way in which, as I think, faith chiefly promotes health is precisely by the creation of peace of mind beyond what can be reached in any other way, and especially beyond what can be reached by those who have much to distract them, whether in their circumstances or in their bodily condition. It is not so much, as I think, by the *direct* action of faith in God that He will remove this or that cause of ill-health, but rather that faith has so formed the habit of our mind and thought and feeling that we are saved from the waste of energy that is brought about by nervous anxiety and nervous fret, and the peace of mind which it creates is a predisposing cause of health.

Only let us remember that in all departments of the spiritual life failure of expectation is a real barrier to the activity of God's gifts. And therefore, even if we have great faith in God in reference to a certain area of our lives, but have never tried to apply this faith in God to our bodily strength and vigour, then we shall not receive from it the gifts we might expect if we had deliberately made that connection in our minds. It is always true

that the gifts of God are hampered in the benefit they would bring to us by any failure in our expectation, for that expectation itself is the activity of faith in relation to them. But we need, as I think, to be very specially on our guard at one point.

What are called faith-cures look very similar to what are called cures by suggestion without any reference to religion and faith—the kind of cures which M. Coué carries out at Nancy, and are perfectly well authenticated. These have no reference whatever to religious faith. M. Coué himself is a Christian man, but he does not call upon either his own religion or the religion of his patients in his treatment of them. The suggestion that he makes is the suggestion that you are going to get well, and nothing else, and the faith is not faith in God but faith in your own prospective recovery so far as there is active faith involved at all. It is the operation upon the system of a firmly rooted belief that M. Coué rests upon. It is not faith in God. Now if we find that there are cures wrought ostensibly through religious faith, but that precisely similar cures are wrought by suggestion where there is no reference to religious faith, we must be very careful what we do, because we are not only concerned as a Christian Church with getting people cured, but we are concerned with commending the Gospel of Christ, and while we shall rejoice in the cure of anybody who is in fact cured, we must be very careful how we make claims in the name of the Gospel which are liable to refutation. It is very dangerous to say of any cure that is wrought, "This was done through the Christian faith of the patient," because very likely a precisely similar case can be produced where an identical cure was wrought with no relation to the Christian faith at all. We must not confound faith with suggestion. But while we are very careful in that way we shall also surely believe that where there is real faith in God it is at least possible that God

will put forth His own healing power where He sees that in response to our faith it will be best for us, and that therefore a living faith in God may open the resources of the Divine healing. And while we shall hesitate to claim that any particular case was certainly an activity of God in answer to prayer, we shall continue most certainly to pray, and we shall continue to encourage faith in those who are sick, so that through that faith God may, if He sees it to be for their welfare, give them the blessing of health. And we shall believe there is no limit to what His loving power can do where His loving wisdom sees that it is best. Consequently, while not making claims in the name of the Gospel for any particular cures, we shall earnestly endeavour by our own prayers and by our teaching and influence to help those who are suffering from disease to put their trust more perfectly in God, knowing that this is the way to receive from Him whatever He sees to be most for our benefit.

Faith, then, to summarise once more, is a cause of health, and therefore spiritual healing is, in principle, possible. That does not mean that it is certainly possible in regard to all cases of illness, but in general principle spiritual healing is a possibility. But it is only possible when faith is uppermost and health is secondary in consideration. It is certainly indispensable for any cure that is to be regarded as a cure wrought by religious faith that it should be the outcome of a complete trust and repose in God, and not a kind of clamorous claim that He shall give health whether He sees it best for us or not. Therefore, in any ministry of healing which the Church undertakes we must be very careful that faith in God is always first and last, and that the gift of health is regarded as strictly incidental.

Now this leads me to speak more in particular about those missions of healing which have lately attracted very great attention. I want to say, first, that I am personally

most grateful to the Bishop of Bradford for the way in which he ordered and conducted the mission of healing in his diocese, and I am most thankful that he saw his way clear to promote that mission of healing under his full sanction and commission. In consequence the rest of us have gained some experience for the guidance of our own action. I should not have been able to take that step myself, and I could not take it now, but I am very glad there has been a Bishop who has found it possible to take it, because I think it has helped to guide us.

There were certainly some cures—in proportion to those who attended the Mission, so far as the records at present go, rather a small number. It is claimed that those who were not cured did not go away suffering any embitterment of disappointment, but went away having gained a greater strength with which to bear their affliction. I do not know whether that was general, because it is likely that those who were disappointed would not write to say so, whereas it is certain the majority of those who were benefited would write to ask that their thanks should be offered with others in the after-thanksgiving. The whole enterprise, as it seems to me, ought to be regarded with care, sympathy, and reverence, and by no means condemned.

But I noticed certain features which caused me misgiving. The Bishop of Bradford laid down carefully thought-out regulations, the keeping of which would very largely have safeguarded the position about which I am anxious, but it proved impossible to keep the conditions. One was that there was to be no advertisement. Well, if anything has ever been advertised it was the mission of healing at Frizinghall—not because the incumbent or anyone officially concerned was responsible, but because the Press became greatly interested long before the mission began. The result was that there were articles about it, and distant people sent in applications.

One of the requirements was that those who came must present evidence that they came with their doctors' full approval and after careful preparation. It was possible in the diocese of Bradford for the Bishop to ensure that careful preparation was given. It was not possible to exercise any supervision over the kind of preparation given to those who came from a distance. On the other hand it seemed impossible to exclude them when they had prepared and come and presented their credentials.

Again, there could not be, without an elaborate organisation, the kind of medical supervision that seems to me to be necessary. At Lourdes there is a regular medical bureau, as I think it is called, in connection with the shrine, and the medical aspects of these pilgrimages receive the very closest attention. Whatever else we may think of Lourdes and its claims, it cannot be held that there is any neglect of careful medical supervision. But this would be impossible in a healing mission without the establishment of an organisation such as could hardly be set up in connection with that one healing mission.

I have alluded to the difficulty of avoiding advertisement, and the result of the advertisement was, of course, that though inside the Church an atmosphere of the deepest peace was carefully fostered, the whole Church was surrounded, according to the Press reports, by excited crowds. Now that is exactly the kind of excitement from which, it seems to me, our Lord withdrew after His first great miracles of healing. It is the kind of excitement which tends to set the public mind on the wrong road in the search for faith and its meaning, and unless we could be sure that that kind of excitement on the part of the public is going to be altogether avoided I could not myself take any formal part in any such mission, and I don't believe that this could ever be done.

In addition to that excitement there is the great risk

of teaching people to confuse faith—that is, the quite deliberate and conscious surrender of the soul to God—with mere suggestibility and readiness to believe what is strongly pressed upon you at any moment—in other words, credulity. You could not do a greater disservice than to suggest that faith and credulity are the same thing. It may be true that most of us acquire our faith through suggestion; the number of people who receive their faith through reasoning is always rather small. But the activity of faith, whatever its psychological history, is the conscious surrender of the soul to God, and mere suggestibility or the readiness to believe whatever is impressed on the mind from moment to moment is a totally different thing. Suggestible people are quite liable to hover between strong faith at one time and equally strong infidelity at another. While faith comes partly through what psychologists call suggestion, suggestion is, as a matter of fact, the weakest of all its foundations. Therefore my conclusion is bound to be this:—If there should be a claim made upon me to permit a faith-healer to conduct activities in the Church, and if I were to be entirely satisfied concerning the spiritual character of that healer, and could secure that certain conditions that I would try to make possible were going to be carried out, I should certainly not feel it incumbent upon me to forbid such a thing happening. But I certainly could not take any active step in promoting a mission of healing, nor give any formal commission to any healer who conducts his work in that kind of way.

But we have a duty in the matter. There is no doubt that we have in the Church neglected the connection that does exist between faith and health, and it is largely because of that that Christian Science, for example, has been able to gain so many adherents; for the practice of Christian Science had brought incalculable benefit to many people, though some of the fundamental theories

of Christian Science seem to me to be singularly untenable. There is no excuse for people who have got a better doctrine if they are producing less desirable results, and we have got to find a way of making the connection between faith and health as real as we see it to be in the Gospels and as the practice of Christian Science has shown it to be.

Health is our normal instrument of service to God. There are those, as I believe, who are called to pass through special discipline—it may be the special discipline of long sickness—and they may, by their example and by their prayers, do a service to the Church which really outweighs anything that they or the rest of us can do by what is generally called active service. If that is so, it comes to them as a special vocation. Normally we have to serve God by the use of our bodies, and we shall serve Him best if our bodies are vigorous and strong. Therefore there is a real place for health in the scheme of our obedience to God, and it is reasonable that we should expect to be assisted in keeping our bodies healthy —providing we observe the normal rules of health—in answer to our prayers and faith. And we need, as I think, to emphasise certain aspects of our Lord's moral teaching more than we have done—aspects which bear particularly on this topic. "Take no thought for the morrow what ye shall eat and what ye shall drink." The Revised Version says: "Be not anxious," but the tone of the original would be best conveyed by "Don't worry." And there is no doubt that worry, real worry, real fret, is a sin. It is a sin because it does not arise where faith is strong enough. Fear and anger are beyond all doubt great causes of bodily ill-health. If we can teach people to pray more about the things that cause them trouble and to leave them in God's hands, asking God to use them in relation to all those matters according to His will, then they will over and over again find a new physical

strength, because they will have checked the wastage of their nervous energy which had before been going on. And beyond that we must teach them to expect all manner of good things from God besides health, and if we can really implant that in their minds, having first cured them of the essentially moral disease of worry, the result will be either that in answer to their prayers God will put forth His healing power, or, if He does not, they will have so framed their prayers and dependence upon Him as to know that they are bearing their sorrows as His will for them, and in that knowledge they will find the strength so to bear them as at once to purify and ennoble their own souls and set an example to all around them.

Everything to do with bodily health or illness can be brought in, and has got to be brought in, to our faith and the activity of our faith in prayer and expectation. But the expectation must be for the manifestation in us of the love of God, and not that He will do for us what we in our ignorance might choose; and everything that we can do by our influence, by our conversation, and by our preaching to commend that peace of mind—that peace which passes all understanding, and which comes in answer to man's faith in God—will in fact be a real discharge of our ministry as members of the body of Christ, and incidentally will, no doubt, show fruit in the health of our people of a kind that will even astonish us and be an occasion for thanksgiving to God.

THE VOCATION AND DESTINY OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND[1]

The problem of Prayer Book Revision plainly makes it desirable that we should be thinking out again our convictions with regard to the distinctive character of our own Church. We have not only to think what is the fundamental Gospel to proclaim, which is the essential duty of any Church; but we must also have in mind a clear conception of the particular vocation and destiny of the Church of England.

It is clear at once that its vocation is in a special degree determined for it by its history. We do not claim that the Church of England represents or can accomplish all that is entrusted to the universal Church of God. Our very name precludes that. We are the Church of England. That is to say, we represent Christianity as the English heart and mind and conscience have received and responded to it. It is our duty to try to make that response ever fuller and deeper. But we cannot imagine that we are able to give exactly that emphasis or colour which can be contributed by other nations already included in Christendom, still less that which is going to be contributed, in the Providence of God, by the great races which have not yet received and, therefore, have not given their own interpretation to the Gospel. Therefore we have to ask not only what is the mission of the whole Church of God, but what is the mission of the

[1] Delivered to the Manchester Diocesan Conference of 1925.

Church of England distinctively in the discharge of the function of the whole Church. And the answer, to my mind, is suggested by the familiar fact that we are at once heir of the whole continuous history of Christendom and also heir of that new birth which is called the Reformation. Both of those must be borne in mind, for both of them are equally essential to the constitution, doctrine, and work of the Church of England as it has constantly represented itself from the time of the Reformation onwards.

There can, of course, be no sort of doubt that during the period which is called the Dark Ages—that is, roughly speaking, from the fall of the Western Roman Empire until either the coronation of Charlemagne or, on a more extended view of the period of darkness, the predominant influence of Hildebrand—the Church suffered a considerable degree of paganisation. Nations were brought in with singularly little teaching. Sometimes they were baptised in multitudes at the sword's point, and it was quite inevitable that they should bring with them into the Church many beliefs not only underived from Scripture but even hostile to the general spirit of the teaching of Scripture. And there was through all that period a ferment very difficult to trace because our records of it are scanty—and such records as there are have never been a subject of study with myself and, therefore, I could not trace it even so far as it is possible that it should be done.

But in the eleventh century there came the beginning of a great revival which aimed—as all revivals aim—at recovering the spiritual character of the Church and its fidelity to the New Testament. We, as we look back, think that we see many definite errors in the very programme of that revival. But there can be no doubt about the motive and intention of its leaders. It was a genuine effort towards the more spiritual conception of the

Christian religion and a recovery of the true outlook of the New Testament. One of its great features was the effort to secure something that should in its measure at least correspond to the Kingdom of God of which the Gospels are so full, through asserting the supremacy of the Church over secular affairs. The Pope who clapped a crown upon the head of Charlemagne in St Peter's on Christmas Day of the year 800 was undoubtedly wishing to assert, as his successors never failed to assert as a result, that the Emperor derived his authority from God through the Church and through the Pope as the Church's representative. We know that that endeavour to secure the kingdom of righteousness by merely setting the organisation called spiritual in a kind of supremacy over the organisation called secular or civic not only failed but was bound to fail, because, though the aim was noble, the method was inappropriate to the aim. But all through the early Middle Ages the spiritual movement dictated by that aim was still at work, and we must recover the perspective of history if we are to understand what some of the great emerging conceptions really meant to those who first formed them and commended them to the Church.

Let me take one that is at the present moment inevitably a subject of much controversy. Students of the thought of that period cannot be under any sort of doubt that the doctrine of Transubstantiation, as it was officially formulated and expounded by the Church in those days, was a most deliberate, a most genuine and for the time a partially successful effort to spiritualise the very gross conception of the Presence of our Lord in the Sacrament which was then prevalent. I do not wish now to give anything resembling a lecture on that doctrine. It has become to us very difficult to understand and, I venture to say, quite impossible to hold, because the terms in which it was formulated no longer represent the way in which any human being thinks. But those terms were

the best that could then be utilised and they were, of course, not invented for the purpose but were derived, as was the whole of the philosophy in which the schoolmen interpreted the faith, though with much modification on the way, from Aristotle. They depended on the distinction between substance and accident, where the substance is something imperceptible by all the senses and apprehensible only by reason, which was identified with the spiritual faculty.

In this doctrine, therefore, what was being asserted in the language of that time was a real spiritual Presence. All the material qualities of the bread and of the wine remained exactly what they had been before. The spiritual element, which they called substance, was alone changed. Now, as I say, that is a doctrine which, as thus formulated, I do not imagine anyone now can really hold, because no one thinks in that way; and if you adopt a special method of thought for dealing with some particular department of experience I should maintain you do not really hold in your mind what you express that way at all, but you are merely seeking out certain words in which to formulate it; it is not the way you think about it or apprehend it. Therefore, I am very far from desiring anything resembling a reintroduction of that doctrine. But I am also very eager that we should be fair to the supremely great thinkers who worked it out, though I believe that their aim was an impossible one to achieve. For what they were really trying to do—and I cannot help thinking this has happened at other times in the history of some parts of the Church—was this: they were trying to provide a doctrine which was intellectually acceptable and spiritually exalted, which would none the less give a sanction to certain popular uses which were valued by the people because they took them as representing some doctrine altogether different. It is, for example, and always has been the official doctrine of the Roman Church that when

the Host is carried in procession Our Lord is not carried round the Church because He is not locally present in the Sacrament and, therefore, the moving Sacrament does not involve any motion on His part. But I find it very difficult to suppose that those who greatly value such processions of the Host would not feel that their religious practice was deprived of what gave it value in their sight if that doctrine were strongly pressed home upon them.

One of the things we can learn from the past efforts towards reformation in Christendom is the unwisdom of any attempt which has in view this double object of both conserving something which is valued for one reason and at the same time commending that something to the more sophisticated members of the Church by explaining it in a way which removes what endears it to its adherents. For the Reformation of the early Middle Ages did not go deep enough. It was a splendid movement, but it did not reach the roots. And, consequently, it was followed by a decline which, I confess, is to me one of the most solemn warnings that the history of Christianity gives us.

There was hardly any period of more noble and glorious aspiration than the period of the earlier Middle Ages—the eleventh, twelfth and, perhaps, the early thirteenth centuries. Yet by the end of the thirteenth century that has nearly all gone and the secularisation of the Church has made great advances, and that decay which made the Reformation inevitable, if the Church was to be recovered, has well set in. It could not be, I think, that ideals so splendid could have led to a reaction so complete unless there had been something fundamentally false about the method by which these ideals were pursued.

Still, before we pass from that, let us notice a point of strength in that mediæval outlook. It aimed at and to a great extent achieved a comprehensive unity in doctrine and in practical aspiration. No doubt in doctrine this

comprehensive unity was reached very largely by the simplifying process of leaving out what could not be conveniently fitted in. But it would be quite unfair to summarise the great effort of scholastic theology in that way. More true would it be to say that it was easier then to reach a comprehensive unity because the life of mankind was not yet anything near so complex and variegated as it has since become. And the very success of the great schoolmen and particularly of St Thomas Aquinas in achieving that intellectual unity was to lay fetters upon the mind of the human race in the generations that followed. So strong was the intellectual structure they built that nothing short of an eruption in the mind of man could shake its foundation or what was erected on it. Magnificent as it was, its very magnificence constituted a danger. Indeed one desires to say that while we should aim, as they aimed, at trying to reach, if we can, or in the measure that we can, a view of the world inspired by Christ which really puts every feature of human activity into its own place, we shall immediately be on our guard if we feel we have done it with completeness. For it is not possible that in any period short of the last even the whole collective mind of the Christian Church should have reached the final apprehension of truth, and until that final apprehension is reached there must be and there ought to be some loose ends, some incoherences, some gaps still to be filled in. We ought not to have a complete system.

Something the same is true concerning that magnificent effort towards the unity of Christian civilisation which all readers of Lord Bryce's *Holy Roman Empire* must at least have learned to admire. Here, even mercifully, the achievement was never complete, but still there was the effort to bring within the domination of big unifying principles the whole life of all the nations. And on one of its sides the Reformation was the reassertion of the

right of a nation to live its own life and to refuse domination from outside where that interfered with its own characteristics. In other words, the great mediæval achievement was won partly by suppressing individuality in the spheres of thought and the spiritual life, and partly by repressing nationalism, which is individuality as expressed in the great units whose interaction makes up human history on the broad scale.

Now the Reformation came—as I have said that all reformations must ever come—as an effort to recover the spirituality of the Church. And to that end it took its stand upon two great principles—the supreme authority of Scripture and the duty of private judgment. I need not speak about the former. It was accepted from the beginning in our Church, and I cannot imagine a day coming when the Church will take its stand on any other foundation than the supreme authority of Scripture. The interpretation of Scripture, indeed, may vary both from one man to another, and from one age to another, but those variations, on the whole, are, comparatively speaking, variations of detail. Nobody supposes that Scripture makes any claim to set before us the whole truth concerning God and His dealing in the world. We have never tried to treat it as orthodox Islam has treated the Koran—that is, regarding all knowledge not contained in the Bible as useless and almost wicked. But its supremacy remains none the less, for it is there, and there only, that we find that teaching given, as the Writer to the Hebrews says, by divers portions and in divers fashions through the Prophets, which comes to its fullness, and the light, which had shone fitfully, blazing out in all its glory, in the Person of Jesus Christ. And along with that the Reformers asserted—please notice—not the right but the duty of private judgment. If it is a duty, no doubt it must be a right, and I should be very sorry to risk the affirmation that you will not find the phrase about the

right of private judgment in the writings of the Reformers. But the stress is not upon the right but upon the duty of every man sincerely to make up his mind what it is that God says to him through the Scriptures. He will do that in the fellowship of his fellow-seekers in the Church; he will allow to the witness of the Church's authority, if he is wise, a weight which will override any mere whims of his own mind. He will never set anything which has that authority on one side merely because he himself "can see no use in it" or anything of that kind, but he will recognise the duty of making up his own mind and of appropriating for himself, so far as the Holy Spirit enables him, the truth that is given to the world through the Scripture.

That movement of the Reformation, stressing the authority of Scripture and the duty of private judgment, was reinforced by the nationalism of the period. At first, private judgment being released from an authority, which had sought to be something more than spiritual, appealing to reason, heart, and conscience, and to become coercive itself, showed signs of rebellious tendencies; and private judgment was in much peril of leading to theological chaos. Again, the new stress upon nationalism, as a real and recognisable force in the life of man to which free play must be given, led to the practical ascendancy of Machiavelli, the burden of whose teaching, of course, is simply that the State owes no allegiance to anything beyond itself and, therefore, whatever is in the interest of the State is politically right. Consequently, also, there was a great tendency for religion to retreat upon purely individual life and conduct, leaving the great movements of the world, with which the Bible itself is so much concerned, not only in the Old Testament but also in some books of the New, to find their way as best they could, unguided by the Christian conscience deliberately directed to that end.

In such a situation and in a Church which is the heir of both those great streams of tendency, what is our duty? First, what is our conception of loyalty in any case. To that I would answer, first, loyalty shows itself in the determination to obey the directions of the authority to which loyalty is given, even when one's own judgment dissents. It is, as I see it, quite compatible with loyalty that a man should disagree with the direction given to him and that he should try to secure by constitutional means that that direction is altered. But it is not compatible with loyalty that he should ignore that direction as long as the authority which he has undertaken to obey continues to give it. It may, of course, be a man's duty so far to resist that authority as to give up any office that he may hold on condition of obeying it. He retains to the full not so much the right, as I have said, but the duty of private judgment, and he must not violate his own conscience. But while it is a duty to obey so long as we hold office on the condition of obedience, it remains, as I have said, perfectly permissible that we should by constitutional means try to bring about an alteration of the rules or the laws which at any time are guiding us. There is nothing rebellious, for example, in desiring in the political sphere an alteration of the franchise. It is true that those who urged the Reform Bill of 1832 were called by their opponents "revolutionists" and "rebels"; but most historians agree that they were the saviours of society and of the State. Wisdom in making changes when conditions require them is one way of serving the society to which our obedience is due. But, secondly, I would add that I think loyalty, while it does not require submission of personal judgment, does require a certain spirit of deference to the judgment of the society which we honour. That is to say, we shall always approach our differences from it with the expectation that, after all, it will turn

out to be right rather than we; and we shall fully admit that the burden of proof rests with us when we are at variance with it. If we are in sufficient sympathy with it at all to feel right in being members of it, then we shall expect that its collective wisdom will be greater than our individual judgment.

Well, now, with such a view in mind, we turn to our attitude towards the situation arising from this history I have tried to outline. The Reformation was something in the nature of a spiritual eruption. Forces in the human mind and spirit, which had been repressed and refused their natural and proper outlet, there broke through—in the main, as I believe, to the immense benefit of the Church and of the world. But such upheavals cannot be times for the most deliberate kind of judgment and circumspection. And, moreover, in a period of such upheaval there is a necessity for drawing hard-and-fast distinctions where, in fact, the truth is better represented by shading lines. When a great conflict is raging men must stand firmly on one side or another, but it is very seldom that all the truth is on one side and all the error on the other. Most often we have, as my father used to say, to deal with a situation where there are six points on the one side and seven on the other, and what you have to do is to find the side where the seventh point is and then go for it with all your might. That is extraordinarily difficult to do. People who ignore the truth which there may be on the other side have no difficulty in giving whole-hearted service to the side to which they belong, and people who are content to maintain a balanced mind and a suspense of judgment find it comparatively easy to appreciate the truth there may be on both sides in any contention. I am always impressed by the contrast in the Book of the Acts of the Apostles between the wise and dignified Gamaliel, out of whose wisdom and dignity there was nothing to be got: and the ferocity of Saul

breathing out threatenings and slaughters, who was then, indeed, upon the wrong side, but who, when he came by the grace of God to take the right side, showed the same energy and zeal and laboured more abundantly than they all. I am quite sure that at times of crisis there is a great duty on us of decision; but we must try to exercise that faculty of decision allowing, as far as is compatible with definite action, for all the truth that is on the other side. And as the crisis becomes less acute and the antagonism less bitter it becomes possible to recognise the shading off from one position to another and to dispense with some at least of the lines that had been drawn so hard and fast. Thus, if I may take an illustration from what we have been considering, it is at least possible that there were some things which it was right to discard in the circumstances of the Reformation conflict, which it might be quite equally right should now be permitted in a calmer day when the abuses with which they were then connected are less likely to be associated with them and when there is more possibility of calm reflection upon the principles of what we are doing. As I heard Canon Quick of Carlisle say the other day, as I thought with much truth, "The Church of England has repudiated the Papacy in vain if it has not got the right to change its own opinions."

But there remain the two principles which seem to me still fundamental—one, the authority of Scripture, as I have mentioned, and one for which I would rather vary the phrase now and call it the freedom of the individual religious life. This seems to me quite plainly a characteristic the Church of England deliberately adopted. The whole desire of the Church has been to offer the fullness of God's help to every soul but never to dictate to any soul precisely how that soul may best receive the benefit. It sets a high standard for the individual member. No doubt it involves comparative failure for very many

who might, by a more strict and more military discipline, have been led to a fuller use of all means of grace than in fact they practise under the Anglican system. None the less I believe the Church of England did deliberately adopt that attitude and I believe it did so rightly. For with all the dangers—in fact, humanly speaking, with all the certain loss involved—there is made possible in this way for all members of the Church a fullness of individual apprehension and appropriation which is almost impossible and is certainly discouraged under a system which marks out for men quite clearly their religious duties so that when they have performed these they feel that their duty is done. But that involves us at once in the necessity for a very sharp distinction, or at least a very carefully drawn distinction, between the means and ends of the religious life. Nearly all the points about which there is controversy in the Church of England are means to an end on which we are all agreed. We are all agreed that the end of the Christian religion is fellowship with God the Father through Jesus Christ in the power of the Holy Spirit, and fellowship in Him with one another. Nobody, I think, would dispute that the goal, represented inadequately, of course, by such a phrase, is what we all have before ourselves all the while. What we dispute about are means to that end.

Now that in itself should affect very much the temper of our controversy, for if we recognise that we are agreed about the goal we are seeking, while we may still differ about the utility or legitimacy of some means that are proposed, our difference will be one full of respect and affection. It will be the difference of colleagues united in a common aim. And I will venture upon a relatively controversial point which does not, so far as I know, affect questions under discussion. In regard to the matter of Reunion I find myself quite unable to agree with the proposition that has been advanced that as foundations

of the Church faith and order stand on a level. Faith seems to be perfectly indispensable and about that there must be agreement on the vital points, before union and communion are possible. But that we should agree about any necessary order in the Church for maintaining that seems to me, at any rate, less important and, I am inclined to think, not essential at all. That we must agree what order is in fact to be adopted is plain, for Reunion means the adoption of a common order. But we know quite well that it makes all the difference in the world in our approach to our Free Church brethren whether we say that the Church order which we recommend—and which many of them after all are ready to adopt—is the best for achieving the purpose which the Church has in view and therefore is to be adopted; or that it is the only one which constitutes the Church as a Church at all and that, therefore, as long as they do not adopt it they forfeit all right to that name. Between these two as methods of approach there is the widest possible difference, though in both cases, as a matter of fact, the result will be that the Church of England will be standing by an order that it has inherited. Then, further, this insistence on the freedom of the individual religious life must involve a large variety of interpretations of our common rites and our common doctrines. And there should, I think, be very much liberty given. It seems to me, that the spirit of the Reformation requires such large variety to be allowed; that the spirit of the Reformation had never achieved its goal until it worked itself out in religious toleration; and that religious toleration, having been achieved, is now a sacred principle.

But toleration has two sides to it, a restraining side as well as an emancipating side. For if a society is to tolerate officially two interpretations of any one rite it must condemn such methods of using that rite as imply the falsity of one of the interpretations it tolerates. You cannot at

the same time tolerate two interpretations of something, and also tolerate a way of following out one of those interpretations which inevitably involves the absolute falsity of the other. That seems to me to be really an almost self-evident proposition. But I find that people have very commonly not attended to that aspect of toleration, and that they are mainly concerned when they praise the principle of toleration to say to their neighbours, "Why can't you let me do what I want?" The real spirit of the principle of toleration is, on the other hand, to say, "I feel I should derive great benefit from such and such a practice but, plainly, I must refrain from it unless you with full goodwill can agree to my following that practice while we remain in fellowship together"; and then the other should exercise the utmost charity in his answer. As with all virtues, what we have to think first about is the interest of the other party.

Now, in fact, there is a great growing unity in the Church of England. Of course, it has ebbs and flows, and it may be, as I have heard said, that there is a stronger spirit of partisanship at this moment than there was six months or a year ago. I do not know and I do not much care, because you cannot measure such movements by months or years. But if you take a period of ten years at a time and look back there can be no doubt whatever of a great and growing unity, broadly speaking, in the Church of England. There is a greater mutual understanding, a greater mutual respect. Our controversies, through the accidents of history, are at the present moment more public than they have usually been, because we are engaged in action in which the public takes an interest and therefore the public is thinking about them, which it was not before; and therefore many people, becoming aware almost for the first time of strong differences of opinion in the Church of England, say that it is heading for disruption. Nothing could be

more widely remote from the truth. It is heading straight towards a greater and greater unity, not chiefly of mutual toleration but of mutual appreciation.

Well, now, this Anglican way is an extraordinarily difficult one to follow. But it is difficult with the difficulty of the ideal. Christian character consists of a balance of many virtues any one of which is comparatively easy to achieve without the others, just as, in the signal instance of the Pharisees in the Gospel, it is tolerably easy to set a high standard of conduct if you do not make much effort to be sympathetic with those who fall below it. Or it is easy to be sympathetic with those who fall below it if you do not maintain a high standard. But it is overwhelmingly difficult both to maintain a high standard and also to show sympathy with those who fall below it: and this is the way of Christ. That kind of difficulty is inherent in the way of any ideal and supremely so of the Christian ideal, and that kind of difficulty in our Anglican mission is itself some evidence that our feet are on the right path. Don't let us suppose that because, in face of that difficulty, there is an amount of disunion amongst us sometimes, which is not made equally apparent in other Communions which are adopting a method to my mind demonstrably less ideal, therefore the Church of England is either a feeble body or a body tending to its own disruption. We are steadily going forwards in the effort to do what is as difficult as anything can be—the holding together of different sides of a truth so rich that no individual and no group ever appropriates it fully. Moreover, we hold out, as is commonly said, a hand upon both sides to the other great Christian bodies. We can hold out a hand both to the ancient Churches of the East and to Rome on the one side, and to all those who with us are heirs of the Reformation on the other; and in that we have a position unique in Christendom, the full value of which can only be realised for the uni-

versal Church so far as we are true to both sides of our own tradition. And so I would say, do not fear parties. They will arise; they ought to arise. We shall none of us grasp the whole richness of the Gospel as the Church of England has understood it and is learning more fully to understand it. And, of course, we shall act most easily and most effectively in combination with those whose angle of vision is much the same as our own. So groups will spring up and there will be parties. We do not fear parties, but we do fear partisanship—we do fear, that is, the spirit which tends to think of the other groups in our one Church as anything other than comrades and allies. We fear anything which leads us to regard them as our opponents. What we seek to possess in fuller measure even than now is the unity of friends of different opinions and temperaments who, because of their diversity, are able to enrich each other.

And there is paid to this Church of England from outside a very singular regard, a regard out of all proportion to our magnitude as measured by numbers. That was shown, for example, rather markedly at the recent conference at Stockholm, where one of the most prominent Lutheran theologians of the time asked to be allowed to make his communion with the Church of England because of his profound sense of all that the Church of England has in store for the Christendom of the future. And those who have had the opportunity of special intercourse with the leaders of the different bodies on the Continent all assure us of the wistful gaze they are directing from the one side and the other towards this Church of England with its marvellous richness and its balance of various elements which elsewhere have fallen asunder. Here is something of quite extraordinary value not only to us but to the world and to the purpose of God; and we are its trustees.

Or, again, think of the position we hold in the field of

missionary enterprise. Here, again, it is the fact—almost embarrassing in the honour it brings us—that the other Christian bodies are looking to us to discharge a responsibility which, if we judge by human standards of calculation, is utterly beyond our capacity as it is also out of proportion to our numerical status in Christendom. We make a great blunder if we leave out of sight all the great missionary work done by the other Christian bodies; and sometimes our outlook in that respect has been insular and narrow. But whilst it is our duty certainly to take into account all the magnificent service they are rendering, we must be stimulated to a new sense of responsibility as we realise the position which, by the mere pressure of events, is falling to us with regard to the evangelisation of the world.

So, then, I hope that we may approach the coming year, with its critical decisions about the foundation of our Church's worship, filled with a sense that God has a great and high vocation for this Church of England, that he has marked it out by its history for the discharge of a task as difficult as it is noble, that we shall be very careful how in our traditional English way we speak in belittling tones of that to which we belong because it is ours, and that, at any rate, deep in our hearts there should be a great conviction of the glory which really does belong to this Church, if not in what we have achieved then at least in what God has pointed out so plainly as His purpose for us. And we pray in the words of the familiar Collect that He will indeed so "stir up the wills of His faithful people" that we may be not altogether unworthy of so noble an inheritance, that we may not let pass by unused so glorious an opportunity.

THE OBLIGATION OF WORSHIP[1]

All thoughtful Christians are deeply concerned in our time as they watch certain changes coming over the habits of our people—changes which result from the great development in the means of rapid locomotion and in the provision of popular entertainments. Plainly these things can be used for good; but they may also be misused. It is their effect on the use of Sunday which is causing religious people the gravest concern.

Now I am anxious that in our zeal for the preservation of the blessings of Sunday we should remember that all the work of the Church starts from the acknowledgment of God's Universal Sovereignty, and our unlimited obligation to give ourselves, our time, our substance, in His service. Under His Sovereignty no limits can be set to our obligation, no limits at all. That is the basis of the whole work and method of the Church. It is also the source of a certain amount of difficulty in commending the work and methods of the Church because we are always liable to be confronted with the retort that all life should be dedicated to God, all times and all places, and therefore men may serve God by following His will through all their conduct without any special time set apart for worship, and without any society specially organised for religion. We know the facility with which some people, with just a smattering of Latin, will tell us, "*Laborare est orare*"—"To work is to pray," and one

[1] Delivered to the Manchester Diocesan Conference of 1926.

always wants to ask in reply whether they are quite sure that *their* work is praying. If indeed a man were to say that he had reached that pitch of spiritual development in which he was conscious of no transition whatever between participation in the highest mysteries of our religion and ordinary secular work or occupation, because he could so completely carry those things out to the glory of God, I should then, of course, have to say that so far as he as a solitary individual was concerned, if that was a true account, he had already anticipated the state of Heaven and I had no advice to offer him. I should however, in the first place, be very doubtful whether his account of the matter was precisely accurate, or, if it were, whether it was not so because his experience when participating in religious worship was of a singularly limited character. But even if he was proof against any such reply I should still have to say, "There are others who have not attained to this exalted spiritual state, and it is your plain duty, as a Christian, to be bringing this spiritual apprehension which you apparently possess in so high a degree into the common stock by taking your part in that order of worship whereby alone most of us are able, and, as I believe, any of us truly are able, to maintain undimmed our sense of the Divine Presence and the Divine Sovereignty." It is a plain fact that we are incapable of apprehending the Glory and Majesty of God while we give our minds to those occupations which it is none the less our bounden duty to carry out to the very best of our capacity during the greater part of our time. A man has his employment by which he earns his daily bread, and it is a man's undoubted duty to do his very best work in that state of life. For that he must concentrate his attention upon the immediate matter in hand. It is his duty to God to do so; but, just because his duty to God here requires that he should concentrate his whole attention upon something of a comparatively

narrow range, it is plainly impossible that he should, at the same time, be holding in his mind the thought of the Divine Majesty and letting that produce upon his soul those influences alike of humility and of spiritual growth which are the result, and the result solely, of some degree of personal communion with God.

And so what the Church has done, and not only the Christian Church but all religious organisations of every kind so far as I know, is to set apart certain times, certain places, certain persons, and certain things, as specially dedicated and consecrated in order that there may be no distraction calling us away from the contemplation of the Eternal and Supreme. In fact we cannot do without it if we are to maintain any reality of religious life at all.

We consecrate our Churches, we hallow them and set them apart from all unhallowed or ordinary uses so that all the associations of the building may help us to fix our minds upon the God whom we wish to worship, and to whom we all of us find it very hard to turn our attention with fullness and concentration of devotion unless we have such an aid. Almost always, according to the custom of our Church, though there is no law about this, the service for the consecration of a Church building begins with the singing of the Psalm, "The earth is the Lord's and all that therein is." There is no pretence that in consecrating a Church we are giving to God something that was not His already. On the contrary, because it is His already, with all the rest of His world, we mark it off so that here at any rate we may remember that Sovereignty which rules not only here but also everywhere besides. We consecrate Churches to represent and to remind us of the sanctity of all places. And the same is true about the use of Sunday. The principle of the Fourth Commandment is perfectly clear, and we have always to remember it governs the whole week as much as the seventh day. "Six days shalt thou labour and do all that thou hast to

do" is quite as much part of the Fourth Commandment as the demand that we should keep holy the Sabbath Day. We cannot exclude this Commandment from the scope of our Lord's declaration that He came to fulfil—that is, to complete—the Law. This Commandment, like the rest, is binding upon Christians in its principle. The Christian Sunday is not the Jewish Sabbath, but it enshrines the same principle—the principle of the Fourth Commandment. That is a Commandment dealing with the whole use of our time. All our time is God's, and we set apart the one day not because the other days do not belong to Him, but to represent and to remind us of the sanctity of all times. To that I shall come back later, but I want to carry it a little further, and show you how the same principle runs clean through the whole life of the Church.

For in the same way we set apart persons to represent the priestly character of the whole Church, and to discharge its priestly functions. Only they may do this, because only they have received the commission to act for the Church in this respect. But it is possible so to set them apart, only because they with all other baptised Christians are members of the Body of Christ, which is a priestly Body.

Once more, in the highest act of our worship, we set apart and hallow certain food and drink, that as we receive them we may be built up as living members of the Body of Christ; but this does not mean that our ordinary food and drink have nothing to do with our religion. Rather it should remind us that all our food and drink should be building us up as members of that Body, for the strength which we draw from all our nourishment should be used always and only according to His Will.

In all these cases there may be something more than the representative principle I am speaking of, but the

representative principle is there and is fundamental. It is the only way in which, in a world such as we live in, it is possible to secure any real attention or concern for our spiritual and eternal interests. Still more it is the only way to secure that these permeate the rest of life. And so we find this question of our use of Sunday is just part of the method, the indispensable method, of the whole life of the Church, and what is at stake, as a sound instinct has told those who are concerned about the matter, in the growing secularisation of Sunday, is nothing less than the real continuance of religion as a vital force among us. It is threatened from two sides. It is threatened, first, by the prevalent dislike of all kinds of authority and particularly all kinds of authority in religious matters. Everywhere we find people who are eager that their religion should be, as they sometimes put it, the genuine, free, and spontaneous expression of their own spiritual life. Well, I dare say that is what we should all like our religion to be, but it is not what the Christian religion is. The Christian religion is not the expression of our spiritual aspirations; it is the expression of God's revelation to Israel and through Jesus Christ, to which we have to make our response. Religion is not the free evolution and exuberance of the human spirit individual or corporate. The Christian religion is an august power shaping us according to its will, not something for us to shape according to our wills, and the first thing, it seems to me, we have got to get back to here is a renewed sense of the majesty of God, which I do seriously think a great deal of contemporary thinking and writing has tended to leave unduly out of sight. No doubt many of those whom I should accuse of omitting what seems to me fundamental in religion have not intended at all to do this. They have really taken it for granted and wanted to dwell specially on certain other aspects of the Divine Being which they thought

were being overlooked. We have had a great outpouring of religious literature in recent times which possibly takes this fundamental thought of the sovereignty and majesty of God for granted; it certainly does not spend any time in dwelling upon it or helping us to deepen our sense of it. There is a tale of how Emerson once invited Thomas Carlyle to become enthusiastic over the work of a young American lady writer and produced one of her books of essays. Unfortunately for Carlyle's appreciation of this lady, the first essay he opened began with the words "I accept the universe." Carlyle shut the book up and handed it back saying, "Gad, she'd better." There is a good deal of healthy sanity about that, and if it is so with regard to the physical universe, how much more is it true when we turn to Him who made the heavens and earth? We cannot suppose that anything emerging out of our own spiritual aspirations or cravings is going to be in the remotest degree adequate to the dignity and majesty of the Eternal. If there were no revelation of God by Himself, then, of course, we should have to go by what poor light we might then have. It is the whole foundation of the Christian Faith that there is an authentic revelation given by God Himself of Himself. We have not to ask whether this suits us; we have to ask whether we suit it. It comes to us, first and foremost, as an authoritative command. It is well for us if we can pass beyond the stage of mere obedience into the stage of loving response, but a religion is irretrievably weak which has once lost that sense of the Divine authority in life. So when we think what is to be the expression of religion in our own lives it must not take the form of asking what is the kind of thing for which we are inclined, but what is the kind of thing that really answers the Divine demand upon us?

The second great attack on the use of Sunday arises

from the way in which the spirit of individualism has, of late, been running riot. It is not so much a rebellion against authority but rather a determination of each one to live his own life, letting others live theirs, and expecting to be treated in the same way that he treats them—the sense that nobody's doings can be the concern of anybody else. This, again, is flatly unchristian. If the Christian Gospel is true we are members one of another. We have no right whatever to consider only what happens to be for our benefit or for our welfare individually. If on Sunday a member of a Church feels no personal inclination to join in the worship of the Church, still the duty remains of taking his part as a member of the body in order that the body may itself give its worship to God.

Beyond these there is also what we may call, if we like, a consideration of the higher prudence or, if you like the phrase, a duty to self. Even leaving out of sight the eternal interests of the human soul there can be no doubt at all about the mere worldly wisdom of the day of rest which is also a day of quiet. One of the most alarming things about the generations now growing up, or lately grown up, seems to me to be their apparent incapacity to interest or amuse themselves. Something has always to be provided for them. Now that represents a mental and spiritual impoverishment of the most serious kind, but it also involves a kind of perpetual nervous strain which makes difficult the formation either of stable character or of balanced judgment. One of the perils from which it seems to me we are suffering individually, and as a country, is some decay—I will not put it stronger —already perceptible in stability of character and balance of judgment. On the whole, no doubt, town life tends less to produce those qualities than country life, but if that is so then we ought to do everything in our power to counteract the damaging influences of town life while we also tend to strengthen what we sometimes, on the

other hand, tend to ignore—the beneficial influences of town life. But on the lower ground of mere physical and mental health there is great reason for retaining a day of rest and quiet when, if there are opportunities offered for occupying people's time, those opportunities should be of such a sort as can fairly be brought under the headings of rest and quiet.

The problem of what actually should be done with Sunday, and especially of how we should help children to realise the value of Sunday, is becoming extraordinarily complicated. What one desires, as it seems to me, for children is that they should take it for granted that Sunday is a day set apart, not made dull or dreary, but marked by special occupations with a fair proportion of time given to worship. As long as everybody was doing that I do not think any children were conscious of anything in the nature of compulsion in Church attendance. It was simply what happened, and that is for most people the healthiest way in which the sense of membership in the Church and of the obligation to fulfil that membership by attendance at worship, and in other ways, should grow. We are placed in a world where such observance of Sunday and Church attendance is by no means universal. If there is one family of which all the members go to Church, and the children notice that their friends from school, or wherever it is, do not go, and they begin to ask why they should, then what was a matter of course must turn into a free option or else become some kind of relative compulsion. It may be complete compulsion, or it may be a very strong expression of the parents' wishes, but plainly you are here confronted with a difficulty, because there is some objection, some real objection, to compulsory worship as soon as it is felt to be compulsory. There is a real danger that you enlist the child's sympathies and emotions upon the wrong side, and while an outward conformity is continued as long as

it is compelled, the habit is immediately abandoned as soon as the age of freedom is reached. That is a very real danger which we have got to keep in view.

I do not think it is possible to lay down general regulations as to what should be done, but on the whole we have still to aim at making children feel that this is what good Christian people do and, if we can, bring them to feel that participation in public worship is indeed a privilege,—something to be enjoyed and not rebelled against. A good deal will depend upon the attitude of the older people towards it. We want their example but we want that example to be, as far as possible, a living example. Let not the children have any opportunity of seeing that father or mother, or both, stay away from Church if there is not a child there to be taken. This is for the sake of the children if nothing else. It is part of that duty to our neighbour and to our fellow-members of the Church of which I have already spoken.

With two considerations I would conclude. The first is that I think we need to be very outspoken in our insistence that the observance of Sunday, as we have inherited it, is a priceless heritage and an inestimable boon. Secondly, a great deal of the failure to appreciate it comes from a wrong sense of the very nature of religion, from a sense that religion is, first and foremost, the expression of our personal spiritual emotions instead of being the communication to us of that august power which creates and maintains the world and in conformity with whose purpose alone there is wellbeing for men or nations.

THE LIGHT OF LIFE[1]

"In Him was Life; and the Life was the Light of men.—"S. John i. 4.

It has sometimes seemed that Christian philosophers and theologians have been too timid as regards the scope within which they have allowed the distinctive elements in the Christian revelation to modify the habit of their minds. They have tended to approach their subject with a whole apparatus of preconceptions, in the terms of which they try to interpret the Christian revelation and Christian experience. In an earlier age these presuppositions were usually those of Greek philosophy in one or other of its phases; in our day they are likely to be drawn also from natural science.

No doubt this is to some degree inevitable. The theologian is not merely thinking out the significance of his religion for his own gratification. He is concerned to find ways of exhibiting that significance to others of his generation. So he must of necessity find intellectual bridges between his mind and theirs; he must find common conceptions which hold in their minds positions at least analogous to, if not identical with, that which they hold in his own. But it still makes all the difference in the world of what sort those common conceptions are, and whether they are really germane to the substance of what is to be expressed or elucidated by means of them.

Plainly theology is a kind of thinking; it is thinking

[1] Sermon delivered in Great St Mary's Church, Cambridge, on Septuagesima Sunday, February 13, 1927.

about God. Now the mind has a very natural tendency to take its own processes as the normal material of its reflection. I am not asking that theology or Christian philosophy should be other than scientific and intellectual; when it ceases to be intellectual it ceases to be either theology or philosophy and becomes mythology or rhetoric. But no science creates its own material. Physics does not create the physical world; biology does not create living organisms. My plea is that theology and philosophy should give as much consideration to the apprehensions of reality which come to us through Art, and through religion itself, as to those which come to us through Science.

It may be answered that theology, at any rate, from its very nature, is bound to be concerned with the apprehensions of religion. And, in the most obvious sense of the words, that is true. But theology may easily falsify those apprehensions in the very act of systematising them, if it handles them by methods which are only properly appropriate to physics or even to biology. Religion itself is more like Art than like mechanics, and theology should be closer akin to æsthetic criticism than to physical science. In technical language this means that theology must pay as much attention to the connotation as to the denotation of the language used by religion.

It will be apparent to everyone who has read Canon Streeter's recent book *Reality* that I have his contention in mind. I regard that book as a timely and a most valuable contribution to theological advance. No doubt it is here and there open to technical philosophical criticism, and I personally regret that he should have followed Bergson so closely as he does in his use of certain terms, more particularly the term "intelligence" or "intellect"; for it seems to me important on general grounds, and favourable to Canon Streeter's intention, to insist that Art is every bit as intellectual as Science

itself, but that it represents a relatively final stage of intellectual process—the issue of the process rather than the process itself. The method of æsthetic appreciation and the method of scientific construction are certainly different, indeed they are exact opposites. But they are not alien from each other; like the convex and the concave they are opposites which mutually complete each other.

The method of Science is perpetual restlessness. It "explains" the object of its investigation either by setting it in an ever wider context of cognate facts, or else by breaking it up into its constituent parts and setting these in relation to one another in an intellectual construction designed to reproduce the structure of the original object. The method of Art is to concentrate attention so closely on the object, or on those aspects of the object with which the artist is concerned, that a real unity is established between the mind and the object. Science leads to a knowledge of the object from without; Art leads to a knowledge of it from within. But both are real apprehensions, real forms of knowledge. Moreover, there is just as much intellectual activity in the production of an artistic masterpiece as in the production of a scientific treatise. There is the same need for coherence, for relation of parts to a whole and to one another within the whole. But whereas for Science the process of construction and the validity of the process is the vital moment, for Art the vital moment is the contemplation of the result and its value. Science itself passes over into Art when the construction of any relatively independent department is complete, and the mind contemplates the object with all the new understanding of it which the scientific inquiry has brought with it. This is Spinoza's *Cognitio tertii generis* or *Scientia intuitiva*. This is the *θεωρία* which in a moment of supreme illumination Aristotle declares to be the *ἐνεργεία* of which *ἐπιστήμη* is the *δύναμις*.

But while Science is thus always ready to pass over into Art, it gives us before it does so the priceless possession of scientific knowledge, that is, the knowledge by means of which we may control Nature by obeying her. But it does not give sympathy, or the kind of guidance in conduct for which sympathy is indispensable. Here methods more akin to those of Art are necessary.

It is clear that this sympathy is only appropriate where the object of attention is another mind; and I believe that those are right who hold that all æsthetic appreciation implies an artist bringing us by his art into sympathy with himself. I believe that Lord Balfour is right in regarding the Beauty of Nature as a real ground for Theism, not because from Beauty we are justified in logically inferring a Designer, but because our attitude to Beauty turns out on analysis to be in itself a personal relationship to a person. But whether or not all æsthetic appreciation is, as I believe, grounded in personal sympathy, it is certain that some æsthetic appreciation has this characteristic, and that the kind of personal understanding which depends on sympathy is in itself akin to æsthetic appreciation, in that it is direct, intuitive, and conditioned by concentrated attention. Sympathy requires that we should think of the person concerned as an individual, as what he is in himself, not as a possible instrument for some purpose beyond himself.

Now there is a science of the behaviour of persons, and it is called Psychology. And there is an artistic apprehension of persons provided by drama and romantic literature. Plainly their methods are very different. The critic may take Macbeth and Lady Macbeth to pieces and exhibit their psychological mechanism; the greater the dramatist, the more thoroughly can this be done. But we know quite well that this psychological analysis is not a repetition in reverse order of the process by which the dramatist created his characters. Both the play and

the characters who constitute it are intensely intellectual constructions; but they were not intellectually constructed. Their unity is that of life which is not different from that of logic because it contains logic, but is more than mere logic. The mind working as inspired imagination projects from itself creations which exhibit a subtler logic than the consciously analytic or synthetic mind can call into play. The scientific processes of the critic can trace this subtle logic afterwards; but no deliberate following of the principles of logic would lead to a result in which variety was so closely and so vitally knit together in unity. The difference is like that between the machine and the living organism.

No one now disputes the value of psychology. And for some purposes it is indispensable. Medical science rightly makes increasing use of it; and it is fearful to think of the avoidable harm that has been done in spiritual direction for lack of it. Yet no one is likely to say that some study of psychology is necessary to the living of a civilised life; and most of us would say that some study of literature is thus necessary. Of course the chief way of learning to live among one's fellows is to live among them; but so far as further aids are sought, the psychologists would be the first to say that the dramatists and novelists can supply something which they themselves never profess to give. But that something is a just relation to the facts of human nature, and is therefore an apprehension of reality, to which it is difficult to refuse the name of knowledge. Indeed, there are persons utterly ignorant of psychology as a scientific study, of whom we say naturally that they understand human nature, or that they know how to handle men; and while, of course, many of these have not been wide readers of literature, it is indisputable that such reading tends to develop such knowledge.

To me it seems a mistake, and philosophically a

disastrous mistake, to separate this mode of knowledge altogether from the knowledge to which Science leads. Some writers wish to confine the use of a whole set of terms to our apprehension of the inanimate and the measurable, and to use another set of terms for our apprehension of quality and of life. For their own purposes they are at liberty to do so, but I think the added clearness is too dearly purchased. Quantity and quality are utterly distinct as abstract notions, but in the concrete they not only co-exist but are vitally interrelated, as is shown by the importance of proportion as an element in Beauty. It is true that the intellect can only reach its own ideal of absolute precision in the category of Quantity; but to say that the intellect cannot apprehend motion or life seems to me deeply misleading, as preparing for a false antithesis between Beauty or other Good and Truth. The mistake has been, as I think, to allow mathematics or other exact sciences to set the norm of Truth in the first instance. For if Reality is Personal, then Truth must be such as is grasped by modes of apprehension appropriate to persons.

This whole contention has important consequences for metaphysics and for theology. The attempt to present to the mind the ultimate reality, if that reality is conceived to be personal, will not indeed abandon logic, but will be conducted rather by the analogy of psychology and politics than by the analogy of mathematics and physics. The unity which it is sought to exhibit will be rather the unity of the *Civitas Dei*—the brotherhood of finite spirits united under the Fatherhood of God—than the unity of geometrical science or even of a dialectical process that has compassed the universe. This will considerably affect our treatment of the central doctrine of the Christian religion and the central act of Christian worship.

Under the influence of that habit of mind which I am combating it is often suggested that the Gospel story is

rooted in a condescension to human weakness. There is more than a mere suggestion of this in the well-known passage in *In Memoriam*:

> Tho' truths in manhood darkly join,
> Deep-seated in our mystic frame,
> We yield all blessing to the name
> Of Him that made them current coin.
>
> For wisdom dealt with mortal powers,
> Where truth in closest words shall fail,
> When truth embodied in a tale
> Shall enter in at lowly doors.
>
> And so the Word had breath, and wrought
> With human hands the creed of creeds
> In loveliness of perfect deeds,
> More strong than all poetic thought;
>
> Which he may read that binds the sheaf
> Or builds the house, or digs the grave,
> And those wild eyes that watch the wave
> In roarings round the coral reef.

Still clearer is the attitude of an earlier stanza:

> O thou that after toil and storm
> Mayst seem to have reached a purer air,
> Whose faith has centre everywhere,
> Nor cares to fix itself to form,
>
> Leave thou thy sister when she prays,
> Her early Heaven, her happy views;
> Nor thou with shadowed hint confuse
> A life that leads melodious days.

The suggestion is strong that the purest Truth, if only we could grasp it, is something highly generalised and abstract. The embodiment of it in a tale may make it acceptable to simple folk like farm-labourers, and brick-

layers, and grave-diggers, and South Sea Islanders; and even the cultivated young man who is not to unsettle his sister—(the poem is of the Victorian era!)—may find he needs the help it gives, and in a world of sin may "fail for want of such a type." Still the story is only a type; the Truth is vaster and (apparently) formless; and the really superior may dispense with the type.

Now if my whole contention is sound, the story is in principle capable of being itself the Truth in a fuller, deeper, richer sense than any concatenation of metaphysical principles could ever be. If ultimate Reality is Personal—Supra-Personal if you like, and can attach to the term a meaning which is not better expressed by Infra-Personal—if, I say, Reality is, at the least, Personal, then its expression can only be given in personal life. Then when the Johannine Christ declares "I am the Truth," He is not using rhetoric, but uttering sober fact.

When theology tries to handle this truth scientifically, it inevitably has recourse to terms in use in other connections. So the Patristic theology was bound to use such terms as Substance and Nature, trusting to the new content supplied by the new revelation to transform their connotation as might be required. This is not the time to embark on a discussion of the question whether that transformation was allowed to take place, at any rate in any adequate degree. What we watch in the formative period of Christian theology is indeed a perpetual expansion of the conception of God under the influence of the revelation in Christ; but, for the most part, it seems fair to say that neither then, nor at any time since then, have men, so to speak, integrated their Christology with their theology, or given full value, theologically, to the words "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father."

No doubt non-religious philosophy is in far worse case than theology in this matter. But non-religious philosophy can only be defeated and converted by the

demonstration that Christianity can provide a metaphysic which is superior as a metaphysic to any other.

Now there is not one point at which the view which I am advocating will make a sharp difference to the course of theological thought. But it will give to all of it a rather different tone and direction. Especially will there be a hesitancy to rely on those methods of argument of which the syllogism is the classical illustration; there will be little of either deduction or induction from particular texts. The coherence sought in the conception of God will be a constancy of moral character, not an argumentative cogency. That there is danger here of encouraging looseness of thought and every kind of sentimentalism, I do not deny; but it is not necessary that thought about a person should be less exact in its correspondence with its object than thought about a triangle, and while sentimentalism in the one case is possible and not in the other, it is not necessary in either. If an illustration is wanted of the kind of distinction that is in my mind, I would suggest the contrast in method between S. Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo* and Dr Moberly's *Atonement and Personality*.

But if our thought about the Incarnation or the Atonement is affected by these considerations, still more will be our thought about the Eucharist, which is itself a dramatic presentation. Here our thought can only be on sound lines if it is at least akin to sound thought about æsthetic, and especially dramatic, values. Here I must submit, without any attempt at adequate justification, that such values are only actual in the experience of appreciation. Shakespeare's plays are beautiful; but there is no good in that if no one reads them. On the other hand the reader does not create the beauty, but apprehends it. It is exactly because we are here in the realm of values—and for the actuality of any value appreciation is necessary—that devout people have been able

to interpret the same experience, some in purely objective and some in purely subjective terms. As usual in such a controversy, each party is right in its assertions and wrong in its denials. Indeed the Catholic tradition, which insists on the objective reality of Christ's Presence under the forms of Bread and Wine, has also constantly asserted that faith is necessary in the recipient if he is to appropriate the virtue of the Sacrament. Still it is undeniable that there has at times been an exclusive insistence on the objective Presence as a result of Consecration, which is on the road to magic; just as on the other side there has been an insistence on the subjective appropriation which has concealed the reality of the gift. The fact is that from the very nature of the matter, subjective and objective elements are both indispensable, and what is left of either when the other is removed is an abstraction only.

In that great act of worship we re-enact what our Lord did in the crisis of His ministry. We take Bread as He took it; we bless it, as He blessed it; we break it, as He broke it—saying the very words by which He connected this symbolic action with the death to which He had condemned Himself when He let Judas go about his treasonous work. Then we receive, as the first disciples received, the Bread so blessed and broken. In the context of those thoughts and memories the Bread becomes the vehicle of the significance of what Christ did that night; and whenever that context is revived, that significance revives with it. So the reserved Sacrament is as effectual a sign as the Sacrament received in the course of the Eucharist, for the communicant has the context full in mind. But such a method of communion should be rare and exceptional, otherwise the omission of any reproduction of the context would tend to suggest that the context is comparatively unimportant, whereas it is essential and indispensable.

The breaking of the Bread, which He called His Body, stood for the Death to which a few hours would bring Him. We do not, we cannot, repeat His offering of Himself; that is eternal fact; but by means of His own effectual symbolism we enter into the significance of that self-offering, and in union with it make the offering of ourselves. The Bread is still bread, but it is charged with new meaning. But it becomes so charged because we repeat, and know that we repeat, what the Lord did at the supreme crisis of His life. "In the same night in which He was betrayed, He took Bread." There is here no miracle in the sense of something without analogy in ordinary experience; but there is here the supreme instance of that endowing of matter with spiritual significance and quality which is the perpetual achievement of all Art. As the water fetched by David's mighty men was hallowed by their heroism, so the Wine that Christ blesses and gives in token of His dedicated life carries with it the power of that life, and therefore truly, though spiritually, is to us His Blood: for that is what the word Blood, in a sacrificial context, connotes.

But so soon as the consecrated elements are separated from that context and from the purpose of communion, we enter a region where, I submit, all kinds of inference become illegitimate. That those who know the purpose of the Blessed Sacrament should show reverence to it seems to me proper enough; if any find that they are assisted in their prayers by offering them where they know that the Sacrament is in keeping, I can see no sort of objection to their doing so, unless they diminish their power of praying in other places. But if any kind of action depends for its legitimacy upon a doctrine logically inferred from our Lord's words at the Last Supper, it seems to me to be thereby condemned, because we have no right to take dramatic words as the initial proposition of an argument. The *reductio ad absurdum* of all such

arguments is reached when men discuss what happens to the Presence if a mouse consumes the species. The thoroughness of mind which led earlier theologians to pursue such inquiries is entitled to respect; but the fact that such inquiries arise at all is evidence that a wrong turn has been taken further back.

So my plea is for a theology which keeps close to the living Personality alike of God and of Man. The less personal our thought becomes, the further from life and the nearer to mechanism, the more we shall distrust it. We shall try to guide our steps by that light which is actual life, and ever more fully to appropriate a Truth which does not consist of propositions about Jesus Christ, but is Jesus Christ Himself.

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